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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE EVOLUTION OF A POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM:
A CASE IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

by



WILLIAM H. TAYLOR

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Evolution of a Policy-Making System: A Case in University Governance," submitted by William H. Taylor in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date October 8 1980

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to examine a single case of policy-making within a university organization in order to help clarify the policy-making systems that develop in response to particular stresses in an organization's environment. The case selected for study took place at The University of Calgary between December, 1977 and October, 1979 and focused on the issues of faculty appointments, promotions, and terminations.

The conceptual model for the study was developed from the literature on university governance and public policy-making. Selected models from each of these areas were examined and formed the basis for the "policy-making system" (PMS) model which guided the data collection and analysis throughout the study. Data, collected through examination of documents and extensive interviews with the key participants in the process, were analysed in accordance with the model and conclusions were drawn regarding the applicability of the models presented in the literature review.

It was concluded that each model contributed to the understanding and explication of the process but that none was sufficient in itself as an explanation of the observed phenomena. It was further concluded that policy-making in universities can be viewed as a network of policy-making systems, each of which is temporary in nature and is initiated in response to stresses in the institution's operating environment. Each policy-making system is itself a network of issues

and actors who function in interaction with their environment, progressing in a heuristic manner toward a vaguely defined policy goal.'

Finally, several implications for practitioners were suggested and a number of hypotheses, which could form the basis for further research, were stated.

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Chapter 1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

For several years Canadian universities have experienced static enrolments accompanied by severely restricted operating budgets. In an attempt to adjust to these new conditions, many institutions have reconsidered policies related to the appointment, promotion, and termination of academic faculty. Since academic staff salaries represent the largest, single expenditure in any university budget, it seems appropriate to examine the impact of current policies and practices in this area and to formulate policies which may enable universities to adapt to a changing environment.

During 1978, the University of Calgary undertook such an examination and over the subsequent one and one half years, formulated and adopted several new policies. This process of policy-making involved a large number of participants, touched on many related issues, and was seen by numerous observers to be a significant effort to cope with a perceived threat in the organization's environment. Thus, an excellent opportunity was afforded to examine, in detail, the mechanisms by which universities reach policy decisions.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to examine a single case of

policy-making within a university organization in order to help clarify the policy-making systems that develop in response to particular stresses in an organization's environment.

The study addressed specific questions in each of the following categories:

A. The Environment

1. What particular stresses in the environment evoked the policy-making system?
2. How did the environment influence the process that developed within the policy-making system?
3. How did other policy-making systems interact with the focal system?

B. The Process

1. What major activities were undertaken during the process? Can these activities be categorized in terms of their function in the policy-making process?
2. In the early stages of the process, what attempts were made, if any, to predetermine the activities that would be undertaken in order to arrive at a policy?
3. How closely was that process followed? For what reasons did the actual process deviate from the planned process?
4. For each of the major activities identified:
 - (a) who were the actors involved and in what way did they participate?
 - (b) what issues were perceived by the actors?

(c) had the environment changed significantly from the previous major activity?

(d) what exchanges took place between actors and the environment?

(e) what were the boundaries of the policy-making system and had they shifted from the previous activity?

C. The Actors

1. On what basis were actors included in or excluded from the process?
2. Did the actors perceive themselves and others as representing specific interest groups?
3. Were the actors predisposed to particular policy alternatives and to what extent did they feel the final policy statement incorporated their preferences?
4. Did the actors adopt strategies through which they could influence the outcome of the process? Did other actors recognize such strategies?
5. Were actors perceived by themselves and other actors to have more or less power in relation to specific issues and in relation to other actors?

D. The Issues

1. How was the primary issue initially identified and through what means did the issue become the legitimate focus of a policy-making activity?
2. Were the issues clearly defined when the process began

and did the definitions remain constant or were they redefined during the course of policy development?

3. How were the issues interrelated, both within and between the system and its environment?

E. The Outcome

1. Did the actors perceive that the outcomes (or policy statements) resolved the issues as they had identified them?
2. In what manner were the outcomes interrelated?
3. To what extent were the outcomes logically consistent?

NATURE OF THE STUDY

This thesis is viewed as a policy study focussing on the processes by which policies are made. While such studies may address a range of topics, for example, the evaluation of policy outcomes or the analysis of implementation processes, there is also a need to understand the process by which choices are actually made between alternative policies. Jenkins (1978:23) went so far as to suggest that "the process of choice may be as important as the actual choice itself." Although the content of the decision process was not ignored in this study, the emphasis was on the description and interpretation of the process which resulted in a statement of policy. This differentiation between process and content was addressed by Lasswell (1971:1) in his definition of the field of policy sciences: "policy sciences are concerned with knowledge of and in the decision processes of the public and civic order." The focus of the present study was

upon the improvement of knowledge *of* the decision processes while still analysing the knowledge or information that went into the process.

Lasswell's definition raises the question of whether or not the present study falls into the realm of the policy sciences. On the basis of its focus on the decision processes it is clearly within the definition. However, "the public and civic order" is often interpreted to refer to the arena of elected officials at some level of government (local, provincial, or national) together with their appointed officials. Only to the extent that publicly supported universities can be considered within the public arena and subject to many of the same forces as government agencies or departments can this study be viewed as research in the policy sciences. In any case, much of the theory and methodology appears to be applicable to a university policy environment and has been incorporated into the research.

The study can perhaps best be described as overlapping the two fields of the policy sciences and organizational theory, and, more specifically, that branch of organizational theory which concentrates on the administration of higher education. This approach is consistent with Jenkins (1978) who repeatedly argued--in his book *Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective*--for a merging of the political science or policy sciences approach and the organizational perspective.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study was considered significant for the following reasons:

1. The content of the policy-making process in the case study was, currently, a significant issue in virtually all Canadian universities. A detailed description of the approach taken by one university to the issue of faculty appointments, promotions, and terminations may prove helpful to practicing administrators in other institutions.

2. Most theory related to the making of policy decisions is either normative or prescriptive, with a lack of real effort to understand how decisions are actually made. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976:246) pointed out that:

Researchers of administrative processes have paid little attention to such decisions, preferring instead to concentrate on routine operating decisions [and] although there is a normative literature on techniques for strategic decision making . . . these techniques have been unable to cope with the complexity of the processes found at the strategic level, about which little is known.

This study was intended to contribute to an understanding of how policies are determined in the complex organizational setting of a large public institution.

3. The conceptual model of the policy-making process, as developed and applied to the case, may prove appropriate to the analysis of other cases, thereby establishing a basis upon which comparative studies may be conducted.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

For purposes of this study, the following definitions have been adopted. Only the broader, more frequently used terms are included in this section. Other, more specific terms will be defined as they are introduced.

Policy--"major guidelines for action directed at the future" (Dror, 1968:12).

Policy-making systems--"any set of organizational and inter-personal arrangements which have evolved to deal with some identifiable class of decision problems" (Friend, Power, and Yewlett, 1974:24). Implicit in this definition is the recognition that, at times, a class of decision problems may contain only one problem and also that the problems must be of a major, non-routine or strategic nature.

Actors--"the set of people involved in a policy [making] system" (Friend et al., 1974:27). In order to be identified as such, an individual must have had significant interaction with other actors and must have possessed the potential to determine in some way the policy output of the system.

Issues--those problems which have become the focus of decision-making activities within a particular policy-making system.

University governance--"a formal arrangement for involving various groups or constituencies of the campus in a decision-making structure and process. The constituencies involved might be two or more of the following: the faculty . . . the students . . . the professional nonfaculty staff, the operating staff . . . the administrative staff" (Millett, 1978:x), and the governors.

Decision-making--"strategic decision-making" (Mintzberg et al., 1976:246); the non-routine, unstructured decisions which are important to the organization "in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set" (1976:246). The terms policy-making and decision-making are used interchangeably in this work.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACSS: Advisory Committee on Special Sessions--a standing committee
of General Faculties Council

APDC: Appointment, Promotions, and Dismissals Committee--a standing
committee of General Faculties Council

AVP: Associate Vice-President (Academic Administration)

BOG: Board of Governors

DC: Dean's Council

FCE: Faculty of Continuing Education

GFC: General Faculties Council

GFC (Exec.): Executive Committee of GFC

GSA: Graduate Students Association

GPC: General Promotions Committee

Krueger Committee: GFC ad hoc committee on appointment policies

Krueger Report: Final Report of the Krueger Committee

OIR: Office of Institutional Research

PAC: Position Allocation Committee

PMS: Policy-making System

PRC: Program Review Committee

SLC: Students Legislative Council

TUCFA: The University of Calgary Faculty Association

U of A: The University of Alberta

U of C: The University of Calgary

VP(A): Vice-President (Academic)

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DELIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

The following constitute some of the perceived delimitations, assumptions, and limitations of this study.

Delimitations

The study considered events relating to faculty appointments, promotions, and terminations policies at the University of Calgary which commenced during December, 1977 when the Vice-President (Academic) presented the problem to the university president. The research was concentrated only on those individuals and groups which became directly involved in the policy-making process related to that problem.

Thus, the study was delimited to include only the policy-making process, thereby excluding such activities as policy implementation, evaluation, and modification, which were considered beyond the scope of the present work.

Assumptions

The following assumptions underlie the study:

1. That the policy-making process was sufficiently overt that it could be described and understood through the collection and analysis of related documents, and through interviews with identifiable key actors and observers. In other words, it was assumed that the process was not secretive and, therefore, that it left a trail of accessible documents, and that actors had little or no compunction about discussing their roles and the roles of others in the process.
2. That despite the acknowledged limitations (discussed later

in Chapter 3) of the case study approach as an experimental research design, the application of this technique to the policy-making process can lead to understanding which can further the process of theory building in the policy sciences and/or organizational theory.

Limitations

The following limitations are acknowledged:

1. The external validity (that is, generalizability to other situations) is limited by the choice of the case study method (also discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3).
2. The internal validity of the data is limited to the extent that: (a) interviewees could accurately recall and describe events; (b) they were willing to discuss the case; and (c) available documents accurately reflected reality.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The remainder of the thesis follows as closely as possible the sequence adopted by the researcher in attempting to answer the problems stated in Chapter 1. An extensive review of related studies was undertaken as an initial step, and results of this survey are incorporated into the review of related literature in Chapter 2.

Using this literature review as a basis, a conceptual model of the problem and a design for the study were developed. The essential components of the model and a brief description of the design are presented in Chapter 3 along with an analysis of how the study may contribute to the process of theory building in the organizational and

policy sciences.

In Chapter 4 the introduction to the case is intended to familiarize the reader with the setting in which the case developed and to give an overview of the major events in the case. These major events then provide a framework for the presentation and analysis of data. The data are presented in chronological order with the conceptual model serving as a guide to both analysis and interpretation.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of the findings in Chapter 5, in an effort to afford an interpretation of the entire process, rather than focussing on separate events as in the previous section. In addition, the final chapter outlines suggestions for further research in the fields of university governance and the policy sciences.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

The information discussed in this chapter is drawn from two major fields of study. The first is the study of higher education and, specifically, the models offered by a number of researchers to explain the process of policy-making within complex university organizations. Selected models of university governance are then compared with respect to several important features.

The second field of studies which appears related to the problem is that of the policy sciences. Although the policy sciences subsume all aspects of the development, interpretation, implementation, and consequences of public policy, only a selected number of models dealing with the policy-making process are included here.

The final topic in this literature review does not fall clearly within either field of study. This is the concept of open systems which has been a conceptual foundation for many disciplines and was judged to be appropriate for this study of university policy-making.

SELECTED MODELS OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

The complexity of university organizations has resulted in an array of models, each one focussing on different aspects of an institution's structure and processes. However, as Baldrige, Curtis, Ecker,

and Riley (in Riley and Baldrige, 1977:9) have pointed out, each model has a particular perspective on the decision process which is central to the understanding of university governance. Below, four models of university governance (bureaucratic, collegial, political, and anarchistic) are reviewed with special emphasis on presenting the perspective each brings to the process of policy-making.

The Bureaucratic Model

The ideal model proposed by Weber (1947) has formed the basis for the bureaucratic model of university governance. The organization was seen as a hierarchy with a rational distribution of authority and responsibility emanating from the top of the hierarchy. Stroup (1966), one of the main proponents of this model, identified several of the features of Weber's ideal model and found them to be present in university organizations. Among the factors Stroup thought significant and observable in university bureaucracies were that they: (1) feature specialization of personnel; (2) include competence as the basis for appointment and promotion; (3) provide a high degree of security to their members; (4) have a system of rules and procedures to govern their activities; (5) are characterized by a hierarchy of authority; and (6) are governed by impersonality.

Although Stroup (1966:39) found many differences between organizations of higher education and other types of bureaucracy, such as the military, business, and government, he concluded that:

. . . it may be stated that higher education is a bureaucracy and that by understanding it in such terms it may become more meaningful. It is too much to claim that it will be better liked, but at least it may be understood.

A more recent work by Blau (1973) concentrated on analysing the effects of specific bureaucratic tendencies on university organizations. Blau's (1973:279) study showed that while universities and colleges may have administrative structures similar to other bureaucracies, various elements of bureaucracy have different implications for academic institutions. He concluded that, although multi-level hierarchies have no apparent adverse effects in government bureaucracies they have negative effects on academic work. Another finding which contradicts much of the conventional wisdom is that large academic institutions in his study tended to be less bureaucratic than smaller ones. Blau also found that several bureaucratic characteristics tend to reduce the degree of centralization in academic institutions, while the opposite effect has been observed in other types of bureaucracies.

Whereas Stroup (1966) accepted bureaucratization of higher education as inevitable, and perhaps the only way to organize a large institution, Blau (1973:280) asserted that it has "deleterious consequences for educational performance" and should be resisted; that because research activities have largely been insulated from its negative impacts, "the most influential faculty members, whose primary concern is research, have no immediate interest in . . . combating the process of academic bureaucratization."

Baldrige et al. (1977:11) identified the bureaucratic model as having four primary weaknesses: (1) it explains the formal distribution of power and authority but tells little about the informal types of power; (2) it concentrates on the structure of organization but does

not explain the processes through which the organization functions; (3) it is static in that it does not explain changes in structure or process which occur over time; and (4) although it explains how policies are carried out, it says little about how they are formulated in the first place.

The decision-making process implicit in the ideal bureaucracy is based on a rational model. There are many variations of this model of decision-making but they all contain essentially the same activities performed in a logical, sequential manner. Dye (1978), when relating the rational model to policy-making, stated that the policy-maker must: (1) know all the society's value preferences and their relative weights; (2) know all the policy alternatives available; (3) know all the consequences of each policy alternative; (4) calculate the ratio of achieved to sacrificed societal values for each policy alternative; and (5) select the most efficient policy alternative.

The Collegial Model

Millett (1962) proposed a collegial model in a reaction to the hierarchical models then being considered. He believed that academic organizations were sufficiently different from other types of institutions that they could be better understood as communities rather than hierarchies. Millett (1962:235) identified the constituencies of faculty, students, alumni, and administrators bound together by a sense of community and common interests, and adopting a mode of decision-making referred to as a "dynamic of consensus." He asserted that a struggle for power in decision-making was inconsistent with

encouraging the learning process and that although the groups may have different views on many issues, the overriding concern for the well-being of the institution would lead to a consensus position.

The collegial model suggests that a hierarchical structure is not consistent with the faculty member's need to be free of organizational constraints in order to fulfil his academic commitment. The academic organization is, therefore, viewed as a community of equals rather than a rigid hierarchy of status and authority.

Baldrige, Curtis, Ecker, and Riley (1978:33) challenged the accuracy of the collegial model as a description of institutions of higher education and said that "discussions of a collegium are frequently more a lament for paradise lost than a description of reality." Millett (1978) also recognized the normative quality of his model but observed that since it was first proposed many colleges and universities have used it as a guide for increasing participation of students and others in the governance process.

The Political Model

Based on a study of New York University, Baldrige (1971) proposed a model in which the university was viewed as a political system. The basic model was developed in the field of political science (Easton, 1957:383-400), and modified to fit an institutional environment rather than the larger social context. The model adopts an open systems approach as a framework in which the social environment produces interest groups which make demands on the political system through a process of interest articulation. There is a transformation of these

demands into policy which is then executed by the system (see Figure 1).

This process of policy formation is the key to the political model (Baldrige et al., 1978:35) and is based on six underlying assumptions about the political process which can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Very few people become involved in the policy-making process. Decisions are usually taken by small groups of elites. The overwhelming majority of people find the process unrewarding and uninteresting and choose not to become involved.
2. Those who do participate move in and out of the process. Baldrige et al. (1978:35) labelled this "fluid participation."
3. Colleges and universities are fragmented into interest groups with different goals and values. Their degree of participation is directly related to the scarcity of resources available and, therefore, participation increases as interest groups attempt to protect or improve their relative positions.
4. In such a social system, conflict is natural and can be viewed as a positive force promoting desirable change, rather than a negative factor indicating a breakdown of the academic community.
5. The exercise of power by interest groups places severe limitations on formal authority. Thus, decisions are negotiated compromises between competing interest groups.
6. External interest groups exert a strong influence over the policy-making process in universities.

The political model challenges the underlying assumption of the bureaucratic model which asserts that rationality is the basis for decision-making. Baldrige et al. (1978) suggested that in university




Figure 1 A simple political model

(Source: Baldridge, 1971)

organizations it is difficult to determine *why* a decision should be made and *who* should make it (both accepted as givens in the bureaucratic model). In addition, contrary to a basic assumption of the rational approach, many options are not available to the decision-maker since they have been effectively removed from consideration by the actions of powerful interest groups. As a consequence, the political process produces complex decision networks within the university, rather than a highly structured hierarchy of formal decision-making. In this regard, Baldrige (1971:190) stated that "decision-making is likely to be diffused, segmentalized, and decentralized. A complex network of committees, councils, and advisory bodies grows to handle the tasks of assembling the expertise necessary for reasonable decisions."

In a later article, Baldrige et al. (in Riley and Baldrige, 1977:19) restated the basic political model of university governance but revised it slightly by stating that three features of the model should have received greater emphasis; paraphrased, for example, as: (1) the impact of routine bureaucratic processes on the decision-making process was underestimated; (2) the original model did not recognize the wide range of political activities which take place in different institutions; and (3) greater stress should have been placed on the impact of environmental factors. As well, "the model did not give enough emphasis to long-term decision-making patterns, and it failed to consider the way institutional structure may shape and channel political efforts" (Baldrige, et al., in Riley and Baldrige (1977:19).

In a critique of the political model, Millett (1978:15) pointed

out several deficiencies. The model did not pay attention to the structure and process of leadership nor did it present clearly defined structures or processes by which political conflicts could be resolved. Millett (1978:15) also declared that "the dilemma of internal political process versus external subsidy" was not resolved. He further implied that the political model may have accurately explained the governance of universities during the 1960s when student protests were rampant but that it may not be appropriate to the current situation where universities are forced to cope with declining enrolments rather than demands for participation in the governance process.

The Organized Anarchy Model

This model was proposed by Cohen and March (1974) in their report of a study of college and university presidents, commissioned by the Carnegie Commission. They claimed that universities belong to a class of organizations which can be called "organized anarchies" and that they share the following characteristics: (1) problematic goals--members of the organization cannot agree on organizational goals. "It can be described better as a loose collection of changing ideas than as a coherent structure" (1974:3); (2) unclear technology--the organization does not understand how it operates but rather learns by a trial-and-error process; and (3) fluid participation--"the participants in the organization vary among themselves in the time and effort they devote to the organization" (1974:3).

Cohen and March (1974) contended that because the public has been conditioned by education to accept the bureaucratic model and is

attracted by its rational basis, it is difficult to adopt the organized anarchy view of organizations. The authors proposed that society now needs to develop normative theories to address the following problems: How can intelligent decisions be made when organizational goals are ambiguous? and how can one cope with the fluid participation of organizational members? Finally, they said that society must have a new theory of management since the current approach to managing organizations is based on "well-defined goals and technology, as well as substantial participant involvement in the affairs of the organization" (Cohen and March, 1974:4).

The garbage can model. The organized anarchy model also provided a description of the decision-making processes operative in universities. These processes were explained by a "garbage can" model which views a decision as an outcome of the interrelationships of several quite independent "streams" within the organization (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972:3). These streams are problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. In contrast to the traditional, rational approach to decision-making, in a garbage can model these streams are all thrown in together and decisions result from the somewhat random possibility of one element "sticking" to another. Consequently, a solution may be available and just waiting for a problem to come along, or a problem and solution may be awaiting a choice opportunity. If the solution, problem, and participant come together when a choice opportunity occurs, then a decision can be made which will resolve the problem (that is, a problem will be attached to

an appropriate solution).

However, Cohen et al.'s (1972) studies of university organizations indicated that most decisions were not made by "resolution" (resolving to take a specific action) but rather were made by "oversight" or by "flight." Oversight occurs when a choice is made without any attention to existing problems--nothing is resolved because all problems are attached to other choices. Flight was explained as:

. . . choices are associated with problems (unsuccessfully) for some time until a choice "more attractive" to the problem comes along. The problem leaves the choice, and thereby makes it possible to make the decision. The decision resolves no problems (they having now attached themselves to a new choice). (Cohen, et al., 1972:83)

In addition to their description of the decision process, Cohen et al. (1972) hypothesized relationships among several attributes of organizational structures, particularly as they relate to a reduction of "organizational slack." Slack was defined as "the difference between the resources of the organization and the combination of demands made on it" (Cohen et al., 1972:12). Two sets of these relationships appear particularly pertinent to this study and are discussed below.

Relationship between slack, heterogeneity, and access structure.

Heterogeneity refers to the degree of difference in values held by organizational members. Since lack of consistency is a characteristic of the organized anarchy, one would expect some level of heterogeneity to exist; however, the degree may vary depending upon certain characteristics of the organization.

The other feature requiring definition is the access structure. This refers to the relationship between problems and choice situations

and is described by the authors in terms of three pure types (Cohen et al., 1972:5): (1) "unsegmented" access, where any problem has access to any active choice; (2) "hierarchical" access, where important problems have access to many choices and conversely important choices are accessible only to important problems; and (3) "specialized" access, where each problem has access only to one choice and each choice is accessible only to two problems.

The hypothesized relationships among these three variables are shown in Figure 2, and the following explanation is provided:

Slack, by providing resource buffers between parts of the organization, is essentially a substitute for technical and value homogeneity. As heterogeneity increases, holding slack constant, the access structure shifts from an unsegmented to a specialized to a hierarchical structure. Similarly, as slack decreases, holding heterogeneity constant, the access structure shifts from an unsegmented to a specialized to a hierarchical structure. (Cohen et al., 1972:12)

North American universities are currently experiencing a decrease of slack as a result of decreasing financial resources. If there is no accompanying change in the heterogeneity of technology and values, institutions will probably move toward a hierarchical access structure.

Relationships among administrative power, interrelationship of problems, and the decision structure. Administrative power refers to "the extent to which the formal administrators are conceded substantial authority" (Cohen et al., 1972:13) while interrelationship of problems is determined by the participants' perceptions. As with access structure, the decision structure is explained by reference to three pure types: (1) unsegmented decisions in which any decision-maker can




Figure 2 Hypothesized relationship between slack, heterogeneity, and the access structure of an organization

(Source: Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972:12)

participate in any active choice; (2) hierarchical decisions, in which important choices must be made by important decision-makers, who can participate in many choices; and (3) specialized decisions, in which each decision-maker is associated with a single choice and each choice has a single decision-maker.

The relationships are shown in Figure 3 and are described (Cohen et al., 1972:13) as follows:

It is assumed that high administrative power or high interrelation of problems will lead to hierarchical decision structures, that moderate power and low interrelation of power leads to specialized decision structures, and that relatively low administrative power, combined with moderate problem interrelation, leads to unsegmented decision structures.

Comparison of the Governance Models

Riley and Baldrige (1977:21) presented a comparison of the bureaucratic, collegial, and political models which is expanded in Figure 4 to include the organized anarchy model. The four models appear to fall on a continuum ranging from a highly organized, sequential process (bureaucratic) to a highly disorganized, random process (organized anarchy). The collegial model reflects a process of decision-making very similar to that of the bureaucratic, with the significant difference being in "who" makes the policy or decision rather than "how" it is made. Within the collegial model, the professional members of the organization (the faculty) are more directly involved in the process whereas in the bureaucratic model administrators have the primary responsibility.

The political model differs significantly from the previous




Figure 3 Hypothesized relationship among administrative power, interrelationship of problems, and the decision structure of an organization

(Source: Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972:13)

	Bureaucratic		Collegial	Political	Organized Anarchy
Assumptions about structure	Hierarchical bureaucracy		Community of peers	Fragmented, complex professional federation	Lacks coherent structure; unclear technology: structure changes in response to market demand for personnel, heterogeneity of values, and organizational slack
Social	Unitary: integrated by formal system		Unitary: integrated by peer consensus	Pluralistic: encompasses different interest groups with divergent values	Pluralistic: problematic goals: fluid participation of members in decision-making
Basic theoretical foundations	Weberian bureaucracy, classic studies of formal systems		Professionalism literature, human-relations approach to organization	Conflict analysis, interest group theory, community power literature	Simulation modelling, organizational power distribution
View of decision-making process	"Rational" decision-making; standard operating procedures		Shared collegial decision: consensus, community participation	Negotiation, bargaining, political influence, political brokerage, external influence	Organization operates on trial and error; few problems are solved by resolution; rather, by "flight" or "oversight".
Cycle of decision-making	Problem definition; search for alternatives; evaluation of alternatives; calculus; choice; implementation		As in bureaucratic model, but in addition stresses the involvement of professional peers in the process	Emergence of issue out of social context; interest articulation; conflict; legislative process, implementation of policy; feedback	Random activity, dependent on problems, solution, and participants meeting at choice opportunities

Figure 4 Selected models of university governance
(After Riley and Baldrige, 1977:21)

two because of the iterative (as opposed to sequential) nature of the political decision process and because of its emphasis on the resolution of conflict as a central part of the decision-making process. The bureaucratic and collegial models assume that organizations can be conflict-free, and not requiring a mechanism such as bargaining in the decision-making process. Although conflict is not addressed directly in the "garbage-can" model of decision-making, it is implied that participants will choose to avoid conflicts which may arise when decisions are made by "resolution" rather than by "oversight" or "flight." Cohen and March (1974) found that resolution was the decision style used least frequently in colleges and universities.

In order to provide other points of reference, the following section presents additional models of decision-making from the policy sciences.

MODELS FROM THE POLICY SCIENCES

Several models of policy-making can be taken from the policy sciences; however, many of them--such as the rational, the political, the group, and the elite models--are already represented in the models of university governance. Below are discussed four models relevant to the study: (1) incrementalism; (2) the public policy flow model; (3) the policy system as a vehicle for decision-making; and (4) the structure of unstructured decisions.

Incrementalism

One model which is not clearly represented is "incrementalism"

or "disjointed incrementalism" as it was first described by Lindblom (1959:79-88). Incrementalism was proposed as an explanation for the process by which public policy is developed in the United States. Lindblom concluded that current models (primarily rational or economic-rational models) were normative in nature, addressing the problem of how policies ought to be made rather than how they are made.

In their first, full explanation of the model, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963:48-54) rejected the rational model on the basis that it is unable to adapt in any specific way to eight factors: (1) man's limited intellectual capacities; (2) his limited knowledge; (3) the costliness of analysis; (4) the analyst's inevitable failure to construct a complete rational-deductive system or welfare function; (5) the interdependencies between fact and value; (6) the openness of the system to be analysed; (7) the analyst's need for strategic sequences to guide analysis and evaluation; or (8) the diversity of forms in which policy problems actually arise.

For these reasons, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963:79-88) argued for an incremental model based on the principle that new policies will be incremental adjustments to existing policies and practices. In determining these changes, a restricted variety of alternatives is considered and a restricted number of consequences are examined.

Another major deviation from the rational model is in the relationship between objectives and policies. The rational model views policies as the means to accomplish stated ends, whereas in the incremental model "what we establish as policy objectives we derive in large part from an inspection of our means" (Braybrooke and Lindblom,

1963:93). Objectives are not set as a first step in the process and then held constant through the process of policy formulation but, rather, are continually adjusted on the basis of the feasibility and relative costliness of alternative means or policy options.

Another feature of the incremental model is its tendency to reconstruct or even transform problems on the basis of shifting interpretations of data. The same data may be translated into two very different views of a problem, depending upon a shift in the values of the policy analyst or policy-maker. This reconstructive treatment of data has resulted in a common use of "themes" rather than "rules" as a strategy in the expression of values. For example, rather than stating that any single value *must* be included in the policy, it may be stated that the value should be given "serious consideration." This preference allows for future reconstruction of the problems with minimum difficulty, maximizing the "opportunities that are latent in the multiplicity and fluidity of values" (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963:99).

As a consequence of the incremental strategy, policy-making tends to be remedial in nature. Policies are often designed to move away from problems in the system, rather than moving toward some known objective. In addition, the analysis and evaluation of policy is likely to be fragmented with different and possibly conflicting approaches being taken at a large number of centres throughout the system. This apparent lack of coordination led to the use of the adjective "disjointed" in describing the model.

As a strategy for decision-making, incrementalism is clearly

in conflict with both the bureaucratic and collegial models of university governance which incorporate the rational approach. There does not, however, appear to be inconsistencies between incrementalism and the political model. The processes of political negotiation and bargaining could occur within a framework where the decision-makers restrict themselves only to incremental changes to existing policies. The same decision-makers may, on other occasions, adopt a non-incremental approach and opt for radical departures from the status quo.

The final model of university governance, organized anarchy, is more difficult to relate to incrementalism. Perhaps the major contrast is that while incrementalism assumes a degree of rationality and conscious choice between alternative policies, organized anarchy assumes a random coalescence of problems and solutions, with little or no effort by participants actively to resolve problems. However, the organized anarchy or garbage can model does not disallow decisions by resolution, implying that occasionally the decision-maker may adopt either the ideal rational or the incremental model.

The Public Policy Flow Model

This model of public policy-making was proposed because the authors (Simmons, Davis, Chapman, and Sager, 1974:460) concluded that "it is necessary to view public policy-making in a way different from current scholarship." In their view, a model must be able to accommodate the complex networks of social interaction and the collectivity of decisions which are essential components of the process. The process should be seen as separate from, yet interrelated with, the

more permanent components of government, since "legislative, judicial, and administrative boundaries are transcended by the policy-making process, even though each remains a fundamental part of the process" (Simmons, et al., 1974:460).

Simmons et al. (1974:460) proposed, as a means of understanding the process, the adoption of a "Policy Flow Model," which they described as "a heuristic model . . . having as its primary focus the relationship of certain elements and value choices in an interactive process which blends them together to produce policy decisions." In their explication of the model, the authors identified three primary components: (1) the actors and groups, (2) the policy environment, and (3) the interaction process. Actors and groups are identified by their involvement in "particular policy decisions" and are described by their "policy style." The policy style is determined by the actors' behaviour and actions in the categories of communications, commitment, leadership, and group dynamics. The model does not provide a means for classifying actors systematically according to their policy style.

The policy environment is described by the power arrangements that operate in a particular interaction network and by the availability and nature of resources. The power arrangements are influenced by factors such as the degree of dependence or autonomy of actors or groups, the nature of the affiliation between groups, the nature of professional staff, the financial arrangements, and the historical traditions of the actors and groups. The effect of the power arrangement is "to alter profoundly the ultimate values and thus the policy which emerges" (Simmons, et al., 1974:463).

The resources from the policy environment are designated as (1) intersocietal inputs defined as "significant social or technological innovations from other societies which contribute to altered perceptions of the possible" (Simmons, et al., 1974:464); (2) technological advances which alter potential policy choices; and (3) the generational dialectic--the value conflict between generations which may redirect social energy and purpose.

The nature of the interaction process is the final feature of the model, a process that:

. . . occurs through space and time and [which] at any particular moment may have one or several actors and groups providing stimuli to the emerging definition of policy . . . [and involves] specific contacts through time among actors and groups, as well as written communication and symbolic signals of other sorts. (Simmons, et al., 1974:465)

The authors recognized this identification and analysis of interactions as a primary concern in the model but have, again, stopped short of providing guidance in how such interactions may be documented or classified.

Figure 5 illustrates the interaction process in the proposed model, which is valuable for its conceptualization of the policy-making process. Its contribution is summarized in Simmons et al.'s (1974:461) statement:

What is distinctive about the model is its appreciation of the random, multi-channeled nature of policy coalescence; its recognition that policy issues blur and change over time, and its stress on the need for orderly research and field methodology which might enable the analyst to distinguish facts from values and identify crucial paths leading to policy formation. The model encompasses a range of processes which include decision and interaction, together with influence factors. It is tentative in design and will evolve as data and evaluation become available; however, it seeks to develop in this tentative way greater insights into the




Figure 5 Public policy flow model


(Source: Simmons, Davis, Chapman, and Sager, 1974:467)

relationships among individual actors, interaction within and among public agencies and their environments, and the context of value choices.

The Policy System as a Vehicle
for Decision-Making

Friend, Power, and Yewlett (1974) developed this approach to the analysis of strategic decision-making in the area of local and regional government in Great Britain. Their research was based at the Tavistock Institute and followed the open systems approach for which Emery, Trist, Rice, and other Tavistock associates are widely recognized. The objective of the policy system model was to develop a better understanding of the planning process which occurs when several agencies or corporations are involved, a situation that Friend et al. referred to as the "inter-corporate dimension." It was their observation that when decisions are not taken by a single corporation or agency but through the interaction of several somewhat independent corporations, the model of a hierarchical framework for decisions no longer applies. Such inter-corporate planning results in "a setting in which managerial and political responsibilities tend to be diffuse and ill-structured" (Friend et al., 1974:22). Therefore, rather than accepting the hierarchical model, these authors developed one in which a structure of authority and other interpersonal arrangements evolve to deal with a particular class of problem situations.

Figure 6 illustrates how a stimulus from the environment is perceived by an actor or group of actors as a problem and how an exploration for possible solutions begins. If a solution is found, a commitment is made to some course of action and a response is made to



* To DESCRIBE a policy system it is necessary to say something about.

- CLASS OF DECISION PROBLEMS within its competence
- SET OF PEOPLE playing roles in decision process for this class of problems
- PATTERNS OF RELATIONS between actors (mutual accountability, membership of groups, etc.)
- Set of RULES, POLICIES, OBJECTIVES, or PRECEDENTS acknowledged by actors as guidelines to choice within action space
- Relations to actors and systems outside this policy system

- ACTION SPACE
- ACTORS
- INTERNAL RELATIONS
- POLICY GUIDELINES
- EXTERNAL RELATIONS


Figure 6 The policy system as a vehicle for decision-making
(Source: Friend, Power, and Yewlett, 1974:26)

the environment. The model also prescribes the information which must be provided so as to describe adequately a specific policy system.

In addition to a description of the features within the system's boundaries, there must be an adequate understanding of the system's environment. Figure 7 shows the three facets of the environment and describes the interfaces between the system and each type of environment. The model suggests that the environment is described entirely by the actors' perceptions of it, rather than in absolute terms. These perceptions, in large measure, determine the policy guidelines of the system and limit the range of alternative choices actors are prepared to consider. However, in many cases uncertainties about problems and policy guidelines exist and will result in efforts by the actors to reduce the uncertainty. The model then differentiates among the possible responses actors make to uncertainty, with each type of response related to one of the three facets of the environment. Figure 8 indicates a number of "loops" through which uncertainty is reduced, resulting in alterations of actors' perceptions of the environment. The figure also illustrates the levels of policy systems, with one being a subsystem within a higher level system--a concept in keeping with the open systems approach.


The open nature of the model is also demonstrated in Figure 8 where interaction takes place between two contiguous policy systems. The two systems do not act as one but rather:

. . . it is more likely to be the exception than the rule that the relationships between the respective sets of problems are identified simultaneously within each system, or that the same degree of urgency is attached to the selection of an appropriate response. The two decision processes . . . will therefore typically be out of phase. (Friend et al., 1974:40)



* Note that actors within a policy system do not necessarily all have the same organizational allegiance. Indeed, they seldom do in public planning, where many classes of problem impinge significantly on more than one type of constituency interest

Figure 7 The policy system and its environment
(Source: Friend, Power, and Yewlett, 1974:28)



* Exploration of a problem in a wider context sometimes takes the process into a higher level of policy system, extending the bounds of both the operating environment and the constituency, and opening up interfaces with further contiguous policy systems. However, the higher level policy system may often be more 'open' in that policy guidelines are likely to be less specific when relating to more complex levels of problem.

Figure 8 Levels of policy system

(Source: Friend, Power and Yewlett, 1974:36)

During this type of interaction with a contiguous policy system, considerable energies will be expended on determining the process of interaction, thereby reducing efforts devoted to resolving the substantive problems.

Friend et al. (1974:41) also maintained that, as the set of problems becomes more complex, the "commitments to action will emerge incrementally, relating only to those problems where the pressures for decision are currently most insistent." This is partially the result of the actors' inability to establish acknowledged policy guidelines to meet all contingencies within the decision process. Such a situation of uncertainty leads to an active scanning of the operating environment in order to identify future problems which may be incorporated into the policy system along with related problems.

Complex problems will, in turn, lead to complex patterns of communication between actors. These patterns are described by the term "decision networks" within which each actor "has developed a communications linkage with at least one other member of the network, but is not necessarily fully connected to every other member" (Friend et al., 1974:43). These linkages are channels along which communications relating to alternative policy choices can flow between actors.

These decision networks are controlled in a variety of ways by the actors. Those actors involved in the manipulation or "switching" of the network are "reticulists" and play an important role in operation of the policy system. These actors have: "skills in selecting which channels of communication to activate at a given point in a decision-making process, . . . how much information to transmit through them

[and] must be regarded as crucial factors in the manipulation of decision networks" (Friend et al., 1974:46). The reticulists will likely have partisan motivations underlying the way in which they exercise their power in the system.

The policy system model was applied to the analysis of several case studies and led to the generation of several hypotheses relating to intercorporate planning in local and regional government (Friend et al., 1974:348). Although the model was developed for the specific field of local and regional planning, the concepts are of a sufficiently general nature that the methodology may be useful in other fields. On the basis of this observation, many of its features have been incorporated into the conceptual model in this study of university policy making.

The Structure of Unstructured Decisions

Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976:246-275) reported on a methodology developed for the study of strategic decision-making. The methodology was developed from the interpretation of detailed descriptions of 25 case studies in strategic decision-making. On the basis of their research, Mintzberg et al. (1976:250) concluded that strategic decision-making (which might be called policy making) is characterized by:

. . . novelty, complexity and openendedness, by the fact that the organization usually begins with little understanding of the decision situation it faces or the route to its solution, and only a vague idea of what that solution might be and how it will be evaluated when it is developed. Only by groping through a recursive, discontinuous process involving many difficult steps and a host of dynamic factors over a considerable period of time

is a final choice made. This is not the decision making under "uncertainty" of the textbook, where alternatives are given even if their consequences are not, but the decision making under "ambiguity," where almost nothing is given or easily determined.

Mintzberg et al. (1976:253) developed a classification system which refers to events as "Elements in the Strategic Decision Process." These elements or routines are sub-divided into three developmental phases, plus a number of supporting routines as described below.

A. THE IDENTIFICATION PHASE

1. *Decision recognition routine.* "The need for a decision is identified as a difference between information on some actual situation and some expected standard" (Mintzberg et al., 1976:253). However, recognition of a need is not, in itself, sufficient for an actor to take action. The decision-maker will consider such factors as the influence of the source of the issue, the decision-maker's interest in the issue, the perceived payoff, and the perceived probability of successfully completing the decision process. Mintzberg et al. (1976) also observed that an actor will be reluctant to initiate action unless he has at least one partial solution at hand, and that his willingness to act is directly dependent on his workload at a given time.

2. *Diagnosis routine.* The objective of this routine is to clarify and define the issues through an examination of existing information and a search for new data.

B. THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

Development tends to be the heart of the decision-making process, consuming more resources than either of the first two routines. The objective here is to develop one or more solutions to the problem

through either a search or a design routine.

1. *Search routine.* Four types of search behaviours were identified: memory, passive, trap, and active. "Memory" search involves the scanning of the organization's existing human, paper, or electronic memory. "Passive" search is waiting for unsolicited alternatives to appear. "Trap" search refers to the activity of letting others know you are looking for solutions (setting traps?) and then waiting for results. "Active" search is the direct seeking of alternatives in either the organization or its environment.

2. *Design routine.* The Mintzberg study suggested that the design routine is a complex, iterative process in which the designers do not follow a grand design but, rather, begin with some vague idea of the ideal solution and then work through a decision tree toward that vague goal. Organizations tend to design only one, fully developed, custom-made solution in each decision-making process.

C. THE SELECTION PHASE

This phase is intricately connected to the development phase since development often progresses in small steps, each one requiring a selection decision. Mintzberg et al. (1976:257) concluded that "selection is typically a multi-stage, iterative process, involving progressively deepening investigation of alternatives." The three routines identified in this phase were:

1. *The screen routine.* This is the process by which the number of ready-made alternatives is reduced to a number which can be more carefully evaluated.

2. *The evaluation-choice routine.* This routine includes either

judgement, bargaining, or analysis. Mintzberg et al. (1976:285)

described these modes as follows:

In judgment, one individual makes a choice in his own mind with procedures that he does not, perhaps cannot, explain; in bargaining, selection is made by a group of decision makers with conflicting goal systems, each exercising judgment; and in analysis, factual evaluation is carried out, generally by technocrats, followed by managerial choice by judgment or bargaining.

Contrary to the normative literature on decision-making, Mintzberg et al. concluded that very little use is made of the analytical mode. Judgement was the most favoured mode, but where there was extensive participation in the process and issues tended to be contentious, then negotiation was the favoured mode.

3. *Authorization routine.* This routine is evoked when the decision-maker cannot commit the organization to a course of action. Although authorization is usually sought for a completed decision, it may also be sought before an actor proceeds with a decision process. Authorization typically involves complete acceptance or complete rejection, with little effort to modify the solution. At this point in the process, difficulties are often encountered because the authorizers are generally less well informed than the developers and because outside political groups often choose this opportunity to exert pressure.

D. SUPPORTING ROUTINES

These routines are considered supportive to the three, central decision-making phases.

1. *Decision control routines.* These correspond to what Dror (1968) has called "metapolicy" or decisions about the decision-making process itself.

2. *Decision communication routines.* These routines include the exploration, investigation, and dissemination of information.

3. *Political routines.* These are political activities such as bargaining, persuasion, and cooptation which occur in all three phases of the decision-making process. Through these activities the power relationships between actors are clarified.

Those elements of the strategic decision process listed above provided a classification system in which all observed activities in the 25 case studies could be accommodated. However, this classification does not demonstrate the dynamic nature of the processes observed. For this purpose, a general model of the strategic decision process was designed by Mintzberg et al. (1976:266) and is reproduced here in Figure 9. This model allowed the researcher to map the sequence of all activities, including the iterations or "loops" that are a feature of complex decision-making processes. The model contains the three phases of the decision process (identification, development, and selection), but requires only that the first and last phases be part of the process. While the model accommodated the plotting of the classical, rational approach to decision-making, not one of the cases in the study followed the pure, rational approach.

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH

The open systems view of organizational structures and processes is the final topic discussed in this literature review. Many writers in the policy sciences (Dye, 1976; Jenkins, 1978; Frohock, 1979) have adopted this approach to policy studies, as have many organizational




Figure 9 A general model of the strategic decision process
(After Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976:266)

theorists and students of university governance (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Millett, 1968; Baldrige, 1971; Richman and Farmer, 1974). The concept of open systems does not prescribe a rigid framework within which to observe or analyse organizational or inter-organizational phenomena; rather, it suggests a number of general characteristics which determine or explain the operation of systems in the natural or social context.

Before examination of these characteristics, it may be useful to consider the definition of a system. Von Bertalanffy (1956) proposed a most concise definition when he referred to it as "a set of elements standing in interaction." Fagen (1956) defined it as "a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes." Kast and Rosenzweig (1974:101), writing in the field of management, expanded the definition by stating that a system is "an organized, unitary whole composed of two or more interdependent parts, components, or subsystems, and delineated by identifiable boundaries from its environmental suprasystem." For purposes of this study, any or all of these definitions are acceptable.

Characteristics of Open Systems

In their classic reference, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, Katz and Kahn (1966:21-25) introduced the concept by presenting nine characteristics of an open system. These are paraphrased in outline below, with reference to their applicability to a decision-making or policy-making system.

1. Importation of energy: in order to survive, an open system must import energy from its environment. In organizational systems this

energy may be in the form of people, physical objects, or information.

2. Through-put: imported energy is transformed by the system; for example, in decision-making systems, problems and alternative solutions (information) are brought together by people in some physical setting in order to generate a decision.

3. Output: within a decision-making system, outputs could be in the form of decisions or requests for more resources or inputs.

4. Systems are cycles of events: a characteristic which emphasizes the dynamic nature of a system. The system is not merely a set of interrelationships between components at a single point in time but is, in addition, a set of interrelated events which exist in time as well as space. Katz and Kahn (1966:21) foresaw this as a major methodological approach to the identification of systems, thus: "The basic method for the identification of social structures is to follow the energetic chain of events from the input of energy through its transformation to the point of closure of the cycle." In a decision-making system this involves the tracing of activities such as the identification of the problem and searching for solutions--which may occur in some cyclical pattern within the system--as a means of identifying or describing the system. The decision-making system in this context is an "event system" (Katz and Kahn, 1966:21).

5. Negative entropy: the natural move toward disorganization (entropy) is reversed through the importation of energy from the environment. Within organizations this implies that energy will not only be used to perform the "work" but must be expended to provide order and direction. In a decision-making system, energy must be expended on

such activities as deciding what to decide and developing a working relationship between participants.

6. Information, input, negative feedback, and the coding process: a system continually receives signals from its environment which may cause alterations in its behaviour. These signals are filtered (coded) through a monitoring and translation process whereby the system assigns its own interpretation to the signals. When such information relates to the system's past performance and its effect on the environment, it is referred to as "feedback." In a decision-making system future behaviour would be the modification if a previous decision was rejected by the organization; for example, if a university committee (a decision-making system) recommended a particular policy position which was rejected by the board of governors, that same committee would likely approach the next related issue somewhat differently.

7. Steady state and dynamic homeostasis: open systems tend to maintain a balance between inputs and outputs and, therefore, operate under what is termed a "steady state." The level of operation is not always precisely the same but rather is within a tolerable range. The observed tendency for certain systems (organizations) to expand rather than to operate within constant limits is explained as a need to ensure survival by building a margin of safety within itself. They also move to expand their boundaries by incorporating the external resources essential to survival.

The application of this characteristic to a decision-making system has to recognize its temporary nature. Organizations frequently

establish systems such as ad hoc committees on a temporary basis. These are contrived by the organization (and often include existing structures supplemented by ad hoc arrangements) in order to deal with a particular problem or issue, with an understanding that the system will cease to operate when a decision has been reached. Obviously, it is only during that phase of operation that the steady state principle could apply.

8. Differentiation: "Open systems move in the direction of differentiation and elaboration. Diffuse global patterns are replaced by more specialized functions" (Katz and Kahn, 1966:25). This tendency has been observed in the development of specialized roles within a group decision-making process and numerous other organizational processes.

9. Equi-finality: systems are able to reach the same final state even though the starting position and the paths may differ. The same policy decision may be reached by two different systems even though they have different informational inputs or have used different processes.

Loosely Coupled Systems

The interrelatedness of systems components dictate that it is not sufficient to identify and describe the components in a systems analysis. The linkages among components must also be identified and the strengths of the linkages assessed. The stronger these relationships are, the greater will be the impact on the rest of the system when a change is induced in any single component. While organizations

are assumed to consist of a close network of very strong linkages, Weick (1976) offered another view by suggesting that many components might, in fact, be loosely coupled. This loose coupling may provide an explanation of why educational organizations often appear to act in an irrational or unpredictable fashion. For instance, Cohen and March (1974) implicitly adopted the concept of loose coupling in their organized anarchy model within which there were very tenuous relationships among problems, solutions, and actors. Weick (1976) pointed out other elements--such as "intention-action" and "means-ends"--which may be loosely coupled, resulting in an apparently irrational process. He listed a number of consequences of loose coupling in organizations; first, that such organizations resist change in the environment. This is an advantage in cases where minor, trivial changes are resisted, but a disadvantage in instances where archaic structures and processes may be perpetuated.

A second consequence is that loosely coupled organizations are more sensitive to the environment since they have more internal, independent sensing elements. This relates to the third feature--the ability of an organization to adapt to environmental change at a localized level. It is not necessary for the entire body to change in order to cope with environmental stress. Further, if one internal unit becomes weak or dysfunctional, the whole system is not seriously affected. While this may operate as an advantage, it can also become a serious disadvantage since the loose coupling makes it difficult to take corrective action to repair the defective component.

In general, it could be argued that while a loosely coupled

system is well adapted to survive in a relatively stable environment, it is very poorly equipped to adjust to major environmental changes. It may also be poorly equipped as an instrument for change, except at a very localized level.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2

This review of related literature included several approaches to the analysis and interpretation of policy-making processes in universities and other public organizations. The process was described as bureaucratic, collegial, political, anarchistic, and incremental. Important features of both process and the environment were identified and various methodological approaches were suggested for their analysis. These alternative models of policy-making do not, in most cases, appear to be contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Although the models may not always be found in their pure form and may alternate within a given organization, it is likely that within a complex body, such as the modern university, evidence of all the approaches could be discovered.

What seems to be required, then, is a conceptual model of policy-making which will not, by definition, exclude the models already proposed. Rather, the model should provide a framework for the examination of an actual case of policy-making, allowing the researcher to explore in detail the interaction of the many components of the process and then to interpret the phenomenon by reference to the explanations already proposed or through the development of new insights. The conceptual model outlined in Chapter 3 is an attempt to meet that requirement.

Chapter 3

THE STUDY DESIGN AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

INTRODUCTION

The primary objectives of this chapter are to present the methodology adopted for the study, to provide a rationale for the choice of a particular design, and finally, to describe the conceptual model which was developed to guide the collection and analysis of data.

Before addressing those topics, however, it may be useful to identify the role of this study in the larger process of theory building in the social sciences. This process was described by Greenberger, Crenson, and Crissey (1976:66) in their analysis of the role of models in the policy sciences. An overview is presented in Figure 10.

The process begins with observations and analyses of the reference system (that is, the real world) which in time lead to the statement of hypotheses about the phenomena observed. These hypotheses form the basis for the development of preliminary models of the reference system. The models assist in the consideration or testing of hypotheses which are then either accepted or rejected on the basis of new observations. As a greater body of tested hypotheses is accumulated, the building of theory progresses to the development of principles and finally to the adoption of laws.

Theory development in the policy sciences is still in the preliminary stages. Most efforts to date have been directed toward




Figure 10 The process of theory building
in the social sciences
(After Greenberger et al., 1976:66)

collecting descriptive data and the formulation of models of either a descriptive or normative nature. Jenkins (1978:20) recognized that theory building in the policy sciences is in its infancy and suggested that many more studies of a descriptive nature are required before one can advance to more rigorous, experimental studies based on hypotheses testing. The present study was an effort to continue the theory-building process by compiling new observations of the reference system, offering an elaboration of existing models of the system, and developing hypotheses which may be tested in further studies.

METHODOLOGY

This section begins with a discussion of the case study method as it relates to the social sciences in general and to this study in particular. The discussion is followed by a description of the data collection and analysis technique adopted for the study.

The Case Study Approach

The case study was adopted as the major methodological approach to the research. The rationale for the adoption of this approach is presented here through an examination of its ascribed strengths and weaknesses and some discussion of its appropriate contribution to research in the social sciences.

Much has been written about the inherent disadvantages of the case study approach as a research methodology in the social sciences (for example, Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Most of the criticism relates to the lack of external validity (generalizability) and the

non-systematic method of data collection which raises doubts as to the internal validity of the study. Nevertheless, there is support for the use of case studies for several purposes. The following were proposed by Shontz (cited in Stone, 1978:137):

. . . (a) presentation of "evidence" on what the researcher considers to be a rare, remarkable, or atypical instance of some phenomenon; (b) exemplifying or illustrating a concept that would be difficult to describe using solely abstract theoretical language; (c) demonstrating the use of a technique (e.g., the conduct of a "team building" exercise); (d) establishing a pool of data that may be useful at a future point in time; (e) challenging existing modes of thought by showing case study evidence that cannot be explained adequately by existing theory; and (f) "confirming" theories or hypotheses by the presentation of supporting case study data.

Of those purposes stated above, a number apply to this study; that is, the thesis establishes a pool of useful data; it challenges existing theories on university governance and decision-making; and it adds to the confirmation of specific theories or hypotheses.

While the case study approach cannot be used for the testing of hypotheses, it has a role to play in their generation (Stone, 1978:136). This is especially true when the subject of the study is not imbedded in a well-developed body of theory. The present case study drew upon, and hopefully will contribute to, theory from the areas of the policy sciences, university governance, and organizational decision-making in general. Several researchers in these fields have contended that theory development is still in an underdeveloped state and could benefit from careful description of phenomena occurring in the natural setting. For instance, Jenkins (1978:20) defended the use of the case study approach in policy sciences at this stage in the development of the discipline: "in the short run it would seem too early to jettison case-study material and the concepts that arise from it simply in exchange

for quantitative sophistication."

Stone (1978:137) presented the following advantages of the case study approach, all of which have, hopefully, been realized in the present study:

- a. The full complexity of the unit under study can be taken into consideration;
- b. Data collection is flexible;
- c. The case study is a useful vehicle for the generation of hypotheses and insights;
- d. Data are collected in natural settings; and
- e. Case studies are generally less expensive research strategies than others.

This study can be classified as "longitudinal research" according to a definition provided by Kimberly (1979:125) where he stated that such research "consists of those techniques, methodologies, and activities which permit the observation, description and/or classification of organizational phenomena in such a way that processes can be identified and empirically documented." Kimberly contrasted such studies with cross-sectional research which concentrates on a number of phenomena that occur at a single point in time. He maintained that longitudinal studies "minimize the problems encountered when process is inferred from cross-sectional data" and "facilitate the development of better models of organizational growth and change" (1979:122).

In summary, the case study approach was adopted as a methodology for this study because the phenomena under investigation can benefit from the development of hypotheses and insights as a prelude to more rigorous theory development. In addition, a longitudinal study of this type is appropriate for research which focusses on organizational processes as opposed to the interrelationships among organizational

components at a single point in time.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data were collected through a variety of techniques. Initial data collection consisted of assembling documents such as minutes from a number of council and committee meetings, letters and memos from key participants, and statistical reports describing the institutional environment. Based on this information, a chronology of the case was prepared and a preliminary list of the key actors was compiled.

This preliminary list provided a guide for the second phase of data collection which consisted of extensive interviews with the key actors. The interviews were loosely structured in that, although an interview guide was used (see Appendix A) respondents were encouraged to talk about subjects of interest to them and to explore topics which may not have been included in the guide. The interviews were all recorded* on audio tape and then analysed in accordance with the conceptual model.

To ensure that all key actors were interviewed, those on the preliminary list were asked to name other influential actors. Any so named were added to the list and subsequently interviewed. During the course of the interviews, other pertinent documents which were not initially available were solicited and added to the data collection.

The analysis of the interview data began with a written compilation of all the pertinent points made by each interviewee. Each

*All interview tape recordings have been preserved and are in the custody of the researcher.

comment was transcribed verbatim or in summary form and sorted according to the classification system established in the conceptual model. This system specified that data would be grouped under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes. The comments were also arranged in chronological order so they could easily be related to particular events in the case.

Documents related to, or originating from specific committees, councils, or individuals, were sorted in chronological order according to their source. The contents of the more significant documents were then subjected to a content analysis which involved extracting the relevant data and assigning them to predetermined categories. An example of such content analysis is given in Appendix I where the responses to the Krueger report were analysed according to their reactions to specific recommendations.

These data (both those obtained from interviews and those from documents) were then subjected to analysis and interpretation on three levels of detail. In the first instance they provided the basis for a description of the contextual setting for the case and an overview of the major events in the process. This information is presented in Chapter 4. The data were then organized according to the conceptual model and reported in considerable detail in Chapter 5. At this time interpretations of specific observations were made and incorporated into the narrative description. The final interpretation of the data was intended to arrive at conclusions which may apply to university policy-making in general as opposed to the specific case. These generalizations are reported in Chapter 6.

Throughout data collection and analysis efforts were made to maximize the validity of the information. Data collected in interviews were compared against other interview data, written documentation, and, where necessary, actors were asked to clarify data. Finally, key actors were asked to react to sections of the thesis which reported activities in which they were directly involved.

THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The principal assumption underlying the conceptual model is that policy-making in an organization functions as an open system and, therefore, possesses the characteristics of open systems that have been observed in other settings. Thus, to describe and interpret a case of policy-making it is necessary to identify the significant components of the system and its environment and then to document the interactions among them. The open systems literature provided the general conceptual basis by offering an appreciation of the operation of open systems in fields as wide ranging as biology, economics, and organizational behaviour. It did not, however, provide the detailed model required to guide research into a particular phenomenon such as the subject of this study--the policy-making process in universities.

This more specific systems model, termed a policy-making system (or PMS) in this study, builds on the research described in the previous chapter. Each of the studies reviewed contributed a different perspective of the policy-making process and it was possible to incorporate a number of them into this study's conceptual model. The definition of a PMS, adopted from Friend, Power, and Yewlett (1974:24), is "a set of

organizational and interpersonal arrangements which have evolved to deal with some identifiable class of decision problems." This definition is not inconsistent with the proposal of a "policy flow model" (Simmons et al., 1974), also described in Chapter 2. This view of policy-making presumes that each policy statement is the output of a unique PMS that evolved in response to a particular environmental stress. Each PMS consists of a number of actors and issues interacting over time and utilizes the resources available to it from the environment. Any number of overlapping systems may be operating concurrently within an organization and the aggregate of these systems could be called the "policy system" of the organization. This larger policy system includes among its components a number of more or less permanent organizational structures, such as departments, committees, or councils, which have designated roles to play in PMSs that evolve in response to specific issues. These structures are not PMSs in themselves; rather, they interact with each other and with less permanent groups or individuals in what Simmons et al. (1974:461) referred to as a "random, multi-channelled" manner resulting in the identification of issues and development of policy.

The PMS has within it four major categories of components: processes, actors, issues, and outcomes. In order to analyse and understand a system, the main components in each of these categories must be identified and described along with the interactions or linkages among the components. In addition, the environment must be described in sufficient detail to gain an appreciation of its effect on the development and operation of the system. The model is specified below in

greater detail under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes.

Environment

The environment includes all actors, processes, and information outside the focal PMS that have an impact on the initiation, development, and outcomes of the system. This global definition is consistent with the concept of open systems but is of limited value in the study of a specific type. To facilitate the study of a PMS, the conceptual model should specify, on the basis of previous research, which of the features of the environment will likely have the major impact. Wherever possible, the model should also incorporate classification systems to assist in the analysis and interpretation of the phenomena observed. Selected features of the environment are presented below showing how each can have an impact on the PMS.

The constituencies of a PMS are those identifiable groups in the environment "to which the actors in the policy [making] system consider themselves to be responsible for the actions which they may select" (Friend, Power, and Yewlett, 1974:29). These interest groups may be very highly organized or may consist of a number of largely independent individuals. This degree of organization or cohesiveness may vary from time to time as a function of the importance of the issues that are central to the PMS. When issues are considered important to the group they will influence the PMS through a process of interest articulation --a process which can involve any number of strategies ranging from rational argument to physical disruption of the organization.

This concept of environmental constituencies or interest groups is central to the model of policy-making proposed by Baldrige et al. (1977) as described in the literature review. It was also adopted by Friend et al. (1974) in their description of policy-making in local government and is, of course, an underlying concept in the study of society by political scientists.

In the university environment a large number of constituencies exist, particularly if the special segments of society are treated separately. However, for purposes of this study only four major constituencies were identified and, since the activities in the case were largely confined to the university itself, the first three were internal to the institution: faculty, administration, and students; the fourth was the community, represented by the appointed governors of the university. At times, these four groups were further differentiated when a special interest group within a constituency emerged as a cohesive or identifiable group.

The faculty constituency tends to be an influential interest group because of its strong beliefs in such principles as "academic freedom" and "democratic administration" of the institution. In addition, although they may have very different disciplinary backgrounds, the faculty share an interest in maintaining and improving their working conditions, their relatively high status in society, and their economic position in the community. Their interests are articulated through such mechanisms as a faculty association, which represents them in collective bargaining, and their participation as individuals on committees and councils.

In the university environment it is somewhat difficult to separate the administration from the faculty interest groups because of the practice of appointing faculty to administrative positions for limited terms, after which they return to their teaching and research assignments. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that during the individual's term in the full-time administrator's role his perceptions of the problems and processes differ from that of his teaching colleagues. In addition, many of them do not return to the professorial ranks but finish their university careers as full-time administrators. Thus, administrators are identified as a separate constituency in the conceptual model.

The student constituency is the largest but probably least influential of the four in matters of policy-making. This is understandable, given the transitory nature of their involvement, their lack of experience, and the difficulty of effectively organizing to make their concerns known. However, the potential impact of this interest group carries considerable influence in the process of policy-making. Even though their interests may not be particularly well articulated, consideration may be given by decision-makers to the student constituency's possible reaction to new policy initiatives.

The direct inputs of the fourth constituency, the community, into the policy-making process are usually channelled through selected committees, boards, and councils. The most effective community input at the U of C is through the appointed members of the Board of Governors (BOG), who have final authority in many areas of non-academic policy-making. In the conceptual model, these lay governors serve as "proxies"

for the community constituency.

The administrative structure can have a considerable impact on the PMS. For purposes of this model, the administrative structure consists of all those in the environment who hold administrative appointments in the university, and the authority relationships among them. This structure is most often represented by the formal organizational chart which locates each administrator in a hierarchy and relates each individual/office to others in the organization by lines representing authority relationships and channels of communication.

This formal structure is basic to the bureaucratic model of policy-making described in the literature review. In that model, individuals are assigned formal organizational roles which determine the nature and extent of their participation in the policy-making processes of the institution. An administrator becomes involved with a particular issue only if the organization has assigned to him/her the responsibility for that area of operation. If it is a legitimate issue for a given individual, the structure then indicates who else should be contacted and involved in developing a solution. The other participants are those either directly above or below the first individual in the structure.

While recognizing that this formal administrative structure does not exist in isolation in an organization, the literature indicated that it can and does have a significant impact on the governance of universities. It has, therefore, been identified as a subset of the total environment of the PMS.

Contiguous PMSs exist in the environment in all complex organizations and these are contiguous if they focus on the same or closely

related issues or if they have significant actors or outcomes in common with the focal PMS. It is not uncommon for a PMS to be initiated by one part of the university, say the BOG, at the same time as the General Faculties Council (GFC) considers the same issue. In such a case there would be parallel, contiguous PMSs which focus on a common issue. Another example would be a case where one PMS identifies a problem it is not prepared or authorized to deal with and passes the issue on to another part of the organization for resolution. This action could initiate a new PMS which is contiguous to the first system because of the source of the issue.

Also included in this subset of the environment are those permanent policy-making groups which are responsible for specific types of issues. This includes GFC, the budget committee, the Appointments, Promotions, and Dismissals Committee (APDC) of GFC, and many more. It should be noted that these more-or-less permanent groups are included in this part of the environment and not in the administrative structure. It is consistent with the bureaucratic model that they should be excluded since they usually do not have a direct authority relationship in the organization. That is, they do not report only to one individual and they do not have individuals reporting to them for authority.

A distinction should also be made between these policy-making bodies and PMSs as defined in the conceptual model. Bodies such as GFC become involved in more than one PMS and are permanent structures whereas PMSs are transitory in nature and focus upon only one issue or a set of related issues.

Identifying the contiguous PMSs is important because of their

potential impact on the evolution and outcomes of the focal PMS. In the application of the conceptual model, attempts are made to identify and describe contiguous PMSs at each developmental stage of the focal PMS.

The operating environment was a term used by Friend et al. (1974) to describe the interactions of all components of the environment in conducting the day-to-day business of the organization. In this environment, the formal roles assigned in the administrative structure become blurred through the influence of the informal organization, and the members of each constituency interact with others to accomplish the organization's goals. This is the environment where policies are implemented, procedures are developed, and problems are identified; in short, it encompasses all processes not identified as part of the PMS. This environment is not separate from the administrative structure and constituencies but overlaps them with a complex, dynamic network of communications and interactions.

In the conceptual model no attempt is made to identify or categorize the components of the operating environment. However, in the collection of data for the study the operating environment was carefully examined in an attempt to identify events which could have an impact on the PMS.

Determining the boundary of the PMS differentiates the system from its environment. The system then contains all those components which have a direct and significant impact on its operation, and the environment retains those components which have a less direct (or subtle) impact on the system. There is no foolproof way of locating this boundary since the investigator can never know everything about the

organization being observed nor can he develop rules for inclusion that will apply in all cases. Nevertheless, a boundary must be drawn in order to focus the observer's efforts on particular components of the organization. Kuhn (1975:45) provided some guidance in this process when he observed that:

. . . the boundaries of a system are always set by the observer, not by the nature of the thing being observed. The nature of the thing observed, however, will make certain boundaries more workable than others.

The drawing of boundaries, therefore, becomes an arbitrary act but it must be guided by principles which reflect both the nature of the system and the purpose of the analysis. This does not suggest that the act restricts the observer from collecting observations about the environment. However, this data collection will probably originate from an observed exchange between the system and the environment which will focus the observer's attention on the impact/origin of such an exchange.

The boundary of a PMS is not static but will shift over time to include or exclude actors and issues as the system evolves. For example, an actor may be active and influential in the identification of an issue but may have no role in the selection of a policy solution. The actor would, therefore, be included in one phase of the system's operation but excluded from another. Similarly, the actors of a PMS may wish to expand or contract the focus of their efforts by adding or deleting issues from the system.

The system's boundary is important not only because it differentiates between the system and its environment but also because of the interactions across this arbitrary line. People, physical resources,

and information, essential components of the system, all originate in the environment. The channels through which these components are transmitted are important, particularly when information is flowing from the environment to the system. Information is always subject to filtration and coding processes which reflect the perceptual biases of the person transmitting the data. Therefore, it is important to identify the person(s), often called "boundary spanners" (Aldrich and Herker, 1977), through which information is channelled into the system in order to interpret the meaning and importance ascribed to the information.

In summary, it is necessary to describe the environment in sufficient detail to understand its impact on the system being analysed, and where possible, its components should be categorized according to their potential influence on the system. The boundary must be determined through an analysis of the interactions between components, taking care to shift the boundary as the system changes through time. Finally, the channels through which information is transmitted should be identified and the filtration and coding processes examined.

The Process

A PMS, in fact any system, has two primary dimensions--the temporal and the spatial. The spatial dimension can be analysed by identifying the components of the system and their interrelationships at given points in time. The spatial dimension in this context implies not only physical or geographic space but also "conceptual or abstracted space" (Miller, 1978:10). The problems of analysing the spatial dimensions will be addressed later; the objective of this section is to

examine the temporal dimension in the process of policy-making.

The process consists of a number of events, linked together over time, with the nature of each being determined by preceding events and by outputs from the environment. The more dynamic the environment and the more permeable the boundaries of the system, the greater will be the influence of the environment on the events. Some processes, by their very nature, are more sensitive to such influences. For example, a political process is thought to be more sensitive than a bureaucratic process to the goals and objectives of interest groups outside the PMS. These influences could occur at any time during the process and will reflect the dynamic quality of the environment, the system, and the boundary itself. The relative stability of the environment will, to a degree, determine the predictability of the sequence and timing of events.

In addition to responding to environmental influences, each event will be shaped by those events preceding it in the system, creating what could be called a "causal chain." In some organizations a conscious, deliberate effort will be made to plan the system by specifying at an early stage the decision-making process to be used, the actors to be involved, and the timing of decisions. In others, the pattern may be established by each event responding to its immediate predecessor rather than to a predetermined master plan. The extent to which a system leans toward one or the other end of this continuum should be determined in the systems analysis.

The analysis should also examine individual events in an attempt to understand their contributions to the entire process. At this level of analysis, each event is viewed as a subsystem of the larger process

or event system. Delineation of these subsystems is somewhat arbitrary but can be guided by a classification scheme derived from observation of actual cases. The classifications used in this study were developed by Mintzberg et al. (1976) and were described in Chapter 2.

The Actors

To appreciate each participant's role in the PMS, information must be collected in a number of areas. It is necessary to determine the basis for and nature of the involvement, the actors' perceptions of the issues and possible solutions, the goals and strategies of the actors, and the amount of power or influence of each actor as perceived by himself and others. Although much of this information is of a subjective nature, involving perceptual biases on the part of the actor and the observer, it is essential to an explanation of the system's operation. It is not sufficient merely to document the decisions taken within the system or to analyse the information available to the actors --a more accurate understanding of the policy-making process will come from an analysis of the individual actor's perceptions of events.

Analysis of the attributes of actors should also lead to a determination of the linkages among actors in the system. These linkages or relationships may be a consequence of an individual's position within the administrative structure, membership in the same constituency or interest group, or simply the propinquity of physical office space. Actor-to-actor linkages are viewed as forming a network of power relationships among individual actors or groups, depending upon the level of analysis. Power is defined as "the ability of various individuals and

groups in the academic community to control policy-making processes through specifically vested or delegated authority or through influence acquired by the mere force of circumstances" (McGrath, 1971:187). This ability is the result of that participant's power over others in the system. Therefore, rather than viewing power as an attribute of each actor, the focus will be on the power relations established among participants or groups, an approach supported by Crozier and Thoenig (1976:562-563):

To analyze these relationships, one should not measure the resources as an accountant, but make a qualitative assessment of the actions open to the partners and of the dynamics of their games. It is equally indispensable to focus on the relationship as such and not on each partner's respective power The nature of the relationship does not depend on the resources of each player, but on the power which they use in the game.

The strengths of the actor-to-actor power linkages are based on several possible sources of power within the organization. Baldrige (1971:154) specified four power bases in universities: bureaucratic, professional, coercive, and personal. Bureaucratic power depends on the formal, hierarchical relationships in the organizational environment and may be based upon an actor's ability to control budgets, faculty appointments and promotions, or the flow of information. Professional power may be based upon an actor's status and respect in his/her professional association or peer group. This power base may also be related to an actor's expert knowledge of the issue being considered. Coercive power may be based on such tactics as disruption (for example, a faculty strike), irrational behaviour, and the use of propaganda. Personal power is acquired on the basis of personality and what Baldrige (1971:163) referred to as "that elusive quality known as leadership."

The relationships among actors are an important feature of the spatial dimension of the system. For a specific event in the PMS, this network reflects the manner in which each actor is involved with all others. The other important features of the spatial dimension are the relationships among issues, and the linkages between actors and issues. These features are addressed in the following section.

The Issues

A PMS is initiated by the identification of a problem in the organization which requires a policy solution. While every organization has many such problems, for the purposes of the conceptual model a problem does not become an issue unless it is formally identified by a legitimate individual or group and one or more persons are authorized to begin developing a policy statement. These persons, along with the issue and whatever information is available from the environment, become the nucleus of the system. Just as new actors and information may be added to the system as it develops, the issue may also change, through decisions of actors either in the PMS or in the environment.

The origin of issues can be examined with several questions in mind. Did the issue develop in response to a problem in the immediate organizational environment or from the larger societal or political environment? Has the issue been a component of other PMSs within the organization? If so, have previous policies constrained the manner in which the issues can now be addressed?

Issues can also be classified according to the nature of the environmental stimuli that evoked them (Mintzberg et al., 1976:251).

Accordingly, issues are classified as: (1) opportunities, where the possibility exists to improve an already secure position; (2) crises, where intense pressure is being exerted on the organization; and (3) problems, where the pressure is milder than crises. An issue may shift from one category to another and actors may perceive the problem differently from one another.

In addition to exploring the origins of the issues, the interrelationships among issues in both the focal PMS and contiguous systems should be examined. Such relationships may be based on the interdependence of resultant policies in the operating environment. For instance, policies affecting the appointment of personnel are closely related to policies on allocation of operating funds and, therefore, the issues should be considered in conjunction. Another basis for a strong relationship may be a decision taken by an authorized person or group that certain issues *must* be considered together. Even though the logical dependence of the issues may not be agreed upon by actors in the PMS, the decision to add an issue to the system is sufficient to dictate that policies must be developed in unison and, therefore, a relationship exists.

Important relationships may also exist between issues and actors. Certain actors may associate themselves closely to an issue if any resolution is perceived to affect them directly. If the issue is related to the individual's power, prestige, or working conditions he is likely to be more concerned with the outcome of the system and make more efforts to influence decisions. When examining the issues, individuals will perceive them from several perspectives and will form differing

conclusions. The extent of the difference in these cases will be an important factor in developing an understanding of a system's operation.

The Outcomes

The primary outcomes (or outputs) of a PMS are the policy statements developed and authorized within the system. These policy statements then become the basis for action directed at resolving a perceived problem in the organization. The conceptual model does not include the process of policy implementation and is, therefore, not concerned with whether or not the authorized policies are implemented as intended or whether they resolve the issues initially identified.

The model is concerned, though, with the relationships between the outcomes and two other components of the system. The first relationships are those between the outcomes and the issues. Do the outcomes logically relate to the issues previously identified? Do actors believe that implementation of the policies will resolve the issues? Will implementation of the policies create other problems in the environment which will eventually require another PMS to be initiated? The answers to these questions are speculative in nature and are based on an interpretation of the data collected from the environment and the perceptions of the actors in the system.

The other set of relationships are between the outcomes and the actors. Analysis of the data may demonstrate that particular outcomes are related to the interests of only one actor or one interest group. On the other hand, outcomes may not be linked with any particular interests in the system or its environment.

The relationships among the policy statements or among intermediate outcomes in each event can also be analysed. The analysis should attempt to determine the degree of logical consistency among outcomes (for example, are the outcomes complementary or mutually exclusive?) and also the degree to which they are mutually dependent. In other words, would the successful implementation of one policy be dependent upon the adoption or implementation of others?

Schematic Representation of PMS Model

A number of schematic conventions were adopted and incorporated into two basic models, the first of which (Figure 11) gives a simplified representation of the major actors in the system and their interrelationships at a single point in time. It does not possess the dynamic qualities of an actual PMS and can best be used to present a series of "snapshots" of the system as it progresses from issue identification through to authorization of a policy statement.

The model consists of a hierarchy of systems beginning with the community (or society) in which the university organization exists. This community includes the values, beliefs, and expectations of its citizens; the technology of its industry; the institutions of its government; and much, much more. The analysis attempts to isolate the significant features of this environment which have an effect on the next level of system--the university organization.

The university is represented by the administrative structure, the contiguous PMSs, and the constituencies. Together, these subsystems form the organizational environment of the third level--the focal system




Figure 11 A policy-making system:
Focus on actors

of this study--or the PMS.

The boundary of the PMS is represented by a broken line, indicating its permeability, which allows actors, issues, and information to be exchanged between the system and its environment. These exchanges are represented by directional solid lines which indicate the flow of information between the PMS and the environment.

The actors or groups of actors in the system are represented by circles. Their relationships to the environment are indicated by broken lines which serve to identify actors with particular constituencies, positions in the administrative structure, or with contiguous PMSs. Any actor may be related to more than one aspect of the environment and the relationship between actors in the system are shown as solid lines. These lines could indicate common perceptions of the issues, similar interests in the environment, or perhaps an authority relationship in the administrative structure. The relationship could also be based on significant interactions between the actors during the course of the PMS.

The second model, shown in Figure 12, focusses on the process rather than on the actors as in the previous model. The process is represented by a series of events in which the output of each becomes the input to the next. In addition, new issues can be introduced into the system at any time from the university environment. (The PMS and the university environment are again separated by a broken line.) The community (society) is shown as the third level of system in the hierarchy. The model demonstrates how stresses or events in the community can result in changes in the institution's operating environment which




Figure 12 A policy-making system: Focus on process

can, in turn, have a direct effect on the focal PMS. It can also represent a situation where community or university conditions result in policy decisions which have an effect on the system.

The opposite effect, where a decision of the PMS affects the environment, can also be shown. Examples of this occurred in the case with the adoption of an interim policy statement and the initiation of a contiguous PMS. Such contiguous PMSs are bounded by broken lines in the model, whereas decision-making groups, such as committees, are represented by diamonds. Circles and squares represent issues and outcomes, respectively.

The two models described above are used to supplement the narrative description of events in the next two chapters. Their particular value will be in an encapsulated summary of each event and the symbolic representation of the many interrelationships that developed during the course of the PMS.

This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology and the essential elements of the conceptual model. An attempt was made to provide an understanding of how the problem was formulated and the data collection organized. The conceptual model provides a framework for the next three chapters, which describe the contextual setting and the major events in the case, present the detailed analysis of the data, and summarize the findings of the research.

Chapter 4

INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE

In this chapter an attempt is made to meet two major objectives. First, the environmental conditions prior to the initiation of the policy-making system are described in order to familiarize the reader with the contextual setting of the case. The description begins with the more generalized societal and governmental influences and becomes increasingly more specific as the immediate university environment is described. As well, the environmental stresses which gave rise to the policy-making system are isolated and dealt with. The more significant of these environmental conditions are incorporated into the model in Figure 13.

The second objective is to provide an overview of the six major events in the case, all of which have been classified according to the Mintzberg (1976) model that was adopted in the conceptual model of policy-making systems. These six units then provide the framework for presentation of the detailed data in Chapter 5.

CONTEXTUAL SETTING

As is usually the practice, the research setting deserves a background, and the following describes the environmental conditions surrounding the case.




Figure 13 The contextual setting for the policy-making system (PMS)

The Community

The University of Calgary (U of C) is located in Calgary, a city of 560,000 population in the province of Alberta. The city is currently riding the crest of an economic and population boom created by the exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the region. Despite the population increases of over 25,000 per year in the metropolitan area, the total university enrolment has remained static at about 10,500 full-time students, since 1975. This condition is explained by a declining participation rate of the 18-24-year old population cohort. More students are opting for vocational and technically orientated post-secondary educational programs or to take jobs immediately upon high school graduation.

Although total student demand has not increased, there has been a shift in demand from the general arts and science disciplines into the professional areas such as management, engineering, nursing, and law. This shift also reflects the concern of students for an education that will lead to career opportunities.

This static enrolment situation may also be a symptom of the general lack of confidence in North American universities--institutions which have been labelled as irrelevant, not in tune with needs of the community, and largely unaccountable in their fiscal operations. In addition, because Alberta's universities are mainly supported through public funds they have been grouped with other publicly funded organizations as a major source of the currently high rate of inflation.

The Government

Alberta universities come under the jurisdiction of the provincial Department of Advanced Education and Manpower. Funding is determined through an incremental budgeting process which consists essentially of the universities submitting an estimate of the upcoming year's expenditures followed by a cabinet decision on the level of funding. This approach replaced a formula funding method which proved inadequate when annual growth in student enrolment levelled off. Although current levels of funding for Alberta's universities compare well with other Canadian universities, there is a general feeling within the institutions that, given the buoyant state of the provincial economy (including a multi-billion dollar "Heritage Savings Trust Fund"), the government is somewhat parsimonious with its support. This feeling, combined with what is perceived as a "manpower" orientation of the provincial department has led to an attitude of suspicion and distrust within some parts of the university, notably within TUCFA.

This level of suspicion is increased by public statements such as that made by Premier Lougheed on October 31, 1979, in which he stated:

I think the time is coming when [the universities] are going to have to make a move--and I'm not threatening--or the public will start to demand that the funders [government] get involved. . . . Global funding will not be acceptable to the public at large unless the universities show a higher degree of setting forth priorities.

These statements left some university officials with the impression that public accountability might, in the future, be ensured by direct government intervention in the operation of their institutions.

Another factor which may affect relations with the government is a commonly held belief that the University of Alberta (U of A) (located in Edmonton, Alberta's capital) enjoys a privileged relationship with the government because of its history (the oldest of the provincial universities), its size (the largest), and its proximity to the government offices. This has led to the conclusion that the U of A has had a much easier time in receiving program approvals and in obtaining funding for special program initiatives.

The foregoing observations are made to point out what the researcher believes to be a form of "siege mentality" of many university faculty and administrators. This is manifest through statements such as "if we don't clean our own house, someone will come in and do it for us," or "how can the government adopt wage guidelines for the public service when excessive salary increases are given in the oil industry." If these sentiments are felt strongly enough by those in key positions they become a strong motivating force in policy-making processes.

The University

The constituencies within the university environment were identified in the conceptual model as faculty, administrators, students, and governors (representing the community). Within the model it was assumed that actors in the policy-making system may feel some allegiance to one of these groups and that their views of the issues will be influenced by this relationship.

Administrators constituency. This constituency includes deans and department heads who are directly responsible for academic units,

as well as those often identified as the "central administration." The administrators have a common interest in the smooth, trouble-free operation of the institution. Collectively and individually, they manage the resource allocation process and the academic personnel system, both of which have considerable relevance to the substance of the case. It seems reasonable to assume that many in this group would have a common concern for maintaining or expanding their power in the policy-making systems of the university. The administrators constituency has approximately 110 members, 50 in central administration and the remainder in the faculties and departments.

Faculty constituency. At the beginning of the case (1978), the number of full-time equivalent faculty was 1385, an increase from a total of 1123 in 1973 (Appendix B), or approximately 23 per cent. This compares with an increase of 15 per cent in the number of full-time students. The increase in the number of faculty from 1977 to 1978 was some 47 full-time positions while the number of full-time students actually decreased slightly. These statistics support two observations: first, that the student demand had reached a static position and, second, that the creation of new faculty positions had continued, despite the slowing of enrolment increase. This apparent discrepancy can be explained partially by the shifting internal enrolment patterns referred to earlier (that is, increased demand in professional programs); however, there were instances where the number of faculty positions increased in programs experiencing an absolute decline in enrolment.

Another important characteristic of the total faculty is its

age structure (Appendix B, p. 12). In comparison with the U of A, the Calgary institution is shown to have a much larger percentage of its faculty in the younger age groupings. The implication of this age profile is that, over the next few years, very few faculty positions will become vacant through retirement or death, consequently restricting the possibilities of renewal of the faculty through gradual replacement. This age profile is, of course, a consequence of the very rapid expansion of the university during the 1960s, when a great many recent graduates were recruited to the academic staff. As this group matures with the institution, they also move together through the academic ranks, analagous to a "population bubble." This bubble is currently in the associate-professor rank and is beginning to pressure the top of the associate range which has traditionally been the major barrier to continuous advancement. Since there is currently no "ceiling" on the full professors' salaries, as more faculty get promoted beyond associate, the university faces a continually increasing salary overhead. On the other hand, as more faculty members have their career progress arrested at the ceiling of the associate rank, the greater will be the demoralizing effect on the faculty as a whole.

The interests of the faculty are represented in many arenas by TUCFA, their faculty association.* The U of C has a long-standing tradition of collective bargaining, thus, TUCFA is very active in all policy areas which affect the salaries and working conditions of the faculty body. Members of the TUCFA executive hold ex officio appointments to many of the committees and councils of the university and are

*For explanation of abbreviations, see page 8, Chapter 1.

represented on faculty promotions committees at the departmental, faculty, and institutional levels.

Student body constituency. Students are represented on most of the permanent committees and councils of the university. This representation is normally provided through the undergraduate SRC and the graduate GSA. This involvement in university governance was not the result of a hard-fought struggle with the administration but rather was accomplished with little fanfare during the late 1960s. The students are regular contributors to the various decision-making groups, although recently there has been some difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number to fill all available positions.

Community constituency. The community is represented in university governance through individuals appointed by the government to positions on the BOG and the senate. Since the senate has little input into policy-making, particularly in the substantive area of this case, the lay members of the BOG alone represent the community. The board is made up of 19 individuals, of whom 10 are appointed from the community. Community appointments are intended to reflect a cross-section of community interests, including business, labour, and the professions. The board has a broad range of powers relating primarily to financial policies and operation of the institution.

Administrative structure. The administrative structure of the university is an important component of the PMS model because it is from here that many actors are assigned their formal roles in the

organization. The U of C structure is shown in Figure 14. The key administrator responsible for academic personnel is the VP(A) who is also considered the senior VP in the structure. The incumbent in this office, P. Krueger, was currently serving his second five-year term, having previously held appointments as department head and vice-dean during some twenty years with the institution. The VP(A) is assisted by an AVP responsible for the operational aspects of the academic personnel function. The VP(A) also has available the services of a well-established office of institutional research (OIR) which can provide statistical data and analysis capabilities on a wide range of institutional policy issues.

The academic component of the organization (as opposed to the service component) is structured around faculties and departments. The administrative heads of faculties are the deans, who may have associate or assistant deans and department heads reporting to them. Most of these appointments are for limited terms of up to five years which may be renewed with the agreement of the incumbent and the president, who receives advice from an advisory selection committee. Within this structure, the deans have the formal responsibility and authority for the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of academic staff.

Operating environment. This includes aspects of the university's operation which will have some impact on the focal policy-making system. Several of its more critical features are identified here, the first of which is the financial operation of the institution. The general impression is one of increasing financial restraint throughout the




Figure 14 The University of Calgary administrative structure

university. Compared with the days of growth and expansion, current budgets are much tighter and restrictive in the hiring of new staff or the development of new programs. Several cost-saving measures, such as reduction of physical plant maintenance, have been undertaken recently; however, no steps have been taken to reduce the expenditure on academic programs through reduction of continuing academic staff. In other words, cost reduction measures have been implemented in some of the fringe operations but not in the central teaching and research functions, thus reflecting the typical pattern of "belt tightening" in organizations under stress. As will be demonstrated later, there appears to be no consensus on the degree of financial hardship being experienced by the university. Generally, the administration seems to be convinced of its severity whereas the faculty does not accept this description, particularly in the context of a buoyant local economy and a government with a large annual budget surplus.

The second important feature of the operating environment is the appointment process of new faculty members. Two important points should be made about the appointment system in operation before the case began. First, there was no mechanism for the reallocation of positions from one academic unit to another. Once a position had been created it appeared to belong to a department in perpetuity, a situation reflecting the period of rapid institutional growth. Second, there was the operation of the "80/20 rule." This policy (Appendix C) was adopted by the BOG as a means of resisting the tendency toward an increased ratio of tenured to untenured faculty. It was reasoned that a large percentage of tenured faculty would reduce the flexibility of

the administration in coping with a declining student enrolment. Presumably, if faculty were not tenured they would be easier to dismiss for reasons of financial exigency. Therefore, the administration was instructed to maintain a ratio of 80/20 between "tenure track" appointees and "limited term" appointees. In operation, this meant that if a department had a large number of tenure-track faculty then all new or replacement appointees would have to be offered limited term contracts (usually from one to three years). To make this situation more palatable to new faculty, oral assurances were given by administrators that all time spent on a limited term appointment would be credited to the probationary period should a tenure-track or "initial term" appointment subsequently be offered. In addition, it was generally acknowledged that only one limited term appointment would be offered to an individual, that is, a second contract must be for an initial term, leading to consideration for tenure. TUCFA was opposed to the 80/20 rule, arguing that it was as easy to get rid of a faculty member on an initial term appointment as on a limited term appointment and, therefore, the procedure served no purpose.

While the 80/20 rule relates to the termination of appointments when enrolments decline or a program is cancelled, there is also the problem of "dismissal for cause," such as incompetence, moral turpitude, or dereliction of duties. The operating procedures of the institution specify the grounds for such dismissal but are somewhat hazy on how a case may be made for dismissal. In fact, no faculty member has ever been dismissed under these procedures, thus convincing some administrators that the procedures are inadequate and should in some way be

revised.

The third aspect of the university's operating environment is the promotion system, within which three professorial ranks--assistant, associate, and full professor--are recognized. These ranks are closely tied to salary scales although there is some overlapping between ranks. Whereas promotion from assistant to associate professor has not been a major hurdle, promotion from associate to full has become the stumbling block in the career progress of many faculty members. The system also includes the granting of so-called "tenure," designated as "appointment without term" in the Handbook for Faculty (March, 1975, rev.). Tenure can be granted only to those on initial term appointments after periods of from two to five years, depending upon the appointee's rank. Procedures dictate that at some point the appointee must either be granted tenure or be dismissed.

Another significant aspect of the promotions system, referred to earlier, is the fact that currently there is no ceiling at the top of the full professor salary range, and a full professor's salary will continue to rise with each newly negotiated contract and with each annual merit award. This issue is significant since it became the focus of attention for one of the contiguous policy-making systems of the organization.

Contiguous policy-making systems. In this section are described some of the closely related policy-making systems in operation immediately prior to the beginning of the case. First, however, it may be useful to identify several of the permanent structures of the

organization which became involved in the policy-making systems. According to the definitions adopted for this study, these permanent councils or committees are not, in themselves, policy-making systems but they are significant components in virtually all systems that develop.

The university operates under a bicameral governance system with the GFC having jurisdiction over academic matters and the BOG having responsibility for financial matters (Figure 15). Each of these bodies also has a number of committees that accept responsibility for specific areas of policy and/or operations. In addition, there are committees such as the Deans' Council (DC) and the General Promotions Committee (GPC) which are advisory to the president. Following is a brief examination of the roles played by each group in related policy-making systems which preceded the case under study.

1. Revisions to the Handbook for Faculty. This process had been active for a number of years with the major responsibility being undertaken by the Appointment, Promotions, and Dismissals Committee (APDC) of GFC, and seemed notable for its singular lack of progress, mainly due to the inability of the organization to allocate and agree upon areas of responsibility. The three competing interest groups have been the BOG, which sees policies in this area as management prerogatives; TUCFA, which views such matters as legitimate items for collective bargaining; and GFC, which views them as academic concerns and, therefore, under its jurisdiction. Consequently, each proposal for change could be challenged and rejected by any of the three groups.

2. Establishing a salary ceiling on the full professor rank.




Figure 15 The statutory structure of The University of Calgary

Although this may not have been acknowledged or recognized as an issue, it appeared to be the focus of attention for the GPC. Recommendations were made to restrict the number of merit increments within the full professor rank and to restrict the size of increments through the adoption of a "Career Progress Adjustment" at a .00 level. These moves met with opposition from TUCFA and had not been established as policy.

3. Development of a collective bargaining procedure. Although this issue may not have had direct bearing on the case, it does demonstrate the nature of the interaction between the BOG and administrators on one hand and TUCFA on the other. This became an issue when legislative changes adopted by the Alberta government removed universities from any prescribed collective bargaining process and instead directed that it must be determined within the institutions. The BOG's business and finance committee and the negotiating committee of TUCFA then conducted negotiations resulting in an agreed-upon process through which annual collective agreements could be negotiated. The framework for such negotiations still remains somewhat open to interpretation since there is no provincial policy that specifies which items are open to negotiation.

MAJOR EVENTS IN THE CASE

To facilitate analysis of the policy-making system, it was considered essential to adopt some means of reducing the process to a number of discrete parts. The classification system adopted was that developed by Mintzberg and his associates (1976) and described in some

detail in the literature review. The path taken by the process, shown in Figure 16. illustrates the "looping" of the process which, according to Mintzberg, is typical of strategic decision-making.

Choosing to employ a classification system introduces a degree of artificiality to the analysis since no such system can exactly fit the observed elements of the case. In several instances it will be pointed out that the demarcation line between events is not clear but that the boundary has been arbitrarily drawn.

Dividing the process into a number of events is, in fact, a process of system analysis in itself. Each of the identified events becomes a subsystem of the larger policy-making system. Each subsystem possesses the characteristics of general systems and, in this study, is analysed under the same headings adopted for the primary policy-making system--environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes. While a detailed analysis will be undertaken in the next chapter, below is an overview intended to provide some understanding of the complete process.

Event 1: Problem Recognition and Diagnosis

The case began in December of 1977 when VP(A) Krueger presented a problem to U of C President Cochrane. Krueger described the situation as a resource reallocation problem resulting from increased pressure on the budget for academic salaries at a time when government grants were barely keeping pace with the rise in inflation. The problem had already been explored in some depth with the assistance of the office of institutional research which had provided statistical evidence of




Figure 16 The sequence of events in the case (After Mintzberg et al., 1974)

the problem. President Cochrane accepted the problem as a legitimate policy issue and advised Krueger to develop a policy with the assistance of the DC which acts in an advisory capacity to the president. This event marked the initiation of a policy-making system as defined in the conceptual model. A problem was identified in the operating environment, given status as an issue, and a procedure was then determined for arriving at a policy statement.

Event 2: First Development Phase

In February, 1978, the VP(A) presented to the DC a recommended policy statement for their consideration. This policy statement contained some very specific proposals for limiting the total number of faculty appointments, for establishing a "freeze" on the appointment of new, tenurable faculty, and for reallocating positions through centralization of all vacancies. These proposals met with considerable resistance in the DC and, following debate, a sub-committee was appointed to report back with further recommendations. The report of the sub-committee--a significant modification of the original proposal--was subsequently adopted and a formal policy statement was issued. Implementation of the policy was to begin immediately.

Event 3: The Major Interrupt

Within days of the decision of the DC, the TUCFA president, W. Zwirner, challenged on the basis of the Universities Act, the authority of the DC to adopt policy relating to the appointment of academic staff. The challenge was delivered directly to the DC and

also on the floor of the GFC through a motion proposed by Zwirner. This challenge resulted in a further modification of the policy statement by the VP(A) and the DC, and the inclusion of a time limit during which the provisions of the policy would be in effect. These modifications satisfied Zwirner and he agreed to withdraw his motion from the GFC agenda and replace it with another. The new motion called for the appointment of an ad hoc committee which would have faculty, student, and administrative representatives and which would recommend policy to GFC on the broad issue of faculty appointments.

Event 4: Second Diagnosis and Development Phase

During April, 1978, the striking committee of GFC appointed the ad hoc committee on appointments policy under the chairmanship of Krueger. The committee was composed of several key actors from the preceding events, including Zwirner and two deans who served on the DC sub-committee, plus a number of actors new to the policy-making system. The committee met briefly during the spring, recessed for the summer, and resumed meetings in the fall session of 1978. Since the meetings throughout this period were held in camera, the university community was not aware of their recommendations until a formal report was submitted to the GFC executive in February, 1979.

Event 5: Evaluation

Although evaluation was also a component of the ad hoc committee's activities, the major evaluation took place after the GFC executive decided to circulate the report to all academic departments

for comment before forwarding it to GFC. During this period a great many departmental and faculty meetings were held to consider the effects of the policy proposals and to draft responses to GFC. The GFC executive received, compiled, and distributed all responses to members of the GFC. The responses were many and varied, reflecting the concerns of both individual faculty members and academic units who would be affected by the recommendations.

Event 6: Choice and Authorization

Although in the Mintzberg model there is a separation between choice and authorization, in this case the two activities were so intertwined that it was decided they should be treated as one event, with the GFC and the BOG having the major roles. GFC considered all recommendations of the committee and, in the case of those which were "academic," gave the final authorization for the policy statements. When recommendations fell under the jurisdiction of the BOG, GFC passed them on only after consideration and endorsement by its own members.

During this final event, many of the Krueger committee recommendations were authorized with only minor modifications. The exceptions were: (1) one recommendation rejected outright; (2) one rejected after study by another ad hoc committee; and (3) two referred for decision and appropriate action. The system was essentially terminated in October, 1979.

Chapter 5

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

In this chapter the descriptive data collected about each event in the policy-making system (PMS) are presented. Wherever possible, the events of the case will be related to the conceptual model of PMS's to provide an interpretation or explanation of specific incidents.

EVENT 1: PROBLEM RECOGNITION AND DIAGNOSIS

The data describing the first event are organized under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes in accordance with the conceptual model developed and described earlier in Chapter 3.

Environment

The initial environment for this event was described in the previous chapter as "The Contextual Setting of the Case." During the course of the event the environment did not vary significantly; however, leading up to the event the intensity of the problem definitely increased, in the perception of Krueger, the key actor. The strain on the institution's budget became greater and the number of new faculty appointments continued unabated (Appendix B). The vice-president could recall no single incident which prompted him to take the problem to the president; rather, he perceived the situation to be worsening and that some action should be taken as soon as possible. The timing of his

approach to the president may have been related to the budget preparation cycle which is at its height during November, December, and January.

The environmental stress that provoked action in this case does not appear to fall at either end of Mintzberg's opportunity-crises continuum; rather, it could be viewed as a "problem decision" which Mintzberg et al. (1976:251) defined as "evoked by milder pressures than crises." There is no doubt, however, that the environmental stress originated primarily from outside the institution itself. The shift in student demand combined with rather stringent financial constraints imposed by the government created a situation where the policies and procedures developed during a period of expansion were no longer adequate.

The environmental stress provoked a response in the organizational system at a point that was both understandable and predictable. The VP(A) was the most senior administrator with direct responsibility for academic staffing and also had a major involvement in the institution's budgeting process. The Office of Institutional Research played a significant role by providing a major channel through which information flowed to the VP(A). OIR retains data on student demand both at U of C and across the continent, in addition to having a significant role in the university's internal resource allocation process. Krueger undoubtedly made use of these data in identifying and diagnosing the problem.

Process

Within this event the process, as represented in Figure 17, was relatively simple. Krueger recognized a problem, did a preliminary diagnosis with the assistance of OIR, and took the problem to his immediate superior in the hierarchy. The president then gave official recognition to the problem and advised (or directed) the VP(A) to develop a policy for presentation to the DC.

This process followed closely the bureaucratic organizational model, in that the lines of authority dictated the communications process and the actors took action on the authority of their offices. Within the pure bureaucratic model, however, Cochrane could have determined the policy since he was the senior line officer responsible for appointments. The decision to involve DC was an expression of the "democratization" of Weber's ideal type--a modification common in universities and many other types of organizations.

Actors

The key actors at this stage were Krueger, Cochrane, and (most likely) Sheehan, director of OIR. All were involved because of their administrative responsibilities in the institution (Figure 18) and at this point were involved only part time in this particular issue.

Issues

At this stage there was a fairly uniform definition of the issue. Kreuger took the major responsibility for officially defining the issue as a problem of static or decreasing revenue at a time when internal shifts of faculty resources were required. This resulted in




Figure 17 Event 1: Focus on process




Figure 18 Event 1: Focus on actors

a lack of flexibility in the system and a severe restriction on the capability of the administration to manage in a "steady state."

Evidence of the problem was available in enrolment and faculty appointment statistics. For instance, for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, although the number of students had decreased the number of courses offered and the number of staff had increased. This problem of declining enrolment and restricted revenue was compounded by the inability of the administration to exercise control over appointments. Krueger pointed out that because the system was so decentralized control could not be exercised on either the total number of positions or the internal allocation of positions.

The problem or issue could be viewed from at least two perspectives. The larger, societal view saw an institution under pressure resulting from a shift in student enrolment preferences and a restriction in government funding. At the institutional level, however, the issue could be viewed as the inability of a management system, fashioned during a period of rapid growth, to function during a period of steady state.

Outcomes

The major outcomes were authorization to proceed given by the president and the preparation by Krueger of a proposed policy statement. The direction the policy-making was to take was also established. DC was to be consulted but, presumably, since DC is advisory to the president and cannot establish policy, the president could exercise his policy-making prerogative once recommendations came forward from DC.

It is possible that the president would then recommend to the BOG who would give final authorization.

The view of Krueger was that this policy issue fell within the jurisdiction of the BOG, rather than GFC, although he recognized that the "delicate relationship between BOG and GFC dictates that the board cannot take unilateral action, except in certain critical fiscal matters" (Krueger, December, 1979:personal communication).*

EVENT 2: FIRST DEVELOPMENT PHASE

During this event, the process moved from the recognition of the issue to the consideration of alternative policy solutions. In keeping with the conceptual model, the data are presented under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes.

Environment

The total environment of the system remained essentially unchanged between events 1 and 2; however, because actors were added to the system, certain components of the environment took on greater significance. Specifically, the day-to-day operating environment of the deans (as shown in Figure 19), became an important consideration. The deans deal directly with appointments, promotions, and dismissals and do not necessarily take the broader, institution-wide view of the VP(A) and the president. The operating environment in the past had made the deans key figures in the decision-making process and had

*All "personal communication" notes refer to tape-recorded interviews, hereinafter called "p.c."




Figure 19 Event 2: Focus on process

charged them with the task of "quality control." Deans are the administrators who "take the flack" when a new policy is introduced, and, consequently, are very concerned with changes affecting the rank-and-file faculty members.

The DC at times appears to serve as a vehicle for interest articulation for the administrators' constituency. Since the council is advisory to the president, there is the possibility of influencing policy at the highest level of the central administration. Therefore, when common concerns exist among the deans they might be expected to join forces at DC in order to present a united front to the president or vice-president. On the other hand, the deans are also involved in a very competitive relationship which manifests itself each year in a fierce competition for a finite resource pool. Because resources are finite, the expansion of any one unit can only happen at the expense of other units. The deans, as spokespersons for their academic units, see it as their duty to protect and defend their colleagues and programs. The issue identified in the initial event could have significant impact on the competitive advantages of their faculties and, therefore, they would be very sensitive to any recommendations.

No doubt their sensitivities were already sharpened by two previous decisions affecting their operating environment. The 80/20 rule, described earlier, placed a severe restriction on the type of contract the deans were able to offer new faculty members, and the recent decision of the GPC to limit merit increments to full professors could produce negative reactions from the senior members of faculty and TUCFA.

Process

The issue was introduced formally to DC on February 6, 1978, when Krueger presented a document entitled "Proposed Academic Personnel Policy". This proposal outlined the reasons why new policies were required (financial restrictions and internal shift of enrolment) and made several recommendations for policy changes. The report recommended:

1. A restriction be placed on the *total* number of tenurable/tenured positions.
2. The creation of a "central pool" of vacant positions from which positions could be reallocated. The pool would be administered by the VP with advice from the Budget Committee.
3. That "limited term appointees" whose terms had expired be offered only another limited term appointment (rather than a tenure-track appointment).
4. That no further tenurable appointments be made (presumably within the 80/20 guideline).
5. Exceptions to be taken to the BOG's Personnel Relations Committee.

The proposed policy was debated at some length with very serious concerns being expressed by individual deans. At the end of the discussion it was determined that a sub-committee of DC would take an in-depth look at the proposal and report back to DC at its next meeting.

The sub-committee reported back to the full council on February

20, 1978 with a revised proposal. This new proposal drastically "watered down" Krueger's original recommendations. No mention was made of limiting the total number of faculty positions or of creating a central pool of vacancies. The revised proposal accepted the restriction on new appointments in the tenure stream but centralized authority for monitoring appointments to the DC itself. It also recommended that the policy be implemented for only one year. This revised proposal was adopted by DC which advised the president of its intention to operate under the new policies.

During this event the process conformed more closely to the political than to the bureaucratic model of governance. Conflict was evident between the central administration and the deans who represented the more decentralized interests. The deans appeared to have exercised considerable power in order to achieve the moderation of the VP(A)'s proposal. The process was representative of many decision processes in universities in that the issue was referred to a sub-committee who came up with a compromise which satisfied the conflicting interests.

Krueger also demonstrated a particular approach to problem solving or policy-making. He presented the council with both the problem and the solution and asked for their comments and presumably their endorsement. Alternatively, he could have presented his version of the problem and had the council come up with a preferred solution. In this instance, although the deans found no quarrel with the definition of the issue, there was little support for the proposed solution and a compromise was struck.

The actions of the deans in this case might also be explained

by reference to the model of incremental policy-making. Perhaps they found Krueger's proposals to be too great a departure from the status quo and on that basis proposed arguments against the suggested changes.

Actors

Krueger continued to be the key actor in the process (Figure 20). He not only brought forward the initial proposal but he chaired the sub-committee and the second meeting of DC. The president's involvement may have changed since it was prior to the second meeting that he indicated his intention to resign from his position with the university. It is quite possible that he had begun to withdraw from sensitive policy issues, preferring to delegate his responsibility to the VP(A) who would have to live with the decisions after the president's departure.

The new actors were, of course, the members of DC. Of these, three took particularly active roles through the sub-committee. These were J. Hyne, dean of graduate studies; J. Woods, dean of humanities, and L. E. McLeod, dean of medicine.

Issues

Discussions of both the initial and revised proposals illuminated several issues which were the concern of one or more deans. These discussions were recalled by two of the deans present (Woods and Chapman) and the issues raised are paraphrased below.

Threat to faculty morale. The freezing of tenurable appointments might have a demoralizing effect on many of the younger, most promising faculty members.




Figure 20 Event 2: Focus on actors

Reduction of the dean's authority. This action was seen as a possible consequence of the centralizing recommendations and could create difficulties in recruiting new academic administrators.

The problem of incompetent tenured faculty. This was not addressed by the proposals. The proposal was seen as attacking the most vulnerable of the faculty (those on limited terms) while ignoring the real problem of incompetents on permanent appointment. It was suggested that a sizable number of the latter should be retired from the institution.

Support staff. These personnel should be subject to the same stringent level of position control; or, if the academic units were to have their budgets restricted the non-academic service units should also be forced to cut back.

The threat of government intervention. This threat to the internal affairs of the university was raised by pointing out the situation that has developed on several United States campuses.

The faculty age-profile. This was suggested as a problem that any revised policy should recognize. It was pointed out that the only way to counter an aging faculty is to continue to recruit younger, energetic faculty members.

Operational problems. Problems were foreseen if the revised policy slowed down the process of appointments.

A jurisdictional problem. This was a potential problem if the BOG's Personnel Relations Committee got involved as the final arbiter, as was recommended in the initial proposal. It was apparently felt that the administration (as opposed to the governors) should manage the

appointments process.

The reaction of TUCFA. This was raised as a potential issue. The view was expressed that TUCFA might feel its members presently on limited term appointments had been given expectations of initial term appointments which could not be offered under the proposed policy. In order to protect the interests of these faculty members, TUCFA could raise opposition to the proposed policy.

In general, there appeared to be a good deal of negative response to the initial proposal by the VP(A), resulting in a postponement of a decision and, finally, the adoption of a more moderate policy statement. The issues raised by the deans pointed out many of the problems they anticipated in the implementation of a new policy. They also suggested other areas, such as tenured faculty and support staff, where more flexibility could be found in the system.

Outcomes

The major outcome from this event was the policy statement contained in a memo dated February 24, 1978 from Krueger to members of DC (Appendix D). This statement was issued as official policy intended for immediate implementation under the authority of Krueger, the acting president.

Secondary outcomes of this phase were the issues identified by DC. These issues demonstrated the concern the deans had for implementation and, perhaps, their concern not to "rock the boat." While there did not appear to be a direct challenge to Krueger's identification and diagnosis of the problem, there was definite concern about

whether he had proposed the best method for dealing with it. In particular, the deans were concerned about increased centralization, the threat to faculty morale of implementing an appointment freeze, the protection of incompetents provided by tenure, and the potential reaction of TUCFA to a perceived threat to its members.

EVENT 3: THE MAJOR INTERRUPT

Until this point in the process, the boundary of the policy-making system was somewhat impermeable. This was possible in the first event because of the small number of actors involved and in the second event because the deliberations of DC are held in private and minutes of the meetings are considered confidential. However, release of the official policy statement opened the system and informed the environment of the outcome of the policy-making process. In arriving at the policy statement, the only constituency involved had been the administration; however, now the faculty constituency became aware of the outcome and their reaction was swift and decisive.

Environment

The president of TUCFA, W. Zwirner, acted on behalf of all faculty but with particular concern for the interests of some sixty members who were on limited term appointments and would be refused tenurable appointments under the new policy. TUCFA was also apparently concerned with the process through which the policy was determined. The process was seen as purely bureaucratic involving only administrators, rather than a more collegial process involving other

constituencies. TUCFA, as the official voice of the faculty constituency, attempted to ensure that the administration did not overstep the bounds of its authority as defined by precedent as well as provincial statute.

TUCFA was prompted to act both by the decision of DC to limit tenurable appointments and by the decision of a contiguous policy-system to designate the normal merit increment as zero for full professors who were already seven increments above the salary base. Since the second decision was taken by General Promotions Committee (GPC) which is essentially DC with a slightly enlarged membership, TUCFA objected to both decisions on the same grounds and through the same channels.

Within the conceptual framework for the study this is an example of the interaction of contiguous PMSs (Figure 21). In this instance, the overlapping of the systems is quite apparent. Many of the actors, including the deans and VP(A), were active in both systems. In addition, policies developed by both systems had impacts on the same constituencies in the environment and evoked similar responses. The environmental pressures prompting the initiation of both systems were undoubtedly the same--budget restrictions leading to lack of financial flexibility within the institution. This phenomenon of contiguous PMSs will also be observed in later stages of the case where decisions taken within the focal PMS led to the development of systems concentrating on a separate but related issue.

Process

The first step documented in this event was a discussion of




Figure 21 Event 3: Focus on process

the DC policy at an executive meeting of TUCFA on March 1, 1978. Following discussion it was decided to inform the membership of the policy by publishing Krueger's February 24 letter in the subsequent issue of the TUCFA newsletter. Following this meeting, Zwirner wrote to the secretary of GFC.

In his memo, Zwirner quoted sections of the Universities Act in challenging the authority of DC and GPC unilaterally to decide on what he interpreted as promotions procedures. It was his view that the decisions contained in the policy statement adopted by DC should have been considered by GFC before it could be accepted as official policy. He, therefore, moved "That the implementation of this policy decision re: appointments contained in the Acting President's letter of February 24, 1978 be held in abeyance until GFC has considered and made recommendations concerning academic appointment policies" (Appendix E).

On March 13, 1978, Zwirner attended the regular meeting of DC. At this meeting it was decided to modify the policy statement to the extent that it would no longer apply to faculty members who were currently employed on limited term contracts, thus satisfying the major concern of TUCFA. In addition, DC suggested that a committee with representation from GFC and DC be appointed, that it study the problem in the upcoming year, and that it report back to both GFC and DC.

On the basis of this revision to the policy statement, Zwirner withdrew his previous motion to GFC and forwarded another one (Appendix B) that proposed setting up an ad hoc committee of GFC which would make recommendations on university appointment policies, would have membership from DC, TUCFA, the GSA, and the SLC, and would be chaired

by the VP(A). At the GFC meeting of April 13, 1978 the motions were adopted and the Striking Committee of GFC was directed to name members to the ad hoc committee.

The process in this event is notable in its adoption of the political model of university governance. The interaction of interest groups in a conflict situation resulted in the compromise of a recently established policy and the legislation of a revised procedure for developing further policy. TUCFA appeared to use three techniques to revise an existing decision and to protect their interests in the future. First, they moved to inform their membership of the policy and thereby develop a numerically strong base of support. They then utilized the legal and legislative means available to them in order to block the action of the administration. In this case, because the TUCFA president holds an ex officio position on the highest academic council, there was a clearly defined channel through which a legal challenge could be made. Finally, the president of TUCFA made personal representation to the VP(A) and to DC. It was not apparent if this was a consciously developed strategy on the part of TUCFA. It was apparent, however, that most of the action was taken by only one individual--Zwirner. At times it was not clear if he was acting on the basis of his office or his personal convictions. The fact that his actions were not sanctioned by the TUCFA executive and he did not use his title on memos indicated that he took the action on his own initiative. However, the reactions of the administration indicated they believed he acted with the support of TUCFA.

The only overt action of the administration to resist this

challenge arose when Zwirner's initial motion came to the floor of GFC. At that time Cochrane, who chaired GFC, ruled that the motion was too late to be placed on the agenda and could not be considered at that meeting. Zwirner challenged the ruling and the majority of GFC members upheld his challenge, thereby allowing the motion to stand. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the president was adopting a specific strategy to block TUCFA's progress; however, the timing of the motion was critical; if it had not been placed on the agenda, Zwirner's position would certainly have been weakened.

The process in this event was particularly notable because it digressed from a process prescribed by the senior administration which had virtually reached a conclusion. This event would be "political interrupt" in the Mintzberg model since it followed the pattern of taking place "late in the decision process when inside or outside groups blocked proposals in the selection phase" (Mintzberg et al. 1976:264).

In outlining the policy-making process in the initial phase, the senior administration either did not anticipate the strong reaction of TUCFA or, if they did, they still did not feel it necessary to include them in the process. Up to this point the decision-makers (with the exception of one spokesman at DC) felt that this issue was solely within the jurisdiction of the administration.

Actors


The one key actor added to the system during this event was Zwirner. He had been active in faculty affairs for many years and was well acquainted with both the key structures and key actors in the

organization. As president of TUCFA he had access to most of the participants and to certain key structures (such as GFC). He also had a considerable power base, drawn from his position as president, from his intimate knowledge of the institution, and from his informal contacts throughout the organization which were no doubt strengthened by his low-key, non-abrasive personality. Zwirner was committed, personally as well as through his office, to ensuring that the governance of the university conformed to a "democratic" or "collegial" model and yet he appreciated the necessity for bargaining and a degree of compromise. He apparently subscribed to the collegial idea but also admitted to the political reality of the institution.

GFC also joined the PMS in this event. GFC is shown in Figure 22 as having linkages with the administrator, faculty, and student constituencies since these are the parts of the environment from which its members are drawn. With such a membership the council becomes a political forum in which conflicting interests can be expressed and considered. Therefore, it was a logical vehicle through which TUCFA could make its challenge. The other key actors remained from the preceding event. These were the president, the VP(A), and members of DC.

Issues

Zwirner brought into the system a different perception of the major issues. He believed the main issue was the appointment of new staff to limited term rather than initial term appointments. TUCFA's position was that the current practices (particularly the 80/20 rule) and those proposed by DC were not fair to individual faculty members and did not work to the advantage of the institution since it hampered the



Z = Zwirner

Figure 22 Event 3: Focus on actors

university's ability to attract the best faculty, who expected tenurable appointments. He termed the current practices as "very dishonest" because certain assurances were implied to new faculty but the institution felt no compulsion to honour these promises.

Zwirner also stated that a major issue was the question of *who* can make policy. In this particular instance he questioned the authority of DC; however, he saw this as just one episode in the struggle to maintain a process of "democratic" governance. He described the DC decision as "an attempt to find an easy solution to a very difficult problem" (Zwirner, November 11, 1979:p.c.).

His view of the environmental stresses also set Zwirner apart from the administrators. He did not believe there was a serious financial situation at the institution, pointing to a large contingency fund, available each year, as evidence that the financial crunch was more imagined than real. Zwirner concluded that because there was money in the budget the restrictive hiring policy was not required.

During this event the major issue identified by Krueger appeared to be submerged in the political issue of who should make the policy, the issue introduced by Zwirner. Krueger stated that he viewed the appointments issue as falling outside the authority of GFC; however, he also apparently wished to maintain good relationships with TUCFA since he showed a willingness to compromise the approved policy statement.

Outcomes

Several important outcomes emerged from this event. First, there was a decision about the decision process itself. This was the

decision to appoint a GFC committee with representation from three constituencies (faculty, administration, and students) to continue the policy-making process rather than leaving it to the administration. This was an activity which Mintzberg has termed a "decision control routine."

The second outcome was a victory for TUCFA. They succeeded not only in redirecting the process but in protecting the faculty members who were currently on limited term appointments. They also succeeded in making the process much more visible to the university by bringing it to GFC.

The final outcome was a short-term solution for the problem most pressing for the VP(A). He succeeded in increasing the degree of control exercised over individual deans in appointment decisions by having all decisions brought to DC. Apparently, in Krueger's view, this examination of each case by the peer group of deans would reduce the number of rash hiring decisions which had contributed to the excessive amount of hiring in recent years.

The event marked the end of the first cycle of policy-making activities and the beginning of the next. The "interrupt" initiated by the faculty interest group succeeded in returning the process to its starting place where the issue would be diagnosed a second time.

EVENT 4: THE SECOND DIAGNOSIS AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE

The description of this event follows the established routine of presenting the data under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes.

Environment

At the beginning of this event the environment was marked by an awareness on the part of the university constituencies that an issue had been identified and a policy-making process had been set in motion. Those not directly involved, primarily members of GFC or the TUCFA executive, were also aware of the conflict that arose out of Zwirner's challenge to DC and the VP(A). This awareness quickly diminished once the motion to appoint a committee was approved by GFC. From that point, the system once again became very closed, with little information crossing the boundary into the university operating environment.

The committee chose to conduct its meetings in private and individual members were advised to refrain from discussing the issues with anyone outside the committee. Linkages with the environment appeared to be limited to informal communications between certain members and their constituents and the formal organizational linkages between the administrators and certain departments. The communications with constituents will be described in greater detail in a subsequent section dealing with actors--it is only noted here that the interactions were informal, appeared to transmit little information, and were apparently discouraged by Krueger, the committee chairman.

The major formal organizational linkage referred to above was between the committee and the OIR. Sheehan, director of OIR, attended all meetings and though not formally a committee member, he took an active role in discussions. Sheehan reported to the VP(A) in the hierarchy and undertook research at Krueger's request. Prior to the formation of the committee he worked closely with the VP(A) in

collecting statistics to describe the problem and in providing information about what policies had been adopted by other universities to deal with similar issues. As a member of the administration, Sheehan tended to view the issue in the same light as Krueger and, inasmuch as the filtering and interpretation of the data are inevitable, it can be assumed that information was provided to the committee in such a way as to support the position of the administration. This should not be interpreted as a charge of bias against OIR or Sheehan but, rather, as a recognition of the fact that the primary channels through which information flowed to the committee were controlled by the administration. This relationship between the policy-making system and its environment were significant in the diagnosis of the problem or issue, and the development of proposed solutions.

Another important feature of the environment was a change in one aspect of the operating environment. As a result of the interim policy adopted by DC and the VP(A), academic appointments were being processed in a different manner. The final decisions were no longer being taken by individual deans but were coming to DC for discussion. This procedure gave the central administration greater control over appointments and removed the pressure to develop an immediate solution to the problem, as identified by Krueger in Event 1.

In summary, the policy-making system at the beginning of this event was quite open because of the discussions at GFC but quickly closed as the committee adopted the procedure of maintaining confidentiality. Information flow between the system and its environment was primarily through formal administrative channels, with much of the

background data coming directly from the OIR. Finally, there were changes in the operating environment which reduced the time pressure to arrive at a policy recommendation.

Process

To some degree this event repeated many of the decision-making activities which had occurred in the previous processes. It began with the appointment of the ad hoc committee which became known for its chairman as the "Krueger Committee." The appointments to the committee were made by the Striking Committee of GFC, in the standard procedure in such cases. The selection may have been influenced by Krueger, who wrote to the secretary of GFC with a request that the committee include representatives of DC who had been on the DC subcommittee and that the membership of the committee be kept small. These requests were no doubt made with the very practical considerations of continuity and efficiency in mind; however, they also guaranteed that the administration would have a strong voice in the committee's decision-making. While the full membership of the committee will be explored in the section dealing with actors, it is worth noting here that the striking committee chose members who represented very specific constituencies or who had a defined link to a contiguous PMS, thus ensuring the political nature of the process. The event appears to conform closely to the Mintzberg et al. (1976:264) conception of a "political design activity" which follows a political interrupt such as occurred in the preceding event.

The initial meeting of the committee on May 17, 1978 was spent in a preliminary exploration of the issues and an overview of

activities to date for the benefit of the new actors in the system. Several of these new actors noted during interviews that they either had no idea or a distorted idea of the issues at the time they accepted the appointment. Following this meeting Krueger prepared a set of notes which he circulated to the committee just prior to their second meeting on November 31, 1978.

These notes were described as "an attempt to identify a broad spectrum of concerns that might be briefly relevant to faculty 'renewal' in the university in the next decade or two" (Appendix F). In fact, the sixteen points in the memo included references to all the policy recommendations made in the committee's final report. That this informal agenda was available after only one meeting (which served mainly to orientate new members) supports a contention from one of the student representatives that the ad hoc committee was really just an extension of the DC subcommittee. The administrators were the only ones who understood the technical complexities of the operating environment and were able effectively to control the process from the beginning of the event. Because of this strong link with DC it is not surprising that the second "diagnosis" phase was somewhat abbreviated, virtually ending after one meeting of the new committee. However, as will be noted in the section describing the issues, although the diagnosis phase ended quickly there was no agreement on what the primary issue was.

Following diagnosis of the issue the committee began the "development" phase, which usually consists of the development of one or more solutions to the identified problem. Mintzberg et al. (1976:

255) suggested that solutions are developed through either "search" or "design" routines. The Krueger Committee adopted the search process when they examined the policies in place at other Canadian universities. These policies had been compiled and reviewed by the OIR and provided to the administration prior to the formation of the committee. This preceding activity served to reduce the search time taken by the committee, thus enabling them to focus on a number of "ready-made" solutions at the very beginning of the process. In addition, the committee undertook to design a number of solutions unique to U of C. Two examples of designed solutions were the recommendations to integrate spring/summer sessions into the normal teaching load of faculty and to adopt new procedures for dismissal with cause. The fact that both these recommendations were outlined in Krueger's notes prior to the second meeting supports a conclusion that the design activity took place outside the meetings of the committee.

It appears that the actual writing of the final report consumed most of the committee's time. After the first two or three meetings there seemed to be general agreement on what policy recommendations would be made, leaving only the task of setting them out in a form that would be acceptable to most if not all members of the committee. The procedure adopted in their drafting was to have one or two members write a first draft which would be brought to the committee for discussion. This draft would then be modified until all objections were resolved.

This process reflects the conflict avoidance model of decision-making adopted by the committee. In fact, members could recall only a

single instance where a majority vote was used to decide on a recommendation. While most members considered this to be a truly collegial approach to decision-making, at least one of the faculty members regarded it in a more cynical light. G. Symons observed that decisions were not based on a true consensus. She felt that, although people had no strong objections to the policy recommendations, they did not necessarily support them.

Several non-administrative members of the committee observed that the deans in particular dominated the discussions and would talk at length on particular points. This was seen by one member as a conscious strategy to convince the committee of the administration view, and was, possibly, part of a strategy consciously adopted by the two deans on the committee. Hyne, well known for his outspoken manner, would take an extreme position on a particular issue. Woods would then join the discussion with a more moderate position more acceptable to the other members. The committee would then adopt the moderate position which was quite acceptable to the first dean. This strategy was observed and described in some detail by a student member and later discussed, without prompting, by one of the deans.

Another minor strategy was described by two faculty members. Symons and Zwirner regularly discussed the proceedings of the committee between meetings and would agree in advance to support certain positions which would be taken at the next meeting. On the whole, however, most committee members did not think there was a great many strategies or attempts to manipulate the group discussions. It was felt, in particular, that the chairman did not get involved in manoeuvring the

decision-making process. On the contrary, two members (Woods and Symons) observed that Krueger was not directive enough and tended to let certain members, particularly Hyne, dominate discussions and thereby reduce both the efficiency and effectiveness of the committee.

Although there was some questioning of the chairman's handling of the actual committee meetings, there was general agreement that it was Krueger's efforts between meetings that really kept the process moving. He provided background information, prepared minutes and agendas, and assisted with drafts of recommendations. While there was also general agreement that Krueger knew some of the specific things he wanted the committee to recommend, he did not attempt to limit discussion on other topics and generally tried to include the views of all other members. This approach of the chairman is generally reflected both in the process and the outcomes of this event. There was an attempt to include everyone in the process and to give everyone something in the recommendations. Rather than a pure collegial model, where the individual goals are not in conflict, this appears to have been largely a political model where the operative technique is compromise. While there was no general agreement on the problem, everyone was prepared to accept the report if there was something in it for them and if other recommendations were not too objectionable either to them personally or to their constituencies.

The decision-making approach was not purely political either, since there was a heavy reliance on data to describe the problem and to attempt to forecast the future for the institution. The administrative members drew heavily upon OIR reports and upon data available to them

from the operating environment. There was not, however, the adoption of a prescribed sequence of activities (such as problem identification, search for alternatives, determining evaluation criteria, and a selection process) which is a basic part of the rational model. Rather, the process seemed to move immediately from problem identification to selection with few intermediate steps.

The process was governed in many respects by an early decision of the chairman. Krueger decided the committee would keep its work confidential, thereby excluding input from other constituency members and delaying the feedback process until a report was distributed. This decision meant that the committee would have to work with only the data available through bureaucratic channels and with only the "creative talent" available in the appointed committee members. A different approach would have been to open the committee to suggestions and reactions from the university community, through public hearings or by soliciting briefs from individuals and groups. The committee members appeared to accept the closed procedure because it presumably took less time to arrive at a final report and they were freer to voice their opinions without fear of being quoted in public.

In summary, the process in this event (as shown in Figure 23) began with a re-diagnosis of the issue, went through the development process, and recommended a number of policy statements in a formal report to the GFC. The diagnosis process was very short-lived, indicating that much of the previous activity within the system was input to this event. The decision-making process had certain collegial and bureaucratic features but appeared on the whole to conform closely to




Figure 23 Event 4: Focus on process

the political model.

Actors

The main actors in this event are described through reference to their roles in the organizational environment (see listing in Chapter 1, p.9), the nature of their involvement in the process, and their personal attributes which may have affected their actions in the case. Following these descriptions an attempt will be made to describe the interactions which took place during this event.

Krueger, who assumed the role of chairman of the committee, continued to be one of the key actors. Since his role in the organization was described earlier, suffice it to state at this point that he was the senior administrator responsible for academic personnel, that he was a long-time member of the university and had served in several senior positions, and that he had been instrumental in initially identifying the issue and moving the process through its beginning stages.

Hyne, the dean of graduate studies, was the senior administrator (in terms of longevity) on the committee. He had served on the DC sub-committee and was an ex officio member of both the GPC and GFC. He has been dean for many years and is notable for having the only deanship "without definite term." In recent years, appointments to deanships carry a limited term of up to five years, renewable after review, whereas at the time of Hyne's appointment no such conditions were imposed.

Hyne is outspoken on many issues and has a reputation for dominating the numerous committees and councils of which he is a member. A common theme in many of his public statements is the need for the

university to govern itself well in order to deter the threat of government interference in the internal affairs of the institution. This threat to the autonomy of the institution was raised as an issue in DC and was presented by Hyne to the committee as one of the environmental conditions which made it imperative that action be taken.

When data were being collected for this study, Hyne was the only participant who would not consent to an interview. The reason given was that the issues discussed in the committee were far too sensitive to be investigated so soon after the event. This reluctance to discuss the case may, in itself, reveal the degree to which he viewed university policy-making in general, and this case specifically, as a highly politicized activity--politicized in the sense of competing interest groups within the institution and also to the extent that the provincial government is interested in the internal affairs of the university. Hyne's refusal to discuss the case meant it was not possible to incorporate his views of the process, the issues, and the other actors except where these views were made known publicly. It was possible, however, to collect data from other actors describing both Hyne's interactions with others and his stated positions on various issues.

An important dimension of the interaction with others is the amount of influence or power each actor exerts on the situation. Hyne was judged by some to be the most influential in the committee and was judged by others to be among the least influential. This difference in perceptions may be interpreted in a number of ways; one is that he, or any individual, can influence others to varying degrees depending upon each person's response to that individual's personality or style. In

this case there were varying reactions to Hyne's forceful and persistent style of presenting an argument. The question of status and rank in the bureaucracy may also be a factor in explaining the variety of perceptions. Hyne's senior position may provoke a positive reaction in some individuals while in others it may result in an equally strong negative response.

Regardless of this variety in perceptions, there is evidence to indicate Hyne was a key actor in the system and influenced the final outcome to a significant degree. During the examination of the system's outcomes it became clear that several of the positions held by Hyne were reflected in the policy recommendations of the committee. These positions have been alluded to previously but will be discussed in greater detail in the sections dealing with issues and outcomes.

Woods, dean of humanities, was the third administrator appointed to the committee. He had served on the DC sub-committee and was familiar with both the operating environment and the previous events in this PMS. Woods was serving his first term as dean and before the conclusion of this case had been appointed president of the University of Lethbridge. During the interview conducted as part of the data collection, he was very open and candid about the case, sharing none of the concerns expressed by Hyne. Woods made several observations on the university governance process in general and about U of C in particular, which may assist in the understanding of his role. He stated that, in general, senior academic administrators should be responsible for the initiation and development of policy--presumably reducing the faculty role to one of approving policy through a representative body such as

GFC. In this case he felt it appropriate that the administration should develop policy and that DC was thwarted because GFC thought it could not be trusted. This position may in some manner have been communicated to other members of the committee and may have helped determine the view of Graham, a student representative, who stated that the committee was an outgrowth of DC and "a way of gaining credibility for recommendations which had already been . . . agreed upon by Deans' Council through bringing in people from other parts of the university community and sitting them down in an insular way and convincing them" (Graham, October 13, 1979:p.c.). It appears that Woods, along with Krueger and possibly Hyne, believed that the proper process for determining policies in this area was through the administrative structure and that the ad hoc committee was a "necessary evil."

Woods made reference to the inability of a number of permanent committees and councils at U of C to function effectively in policy-making. He asserted that GFC was ineffective because it is balkanized, loaded with "Tammany Hall" politics, and has no sense of statesmanship. The Policy and Planning Committee of GFC was a "joke," not because of personnel but because it got too bogged down in detail and was unable to make decisions. He viewed DC as ineffective at times but very effective if given something to do. Woods's comments are reported here to demonstrate the skepticism with which one actor entered the system. This lack of faith in the organization's ability to make effective policy decisions was shared, in varying degrees, by several other members.

When asked to comment on the degree of influence exerted by various actors, Woods was reluctant to name specific individuals. He

did, however, indicate that he thought the administrators had the most influence and that the committee was quite unbalanced in terms of influence. He thought certain members actually had a "negative influence" and that, on the whole, the committee suffered from a "lack of talent."

Woods felt the progress of the committee was hampered by several additional factors: first, that the committee was too large and that several members did not do their "homework"; second, that the chairman did not effectively control certain members during committee meetings nor insist that individual members carry out assignments; and, finally, that the committee "ran out of time" and, therefore, did not complete the task as well as it might have done.

Zwirner has previously been introduced in the case and his role in the organization described. In this section, his role in this particular event and his perceptions of the process are explored in more detail. Although Zwirner had been instrumental in having the Krueger Committee established, his appointment to the committee was made by the Striking Committee of GFC. Zwirner's motion to GFC named the constituencies to be represented but with the exception of Krueger did not name individuals. Zwirner brought to the committee a firm belief in the value and the necessity of involving all constituencies in the policy-making process. This belief was demonstrated when his motion to establish the committee included student representation in addition to administration and faculty. This motion resulted in some debate at GFC during which Hyne, not yet a member of the committee, argued against including student members.

Zwirner viewed the committee's process as primarily a search for

consensus, although he felt there was a need for compromise and bargaining--in his words, "how far can I give on a particular issue and still achieve my objective" (Zwirner, November 14, 1979:p.c.). He also felt that the options of the committee were very much constrained by the power of the deans. This referred not only to the power of those on the committee but to the power of all the deans in the implementation of a policy. If the policy was contrary to their wishes they could ensure that it was not effectively implemented and would, therefore, fail.

Zwirner viewed Krueger and Hyne as having the greatest influence on the committee: Krueger, because he "kept the minutes" and Hyne, because he had clearly thought-out ideas which he forcefully presented to the committee. In Zwirner's view, Krueger looked to Hyne for leadership in bringing up issues and providing information. Zwirner had frequent contacts with the executive members of TUCFA by which he would acquire information and reactions to draft recommendations of the committee.

As the formal spokesman for TUCFA, Zwirner was in a position of having to represent the interests of individual faculty members in the policy-making process. There appeared to be no conflict between this formally prescribed role and his personal view of his involvement. He respected and professed the ideal of collegial governance but was very aware of the political nature of the process and was willing to bargain and compromise within the committee.

Graham was appointed by the SRC to represent the undergraduate students. He was VP(A) of the SRC and was sitting as a student member of GFC. Graham was in the fourth and final year of his undergraduate

program and had been very active in university governance, having served on several university committees and councils.

Throughout the process Graham had frequent discussions with the Students' Union Academic Commission regarding committee recommendations. He regarded these discussions as within the confidentiality guidelines of the committee since the commission did not make the recommendations public. He apparently did not favour the approach to confidentiality taken by the committee but recognized that a more open approach would have taken considerably longer.

As previously mentioned, Graham felt the committee was primarily an extension of the work of DC and served as a policy-making instrument of the administration. While he did not seem embittered about this situation, he believed that the administrators had more power than other members. For instance, in the search for solutions he stated that "usually one of the deans had a solution--more or less prepared." He felt there was only a very narrow search for alternatives involving "not much of a brainstorming atmosphere."

While Graham said he did not feel intimidated by the committee, he did sense a degree of paternalism from some members. He was present at GFC when the committee was approved and, therefore, was aware of Hyne's position that students should not be represented on the committee. Other members of the committee, when commenting on the influence of specific actors generally, agreed that the student representatives were not influential, largely because of their lack of information and experience with the issues, but also because of their relatively low status in the overall make-up of the committee.

B. Ronaghan, the GSA representative, was recruited by the GSA president in response to the request from the secretary of GFC. Ronaghan was enrolled as an MSc student in the department of archaeology and had not been active in other areas of university governance before this appointment. When he joined the committee he had no knowledge of its task or of the major issue; however, he felt that the problem was very quickly defined through the data provided by Krueger. He sensed there was considerable time pressure on the committee and that they worked very quickly to the point of agreeing on the major recommendations. After that point had been reached he thought there was a great deal (too much?) of time taken in drafting the final report. It seemed the main objective of this effort was to ensure that the faculty would not make an "emotional response" to the recommendations.

Ronaghan viewed the decision process as a search for consensus with no overt strategies being adopted by any participants. He felt that while the student members had low influence there was a willingness from all members to listen to and consider his opinions. In his view, the three administrators on the committee had the most influence, partly due to their previous involvement in the process and partly due to their personalities. He was keenly aware of the confidential nature of the committee discussions, and felt that the main reason for this approach was that premature disclosure of recommendations would create opposition from faculty members and would slow down the process.

A. Lucas of the faculty of law was appointed to the committee because of his position as chairman of the Appointments, Promotions, and Dismissals Committee (APDC). The obvious overlap between the two

committees dictated the need for a formal linkage which was achieved by the cross appointment. Lucas's legal background also provided valuable input to the committee, and one other member (Graham) commented that this legal perspective was often sought out, thereby giving Lucas some additional influence.

During an interview, Lucas (November 30, 1979:p.c.) offered some observations about U of C in general and its policy-making process in particular. He stated that, of the several Canadian universities with which he had been associated, "The U. of C. is the most bureaucratized [he had] ever encountered . . . a little bit top heavy." He was also critical of the lack of "professionalism" he observed in many individual faculty members. In addition, he was obviously frustrated by the inability of the institution to develop policies relating to appointments, promotions, and dismissals through the committee he chaired. He explained how the APDC was unable to operate with the conflicting demands placed upon it and the ambiguity as to who had jurisdiction in the policy area.

Lucas noted what has been referred to as a "siege mentality" existing at the university. He observed that U of C appears to be much more concerned with "positional politics" in relation to the provincial government than other universities, such as the University of British Columbia.

Lucas regarded the decision process of the Krueger Committee as a search for consensus but with each member representing a particular department or interest group. He felt very strongly a personal responsibility to defend and protect the faculty of law and thought other

members had similar allegiances. He also felt that Krueger provided good leadership for the committee but also that Krueger "had a pretty clear idea of what he wanted to accomplish with the committee."

Lucas believed Krueger, Woods, and Zwirner to have the most influence in the committee. He also commented on the role assumed by the two deans as "elder statesmen" within the group, with a clear implication that they monopolized the discussion and perhaps spoke down to the other members.

While Lucas respected the decision to keep the proceedings of the committee confidential, he felt that the administrators were being overly sensitive regarding the issue. He kept the APDC informed of what issues were being discussed within the Krueger Committee but did not discuss the recommendations until they were turned over to the GFC executive.

G. Symons, assistant professor in the department of sociology, represented two primary interests in the university. First, she was on a limited term appointment at the time the committee was formed and had been affected by the DC decision to "freeze" initial term appointments; thus, she represented the group of faculty members who had a direct interest in policies relating to appointments. The second interest group she may have represented was women faculty members. Although it was not acknowledged that this was a consideration in appointments to the committee, it is not uncommon for GFC committees to reflect a balance between male and female members.

Of all the committee members, Symons had the most observations to make about the operation of the committee, particularly regarding

its group processes. This was no doubt a reflection of her background as a trained sociological observer. She had also served on several U of C committees and was familiar with its policy-making processes.

In describing the decision-making process within the Krueger Committee, Symons observed that although on the surface it appeared to be based on a consensus model, there may not have been true consensus. Rather, decisions reflected only a condition where no *major* objections were raised. She maintained that there is a difference between this situation (that is, where no negative arguments are raised) and a situation where people make a positive endorsement of a decision. She felt this process, which is probably compromise rather than consensus, was brought about by a strategy of the administrators to wear down the committee to the point where they were prepared to accept anything that did not have a serious negative impact on the interests represented. This "wearing down" process included the domination of discussion by the two deans and the focussing of discussion on technical issues that were often beyond the understanding of other committee members. The chairman contributed to the process by not controlling the discussion--by allowing Hyne and Woods to "go on and on and on." Krueger's influence was ensured because he had control of the minutes and had access to information which was not readily available to the others. Symons did not suggest that the actions of the administrators were suspect or that strategies were even consciously adopted. Rather, she regarded the process as a product of a situation where administrators had all the background and information, where they perceived the committee as a "necessary evil" imposed by GFC, and where there was some

pressure to recommend policies as soon as possible.

The fact that it was a "closed" committee did not concern her because it also served one of her objectives. She knew that a more open process would involve considerably more time than she was prepared to commit and, therefore, she accepted the idea of confidentiality.

Throughout the committee's activities, Symons was closely allied with Zwirner, mainly because their major concern was for the welfare of individual faculty members. Since they shared a common view of the major issues it is not surprising that they collaborated in the committee. This was apparently a very informal arrangement but does demonstrate the formation of a coalition within the committee membership.

M. Sinkey was a senior librarian and had served on a number of campus-wide committees. Within the university's classification of faculty members, librarians are included as "Non-teaching Board Appointees," a fairly large group (approximately 100) comprised of many middle- and senior-level administrators in support departments in addition to university librarians. Although Sinkey was probably selected to represent this group, she did not see herself as a spokesman for any particular interest group. As one of only two female members of the committee, it is possible that her sex was also a consideration in her appointment.

Sinkey was very pleased with the process the committee went through. She felt there was a great deal of time spent defining the problem and a real effort made to include the concerns of all members. She believed decisions were reached through a consensus model and that there were no strategies adopted by others to try to influence the group.

She thought Krueger provided excellent leadership even though he was carrying extra responsibility as the acting president.

Although Sinkey thought there was a wide range in the amount of influence exerted by the committee members, she was reluctant to name any individuals as being more influential than others. It is possible she associated such conclusions or observations with a breach of the confidentiality adopted by the committee.

Sinkey's views of the issues conformed very closely to those of the senior administrators. These views, along with those of the other members, will be examined in detail in the next section.

J. McNeill, an associate professor in the faculty of education when appointed to the committee, was not closely identified with any policy-making structure nor with a special interest group. He was quite possibly appointed to represent the "faculty-at-large" as opposed to representation through the TUCFA executive. The fact he held his appointment in a faculty which was experiencing declining enrolments may also have been a consideration.

McNeill viewed the Krueger Committee as an extension of the work of DC and believed that most of the committee's recommendations had been conceived before the committee was struck. He also thought that the committee report would be only an initial step and that all recommendations would be dealt with at length by GFC.

Given the "awkward, ungainly" nature of the university organization, McNeill thought that the committee's process was both efficient and effective. The chairman focussed the committee's attention on the issues, prepared written statements where required, and also provided a

great deal of data required from the OIR.

McNeill felt that the committee restricted its search for alternatives to those options which might achieve acceptance without considerable opposition. As will be seen where the issues are discussed in detail, he thought the committee was constrained and unable to deal with what he considered some of the major problems.

McNeill would not discuss "on the record" his views on who were the more influential members of the committee. He suggested that there is no reasonable way of determining an actor's true influence and so it would be futile to attempt it.

B. Sheehan, director of the OIR, is the final actor to be described in this event. Sheehan was not a formally appointed member of the Krueger Committee although he attended all the meetings and took part in the discussions. In his role as a staff officer of the institution, he was sensitive to the need to restrict his contribution in such committees to providing information about the issues and the environment. However, because he had intimate knowledge of the policy-making processes of the university and about preceding events in the institution, he was able to exert influence in less direct ways.

Sheehan was called upon by the administration to provide information for many purposes. Even before this case began, Krueger had been provided information describing the enrolment trends, the aging problem of the faculty, and the policy options adopted by other institutions. A memo dated October 17, 1977 (Appendix G) outlined one of the main problems discussed by the Krueger Committee. It also described alternative policies which might be considered, as well as

the kinds of data which would be required to make policy decisions. As will be shown in a discussion of the outcome of this event, many of the policy options suggested by OIR were incorporated into the final recommendations of the committee. It was because of this potential for Sheehan and his office to influence, through the administrative structure of the organization, that he was included as a key actor in the policy-making system.

When describing the process that took place in the committee, Sheehan noted that very little original work took place in the early stages. Rather, the time was spent in educating people with very different backgrounds and perspectives about the technical aspects of the issues. As the issues became clearer, the discussion focussed on the sixteen points introduced by Krueger and, in fact, it became constrained by this list of items which served as an agenda.

Sheehan observed that the committee tended to "skirt around" any items which seemed contentious and then returned to them later. There was an apparent desire to avoid open conflict or disagreement on recommendations and, thus, decisions were reached through a "kind of synthesis." He stopped short of calling the process a consensus model but seemed to be in agreement with Symons's description of the process.

He was impressed by Krueger's leadership and thought it was only because of Krueger's efforts that the committee was able to report as early as it did.

Summary. The key actors in this event were the members of an ad hoc committee that had been appointed with membership from the three

constituencies of administration, faculty, and students. The dominant members of the committee were the administrators who had the advantages of being familiar with the operating environment, previous events in the PMS, and access to information through such departments as OIR. The faculty and student members, on the whole, recognized the power imbalance and apparently accepted it without resentment.

The actors viewed the decision-making process as one of either consensus or compromise. They recognized that the choices were constrained by both the previous decisions in the PMS and the control of the agenda by Krueger, the chairman. There appeared to be overall satisfaction with the direction provided by the chairman with the exception of the criticism suggested by two actors that at times he should have limited the length of discussions. However, other actors felt that he was to be commended for allowing discussion to continue and for providing everyone with an opportunity to speak.

Actors did not perceive many overt strategies for influencing the committee although there were certain linkages between actors, based on common interests and perceptions of the process and issues. These linkages are shown graphically in Figures 24 and 25. The administrators are believed to have the stronger linkages because of their common interests and joint activities in previous events in the system. The linkages between faculty representatives appeared strong only between Zwirner and Symons. Lucas apparently identified somewhat with the faculty group but Sinkey and McNeill seemed to have no firm linkages. The student members did not appear to belong to a coalition.




Figure 24 Event 4: Focus on actors (generalized)




Figure 25 Event 4: Focus on actors (detailed)

Issues

The actors in this event held differing views on what issue the Krueger Committee was to address. During the data collection interviews, each actor was asked to name the major problem he or she thought faced the committee and also was encouraged to state other secondary issues. When analysing the responses it was necessary to eliminate some suggestions which appeared to be solutions rather than problems or issues. The remaining statements all fell clearly into one of the three issues noted below.

1. Resource reallocation

This issue was identified by several actors as the major issue. Subsumed under this title are such terms as the financial problem, control over staffing, centralization of appointments, and program termination. This was seen as the major problem by Krueger, Sheehan, Lucas, and Ronaghan. It was closely identified with such environmental conditions as restricted revenues, increased faculty appointments coincident with declining enrolments, and the internal shift of student demands. Almost all actors saw this as either the major issue or at least an important one. The exceptions were Zwirner and Symons who were not convinced that a financial problem existed and believed, therefore, that resource reallocation, where necessary, could take place using existing mechanisms. Zwirner pointed to a large contingency fund and several annual surpluses as proof of his position that no financial problem existed. Symons observed that, in comparison with other Canadian universities, U of C was relatively prosperous.

2. Limited term appointments

For Zwirner and Symons, this was the major issue. They were concerned that the practice of offering only limited term appointments was both unfair to newly hired faculty and a handicap for the university in its attempts to recruit the best available new faculty. Lucas also perceived this as a major issue when he joined the Krueger Committee, but said he soon recognized it was not a major concern for the rest of the committee. In fact, no other actors named faculty appointment procedures as an issue they felt to be important.

3. Faculty renewal

This was the major issue identified by Hyne, Sinkey, Woods, McNeill, and Graham, and was described as the need to revitalize or bring "new blood" to the faculty at a time when the institution had reached a "steady state" or was actually declining in terms of student enrolment. The faculty age distribution problem (described earlier) was cited as one of the factors preventing renewal through normal attrition and replacement. This issue was also stated as a need to improve the overall quality of the academic staff by getting rid of the "deadwood" in the ranks of the faculty.

Interpretation. An examination of the actors' perceptions of the major issues (Figure 26) suggests general agreement on two of them (reallocation and faculty renewal) with only the two faculty members, Zwirner and Symons, in disagreement. It also appears, based upon data collected during the interviews, that several of the "non-aligned" actors (not administration or TUCFA) were unsure of the issues when

Issues Actors	Resource Reallocation	Faculty Appointments	Faculty Renewal
Krueger	M [*]		S [†]
Sheehan	M		S
Hyne			M
Woods	S		M
Sinkey	S		M
McNeill	S	S	M
Lucas	M	S	
Zwirner		M	
Symons		M	
Graham	S		M
Ronaghan	M		S
[*] Major issue			
[†] Secondary issue			

Figure 26 Event 4: Actors' perceptions of
 the major issues

they joined the committee but were persuaded by the arguments and information provided by the administration to accept its interpretation of the issues.

It was not surprising that given these conflicting perceptions of the issues a pure consensus model of decision-making was not possible. This was especially true since even those actors acknowledging the same major issue may have quite different objectives for the policies proposed to resolve the issue. For instance, although both Krueger and Ronaghan identified resource reallocation as the major issue, they had significantly different objectives. Clearly, Krueger wanted to correct the current imbalance between numbers of faculty and student enrolment in programs across the university. Ronaghan, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that resources would not be allocated primarily on the basis of student enrolment. He feared that programs in the humanities and social sciences would be dropped in order to provide greater support to the growth faculties.

In the next section, the outcomes of this event are examined in an attempt to relate each outcome or policy recommendation to the major issues identified above.

Outcomes

The outcomes of this event were the policy recommendations contained in the formal report submitted to the Executive Committee of GFC (GFC(Exec.)) (Appendix B). Eighteen policy recommendations were included in the report, each one addressing one and sometimes two of the major issues. None was intended to resolve a problem on its own;

rather, the committee intended that each policy would help to mitigate, in some way, the major issues. The recommendations are presented below along with some discussion of the rationale for each, the issue(s) to which each was directed, and, where possible, the actors associated with proposing each recommendation.

The first three recommendations can be viewed together as the establishment of a mechanism for increasing the central control of the position allocation system.

- (1) (a) *that, except as indicated by Recommendation (10), any further growth in the combined total number of regular full-time permanent and full-time limited term appointments be justified by an increase in overall student enrolment,*
and
 (b) *that a workload increase in any unit that is not accompanied by an increase in the University's total student enrolment, or any other academic requirement which justifies an additional appointment, be dealt with by the internal redistribution of vacancies.*

. . . that, effective April 1, 1979,
- (2) (a) *all funds released by vacancies which occur among the regular full-time permanent and full-time limited term appointments be centralized and placed under the direct administrative control of the Vice-President (Academic),*
and
 (b) *that the Vice-President (Academic) shall initiate recommendations for the re-allocation of such funds to E-1 budgets (academic salaries), for action by the University Budget Committee.*
- (3) *that the vice-President (Academic) be required to report to G.F.C. annually in December on the total academic staff profile of the University, including data on changes in the number of Board appointees in the various categories and ranks, in order to maintain an on-going scrutiny of the composition of the faculty and the potential ability of the University to respond to change.*

[The foregoing, and all italicized quotations which follow, are taken verbatim from U of C "Report of G.F.C. Ad Hoc Committee on Appointment Policies," February 7, 1979, pp. i - vii.]

These recommendations gave Krueger essentially the same mechanism he suggested in his initial proposal to DC in Event No. 2. Krueger was identified by other actors as the main proponent of these recommendations which were obviously directed toward resolving the issue of resource reallocation.

These first recommendations are characteristic in that they outlined the mechanisms or procedures through which a particular end may be accomplished, rather than only providing "major guidelines for action directed at the future," which was the definition of policy quoted in Chapter 1. Thus, they go beyond statements of policy into the planning for implementation and operation.

Filling vacancies with faculty currently on limited term appointments was the objective of recommendations 4 and 5:

- (4) *that, whenever new academic positions are authorized in the budget or the re-filling of vacancies is authorized, and an initial term appointment is to be made and is permitted under the Board policy, that any limited term appointees eligible for such a position be given first consideration.*
- (5) *that when full-time limited term appointments are recommended, and the unit concerned has the capacity to offer an initial term appointment, the head of the unit making the recommendation must provide an explanation to the Dean and/or the Vice-President (Academic) as to why an initial term appointment was not recommended.*

These recommendations are clearly associated with Zwirner and Symons who wished to protect faculty members on limited term appointments. The phrase "permitted under Board policy" is an acknowledgement of the 80/20 rule which TUCFA opposed; however, the faculty members achieved some success with No. 5. This recommendation is contrary to Krueger's initial proposal to DC which would have "frozen" the offers of initial term appointments.

Retirement proposals were intended to mitigate the negative effects of the faculty age distribution and, thus, contribute toward faculty renewal by allowing the university to hire new faculty sooner than might have been possible:

- (6) *that the University continue to provide more detailed Pension Plan information to faculty members, stressing in particular the arrangements available with respect to the establishment of certain types of service elsewhere as "pensionable service" under the Plan, and outlining the early retirement option.*
- (7) *that the Vice-President (Academic) initiate appropriate steps to develop criteria and guidelines for the appointment of retired faculty members to the rank of Professor Emeritus, as well as appropriate benefits accruing to that rank, for approval by G.F.C. and the Board of Governors.*

These proposals were not identified with any single committee member but rather were outlined in earlier reports from OIR to the administration.

Leaves of absence, secondments, and part-time continuing appointments were intended to assist in both resource reallocation by releasing operating funds, and faculty renewal by allowing faculty members to gain experience outside the institution:

- (8) *that where it can be accomplished without serious detriment to established programmes, leaves of absence and secondments (where appropriate) of faculty members to other institutions be actively encouraged by the University.*
- (9) *that the G.F.C. approve in principle the establishment of a new class of continuing part-time academic appointees, and that the G.F.C. recommend that the Board of Governors also approve this proposal in principle, with the understanding that detailed terms of reference for this appointment class will be prepared by the Associate Vice-President (Academic Administration), for consideration in the normal manner appropriate to Faculty Handbook amendments.*

These recommendations were not associated with particular actors but originated outside the committee, channelled to the committee by

Sheehan.

In the discussion of these recommendations the report assumed that their implementation could only benefit the institution. There was no apparent consideration of the possibility that these options would be taken up primarily by those faculty in greatest demand in other organizations or the community and virtually ignored by faculty members in least demand. This demand could be a function of both the market-ability of a particular discipline and the competence of a particular faculty member. If this proved to be the case, the university would lose the services of those it needed most and retain the full-time service of those it needed the least.

Integration of spring/summer and off-campus course offerings into regular workload appeared to have as its main objective the reallocation of resources from current faculty members to a pool of new faculty. However, by the hiring of some twenty-four new faculty there would be an infusion of "new blood" which would contribute to faculty renewal. In the recollection of several actors, these recommendations were closely associated with the administrators, most likely Hyne.

- (10) *that, without prejudice to the accepted norms of teaching load, Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus Evening Credit course instruction be incorporated into the regular teaching load of the academic staff,*
- (11) *that the Faculty of Continuing Education retain responsibility for the co-ordination of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, with the objective of facilitating and enhancing the development of these to the extent that budget allocations permit and student demand warrants.*
- (12) *that, in recognition of the potential importance of the further development of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, particularly with respect to the degree programmes of part-time students, the G.F.C. direct that each Faculty review its recent*

history of such offerings and develop policies and long-range plans. It is anticipated that, subject to student demand, Faculties will plan increases in the Spring/Summer and Off-Campus course offerings over time, these developments to be monitored by the Faculty of Continuing Education and reported annually to G.F.C.

The success of these recommendations hung on the assumption that the extra teaching load created by the integration of these programs could be accommodated by the departments and faculties by decreasing the number of low-enrolment sections taught. Apparently one factor not considered was that most of the departments which offered large spring/summer programs also offered large fall/winter programs (that is, had no slack in their teaching resources) and, therefore, could not absorb the extra load without either increasing individual workloads or hiring more staff. There was also an implied assumption that a definition of "normal load" existed and could be used in implementing the proposal.

This was one of the very few "designed" solutions in the report. This proposal was not borrowed from some other institution but was custom designed to meet the unique characteristics of U of C. It was supported in the committee by a great deal of enrolment and financial data presented by Krueger which tended to convince the members of its viability. However, one committee member (Symons) did remark that the background data were incomprehensible and the recommendations were accepted "on faith."

The dismissal for cause recommendation attempted to provide a detailed procedure by which tenured faculty members who were not meeting the institution's legitimate expectations could be dismissed. These dismissed faculty would presumably be replaced by more competent members, thus contributing to the process of faculty renewal. This recommendation

was associated with the administrators, most clearly Woods, who apparently developed the draft article:

- (13) *that the operational procedures described to document continued unsatisfactory performance of an academic staff member, and the consequent action leading to possible dismissal for cause, be approved.*

In addition to this rather brief recommendation there is a very detailed procedure (Appendix B, p. 23) for developing a prima facie case for dismissal. This procedure relies on the annual assessment process, which precedes the awarding of merit increments, by treating the awarding of two consecutive increments of "zero" as grounds for dismissal. As an alternative to proposing this procedure, the committee considered recommending changes to the tenure system in operation at the university. However, they decided it would be futile to recommend changes to such an established tradition even though at least two members (McNeill and Woods) considered it to be counter-productive in its current form.

This recommendation was of particular interest to Graham because one of his main objectives was to promote the use of student evaluations of faculty in the annual assessment process. The proposed procedures included such evaluations as an essential part of the assessment of teaching competence.

The program termination and faculty reallocation and retraining recommendations were proposed to deal with situations where entire programs might be significantly modified or terminated or where individual faculty members might become redundant in a program with declining enrolment. Obviously, these were addressed to the issue of resource reallocation and were intended both to facilitate the process

and to provide a measure of protection for individuals in those programs or units affected:

- (14) *that the mechanism outlined in this Report for the initiation of steps to consolidate or terminate programmes (or units) be approved and implemented.*
- (15) *that a new category of leave be established, specifically associated with the formal retraining of academic staff members who have been required by the University to re-direct the nature of their instructional contribution in order to meet changes in the demand patterns, and (a) that this leave be available for a period of up to 12 months with full salary and benefits, (b) that a dislocation allowance be provided, if necessary, and (c) that formal initiation of the granting of such leave rest with the University.*
- (16) *that a University policy be established whereby academic units in growth areas be required to provide evidence to the Vice-President (Academic) that the availability of staff within other related areas of the University (particularly those with declining enrolment) had been explored before off-campus recruitment to fill a vacant position is authorized.*

The reallocation of a faculty member's time from research or service to a greater teaching load was proposed as a means of resource reallocation:

- (17) *that a university policy be established whereby academic staff members who are not significantly involved in research or service activity may be called upon to assume a higher instructional load as part of their normal appointment obligations.*

This recommendation was proposed by members of the administration and received considerable opposition from faculty members on the committee. In particular, Zwirner refused to endorse the recommendation even though he refrained from submitting a minority report. He subsequently spoke against the motion at GFC. The major reasons for his objection appeared to be that the recommendation intruded on the right of the faculty member to allocate his own time within a certain institutional framework and also that poor researchers are probably poor

teachers as well.

The administrative involvement of academic staff recommendation was directed at the issue of resource reallocation and was proposed by Symons:

(18) *that the University review the administrative processes involving faculty members in order to determine the most effective use of the administrative ability of academic faculty, as an integral part of their overall university contribution.*

This recommendation was apparently a reaction against what Symons saw as a report containing many suggestions for increasing the efficiency of faculty members but, to that point, with no reference to administration. The rationale behind the recommendation appeared to be that if teaching spring/summer could be absorbed into regular load with no extra pay, then many administrative jobs could also be performed with no extra pay. Since no agreement could be reached among committee members, the final recommendation stopped short of specific proposals and suggested only that a review be undertaken.

A summary of the recommendations is presented in Figure 27. These data show the relationships between the recommended policy changes and the issues identified previously and indicates the probable origins of each set of recommendations.

These outcomes demonstrate what appeared to have been an operating principle of the committee; that is, that "everyone gets something." Krueger achieved his initial objective of a position-control mechanism; Zwirner achieved some protection for limited term appointees; Woods saw dismissal procedures proposed; Hyne managed to have several proposals included to increase the quality of faculty; Symons was able to include

I s s u e s				
Recommendation No.		Resource Reallocation	Limited Term Appointments	Probable Origin
1	Position	✓		Krueger
2	control	✓		
3		✓		
4	Limited		✓	Zwirner
5	terms		✓	
6	Retirement			OIR ?
7				
8	Leaves/part-time	✓		OIR ?
9	appointments	✓		
10	Spring/summer	✓		Hyne ?
11	integration	✓		
12		✓		
13	Dismissal			Woods
14	Program	✓		Admini- stration
15	termination	✓		
16		✓		
17	Faculty members' time	✓		Hyne ?
18	Administrative involvement	✓		Symons

Figure 27 The Krueger Report: Relationships between recommendations, issues, and probable origins of recommendations

a reference to administrative workload; and Graham saw support for the use of student evaluations of instructors. This does not suggest that each of these individuals did not have other concerns and objectives; nevertheless, based on data collected in the interviews, it appeared that most actors had a primary goal. When this goal was achieved they could then support other measures proposed by the committee.

The process produced a set of recommendations each of which is somewhat independent of the rest; thus, for the most part, each could stand or fall without affecting the viability of the others. (This, of course, is not true for those which provided the mechanism for implementing a main proposal.) This "loose coupling" of the recommendations forced the authorizing body to consider parts of the report separately and minimized the possibility that the entire report would be rejected.

Another feature of the report was that no alternatives were offered for any of the recommendations. For instance, there was no choice provided on how "position control" could be achieved; rather, a single mechanism was described and recommended to GFC. Mintzberg et al. (1974) pointed out that this is a characteristic approach in cases of strategic decision-making. Particularly in instances where solutions are "designed" rather than just adopted from other situations, the organization tends to develop only one policy proposal to handle a given issue. In this case, although many proposals were put forward they were not alternatives but, rather, complementary policies.

The event just described was the major development activity in the policy-making system. The final events concentrate on the evaluation, choice, and authorization of the policy statements.

EVENT 5: EVALUATION

The major evaluation activity began when the GFC (Exec.) circulated the report throughout the university. Of course, evaluation had been taking place in the Krueger Committee prior to this event as an integral part of the development routine; however, at this point a major and separate evaluation was undertaken by individuals and groups in the environment prior to the formal selection activity.

Environment

The PMS in the previous event was closed by a decision of the key actors, whereas in this event the system was deliberately opened by a decision of the GFC (Exec.). Individuals and groups who had had no role in the development of the policy statements were requested to consider the proposals and to report back to GFC.

The committee had been working in secrecy for the better part of a year and when the report was released many people were taken by surprise. Some of those on GFC who set up the committee had forgotten its existence or at least had difficulty in recalling its precise task. Nevertheless, when the (almost mandatory) request for reactions was issued there was a prompt response and serious consideration given throughout the university environment.

The separation of system and environment in this event poses an interesting problem. Should those individuals and groups in the university who reacted to the report be considered part of the system or part of its environment? They had no decision-making authority and, on that basis, should not be considered part of the PMS. However, their

reactions could, to a considerable degree, determine the final outcome of the system. This was apparently a situation where an arbitrary decision was required and it was decided to exclude the respondents from the system. Part of the reasons for this decision was that since discussions took place in such a large number of locations in the organization and included so many individuals it would have been impossible to identify all actors involved.

The operating environment of the university did not change perceptibly from the previous event. Student enrolment remained static and the budget allocations increased barely enough to accommodate inflation. The institution had adopted no new policies and procedures regarding appointments, promotion, or dismissals which could affect the operating environment.

In summary, the environment of the policy-making system had not changed substantially since the beginning of the previous event. However, because the boundaries of the system had been opened up there was to be much more interaction between the system and its environment during this event.

Process

The final report of the Krueger Committee was dated February 5, 1979 and was placed on the agenda of the GFC (Exec.) on February 13, 1979. After a lengthy discussion of both the substance of the report and its disposition, the GFC (Exec.) recommended to GFC that the report be *received* at the next regular meeting of GFC and that it be returned to GFC for appropriate action at its meeting on March 22, 1979. The

secretary was requested to distribute the report to the appropriate groups and committees for their reactions, which were requested prior to the March 22 meeting. The date was extended to March 31 at the request of several respondents who wanted more time to consider the recommendations. Thus, responses to the report were prepared over a six-week period between February 13 and March 31, 1979.

Throughout the preparation of the responses there was a great deal of formal and informal interchange among groups in the environment. This was facilitated among faculty councils of the university through a series of cross-memberships whereby each faculty has a member sitting on each of the other councils which are in some way allied with them. These members provide a formal communications network through which information and viewpoints are exchanged. In addition, TUCFA held a special meeting to examine the likely impact of the recommendations on their members and also published information in their monthly newsletter. All these activities served to heighten awareness of the report and encourage responses to the GFC (Exec.).

Of particular interest was a process involving the Faculty of Continuing Education (FCE) in response to the recommendations proposing integration of the spring/summer/off-campus offerings into the regular workload. Of all the recommendations, these were the only ones that threatened a particular organizational unit. Whereas the effects of the other proposals would be spread over several faculties and departments and a great many individuals, FCE was threatened with loss of control of class scheduling and the recruitment of instructors. It would also undoubtedly lose a considerable portion of its budget and,

perhaps, a number of faculty and support staff positions.

R. Chapman of FCE had been asked before the report was finalized to react to the mechanisms for implementation as set forth in the proposals for integration. Chapman, with the assistance of his senior administrators, reacted with some positive suggestions on how integration might be accomplished, although in private they were convinced that integration would not be in the best interests of their faculty or the university as a whole. When the GFC report was made public, FCE prepared a response which attempted to discredit much of the data used by the Krueger Committee and to show that the proposal would cost the university a considerable amount of money if implemented.

The FCE report went to the GFC (Exec.) (of which Chapman was a member), and was circulated to several key individuals and groups in other parts of the university who were in the process of preparing their own responses. In addition, FCE staff were encouraged to make the faculty's position known throughout the university through informal talks with colleagues or by formal input into faculty or departmental meetings. It is difficult to determine the consequences of these activities but it is possible they had considerable effect in the final disposition of these particular recommendations.

The process adopted by other units ranged from a report prepared and submitted by a dean or department head, to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to prepare a report, to a formal procedure within a faculty council. In most cases, the actual drafting of a response was done by a single individual or very small group and then either submitted over the dean's signature or formally approved by a meeting of

faculty members.

These responses were reviewed by the GFC (Exec.) on April 12, 1979, marking the end of the fifth event in the PMS.

Actors

Upon submission of their report, all members of the Krueger Committee left the PMS with the exception of Krueger, who remained in the system in his role as VP(A). Added to the PMS were members of the GFC (Exec.) and the GFC secretary. These actors collectively determined the disposition of the report, who would be asked to respond, and how the responses would be handled. Their decisions, therefore, related not to the substance of the report but to the determination of the policy-making process. They made the judgement that it would be better to solicit responses from the whole university in advance of GFC deliberations rather than have them all surface on the floor of GFC.

It was difficult to determine who were the more influential actors in this event (Figure 28). However, Krueger, because of his position, continued to exert considerable influence. R. Carnie, secretary of GFC, also exercised some influence in determining who would be asked to respond. The GFC (Exec.) minutes indicated that he had considerable latitude and chose to adopt a very large distribution list when circulating the Krueger Committee report. Another member of the GFC (Exec.), Chapman, was active not only in the decisions of the executive but in the preparation of the FCE response to the report.

Many of the influential actors in this event were in the environment rather than the PMS itself. Their influence was manifest



Ca = Carnie
C = Chapman

Figure 28 Event 5: Focus on actors

in the reports developed and submitted in response to the request of the GFC (Exec.). The degree of influence of each individual response was based on two primary factors. First, the quality of their response, which could include the rationale, the supporting data, and the format of presentation. The second, and perhaps more important factor, was the status or importance ascribed to that group or individual responding. For example, the response of the budget committee that the integration of spring/summer would cost the university more money was influential primarily because it was the conclusion of the budget committee. Similarly, the negative reaction of the APDC to the recommendation on dismissals could be expected to be influential in the selection phase. The reason for making these references here is to establish that the eventual success or failure of each recommendation may have been rooted in the responses of particular actors in the environment to specific recommendations in the report.

Issues

The issues within the boundaries of the PMS during this event were in part processual (that is, how to handle the report and the responses); however, several concerns arose in the environment that would influence the selection process in the next event. To the extent that actors in the system were aware of these concerns they can be recognized as issues. Following are the four major issues detected in an examination of the responses:

1. Threat to organizational survival

This threat was felt keenly by many units with obviously

declining enrolments. Their responses reflected a concern that the recommendations could facilitate the elimination or consolidation of programs and organizational units. The most obvious example of this concern was found in the response of the faculty of fine arts which challenged most of the Krueger Report. The reaction of FCE was mentioned earlier and was based at least in part on a desire for self-preservation.

2. Centralization of the appointment process

This became an issue in some of the responses where particular concern was expressed that the decision-making power seemed concentrated in the hands of the VP(A). It was suggested that this authority should be vested in a group rather than one individual. That there was little reaction from individual deans to this issue of centralization is understandable since any negative reaction might be interpreted as an attempt by them to maintain their own power at the expense of the whole institution.

3. Threat to individual faculty teaching loads

This concern was raised in connection with the proposed integration of spring/summer into regular teaching loads. Several responses expressed the view that the workload could not be absorbed as easily as suggested and that, since extra funds would not be available for the required additional staff, the existing faculty would have to increase their teaching loads. Although not explicitly stated, there was also a reaction against the recommended removal of payment for teaching extra courses in spring/summer. This was most likely seen as a plot by the administration to get more teaching for the same amount of money.

4. Resource reallocation, limited term appointments, and faculty renewal

These issues, identified in the previous event, continued to be the main ones addressed by the Krueger Report itself. However, the others noted above also gained prominence as the total university community became more involved (Figure 29).

Outcomes

The main outcomes of this event were the responses to the Krueger Report made by many individuals and groups throughout the university. A total of thirty-five formal responses were received and circulated to members of GFC. Of the total responses, twelve were from individuals, eighteen from faculties and departments, and five from various committees (Appendix H). These responses were analysed to determine the level of support there was for each recommendation and the results are presented in Appendix I, with a summary provided in Table 1. In some instances, responses did not lend themselves to analysis by individual recommendations and these have been omitted from the data.

The summary shows clearly which of the recommendations were contentious within the organization. An overview of the concerns and rationale provided in the responses is given below for those recommendations where significant opposition developed.

Position control. This issue met with some opposition from those who felt that it would result in decisions being made purely on the basis of enrolment counts, thus removing any sensitivity on the part of administration to the need to protect programs that may not




Figure 29 Event 5: Focus on process

Recommendation No.	Endorse with				No Comment
	Endorse	Amendments	Oppose	Refer	
1 Position	5	3	7	0	10
2 control	4	8	0	1	12
3	12	0	1	0	12
4 Limited	12	7	1	0	5
5 terms	14	3	0	0	8
6 Retirement	13	0	0	0	12
7	13	0	0	0	12
8 Leaves/part-time	12	2	0	0	11
9 appointments	12	1	0	0	12
10 Spring/summer	1	7	11	2	5
11 integration	4	0	14	0	7
12	4	5	9	1	6
13 Dismissal	6	0	3	3	13
14 Program	5	2	2	1	15
15 termination	9	2	1	0	13
16	8	0	1	0	16
17 Faculty members' time	2	9	4	1	9
18 Administrative involvement	13	1	0	0	11

Table 1 Summary of responses
to Krueger Report

meet the current fancy of the community. Two of the amendments suggested the criteria for reallocation be broadened to include factors other than enrolment. Another source of opposition was the reluctance to vest the authority for reallocation with the VP(A). A suggestion was made that a committee might be more appropriate.

Limited term appointments. This recommendation received some opposition to the idea that preference in filling vacancies should be given to current limited term appointees. Several respondents felt this might compromise the institution's ability to recruit the best person for the position.

Integration of spring/summer into regular programs. This recommendation received the greatest opposition. The reasons stated were that the proposal would cost the university more money, individual faculty teaching loads might increase, and faculty members might be deprived of a block of time when they are free to do research without teaching responsibilities. Opposition to recommendations 11 and 12 indicated that if integration became a fact there would be no reason to include the FCE in the process. This reaction reinforced the view taken by FCE that if integration succeeded it would severely disrupt their role in the organization.

Dismissals. This recommendation met opposition from those who felt it should be considered by APDC and, hence, the suggestion to refer it to that committee. APDC opposed the recommendation because they thought it might "backfire," resulting in fewer zero increments being awarded, rather than more dismissals being effected.

Reallocation of faculty members' time from research to teaching.

This recommendation met with considerable opposition based on an argument that such a move would be a violation of faculty members' rights. The responses containing amendments proposed that any reallocation be done with the faculty members' consent. This would probably remove any benefits as perceived by the Krueger Committee, since the intention of the recommendation appeared to be to get more teaching out of those faculty who were not "pulling their weight" in research. Such faculty members would be unlikely to volunteer for a heavier teaching load. The point was also made that poor researchers may be poor teachers as well.

In general, the outcome of this event was to illuminate specific recommendations with which particular individuals and groups disagreed. It undoubtedly provided opponents of specific recommendations an opportunity to document their arguments and lobby with other groups for support.

In terms of the conceptual model for the study, the outcomes of this event, combined with the recommendations from the previous event, now became the input to the next stage of policy-making. This next stage involves the processes of choice and authorization which, in this case, were performed by the senior legislating bodies of the university.

EVENT 6: CHOICE AND AUTHORIZATION

This final event in the PMS involves both the selection and authorization of the final policy statements and will once more employ the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes.

Environment

The boundary of the PMS contracted in this event to include only members of GFC and BOG. Both these groups had, however, close linkages with the environment. GFC is representative of faculty, students, and administrators, the main constituents in the university environment, whereas the BOG represents primarily the community.

During the previous event individuals and groups provided input to the system through formal channels in response to the GFC (Exec.) request. Once the report went to the floor of GFC for consideration, the input from the environment was of a more informal nature, communicated through the individual members of GFC. Most of these members were now familiar with the recommendations of the Krueger Report since they were involved in consideration of the report during the last event.

The extensive discussions during the previous event resulted in a large number of informed and, in many cases, apprehensive individuals and groups in the environment of the final event. They had made their input into the process through their formal responses and were now relying on their representatives to GFC to support their positions.

Process

The GFC and BOG are legislating bodies that generally do not get involved with the initiation or development of policy but, rather, accept or reject policy suggestions made by others. In many cases these suggestions are brought forward by committees set up by the council or board to examine specific issues, while in other cases the policy recommendations are proposed by the administration. In either case,

recommendations are usually either accepted without change, accepted with minor modifications, or rejected outright. This observation is consistent with the model developed by Mintzberg (1974) and incorporated in the conceptual model. The decisions of GFC and BOG respecting the recommendations of the Krueger Committee were summarized by the OIR and are included in Appendix J. The processes leading up to several of these decisions are examined below.

The report was initially introduced to GFC by Krueger, who gave the rationale for establishing the committee and for the recommendations. During this introduction, the VP(A) restated the problems of fiscal restraint, static or declining enrolments, and the imbalance between enrolment and numbers of faculty. He also stated the need for the university to "demonstrate to the government, . . . to the public, and to ourselves, that we are capable of putting our affairs in order and looking ahead and striving for . . . the appropriate sort of balance between resources on one hand and programs on the other" (GFC minutes, 176.4.1, February 22, 1979).

In the ensuing general discussion, many of the arguments contained in the responses referred to in Event 5 were presented. This discussion was wide ranging, not focussing on specific recommendations. The recommendations were then considered serially in subsequent meetings of GFC, beginning with numbers 1 and 2, at the 179th meeting on April 12, 1979.

Recommendations 1 and 2

These were introduced by N. Wagner, the recently appointed president of the university. Before inviting discussion in the council,

the president stated that he had already had discussions with the BOG executive, who had "invited" him to provide a plan for the implementation of recommendations 1 and 2. The president also indicated his intention to appoint a six-member ad hoc Program Review Committee (PRC) that would "consolidate, prioritize, and redevelop a university program for the 1980s" (GFC minutes, 179.3.1, April 12, 1979).

The PRC would provide guidance to a second, permanent Position Allocation Committee (PAC) which would provide the mechanism for implementing the first two recommendations. The president had, by making the above statements, informed GFC that the recommendations would be approved by the BOG regardless of what GFC did, and that he had already determined his preferred method of implementation which included the PAC.

Recommendations 1 and 2 were then forwarded to BOG for final authorization prior to implementation. Then, along with a set of implementation guidelines submitted by the administration, they were approved on May 17, 1979.

Recommendations 3 to 9

As indicated in Appendix J, these were approved without amendment. No. 9, dealing with permanent part-time appointments, was subsequently authorized for implementation by BOG on November 15, 1979.

Recommendations 10 to 12

These related to the integration of spring/summer/off-campus programs into the regular workload and had precipitated the most vocal reaction in Event 5 and were the subject of extended discussions at GFC. As the secretary of GFC understated, "The responses indicated less than

a high degree of enthusiasm for Recommendation 10" (GFC minutes, 180.6.2, April 26, 1979). Wagner, in his role as chairman of GFC, revealed he was not in agreement with the Krueger Committee's rationale when he suggested that "a successful integration of spring/summer offerings might well cost the University more money, and that people should beware of the notion of a 'bonanza' of new appointments" (GFC minutes, 180.6.2, April 26, 1979). As a means of dealing with the situation, GFC established an ad hoc committee, chaired by Chapman, with membership selected by him to "identify both program and course needs for spring, summer, and evening credit . . . and to make recommendations to GFC on ways and means of meeting those needs" (GFC minutes, 180.6.2, April 26, 1979).

This new ad hoc committee subsequently recommended to GFC the appointment of a standing Advisory Committee on Special Sessions (ACSS) along with a number of recommendations, none of which supported the main thrust of the Krueger Committee. The report of the ad hoc committee was approved and the standing committee appointed. The subsequent report of the standing committee was also approved.

The process is reported as an example of the initiation of a contiguous PMS and is represented schematically in Figure 30. In this case there was an overlap of actors in the two systems, although the issues addressed by the systems were quite different. The Krueger Committee recommended the integration of spring/summer as a mechanism for resource reallocation and faculty renewal, whereas Chapman, perceiving the initial situation as a threat to his organization, assisted in redirecting GFC's attention toward the issue of how to improve the present operation of the spring and summer sessions. It is most likely




Figure 30 Event 6: Focus on process:
Termination of the PMS

that had the Krueger Committee not recommended the integration, the ACSS would never have been appointed.

Recommendation 13

This proposal dealt with dismissal procedures, and was the subject of extended debate. Although the speakers all agreed on the necessity to have adequate procedures there was no agreement on the merit of those recommended by the Krueger Committee. Therefore, the matter was referred, without direction, to APDC, the key group in the contiguous PMS which was attempting to develop revisions to the U of C Handbook for Faculty.

Recommendation 14

As this recommendation outlined procedures for the consolidation or termination of programs, it was approved with amendments which ensured that the deans and department heads would be more involved and that the VP(A) would be assisted by an ad hoc committee of GFC whenever such studies (concerning program consolidation or termination) were undertaken. These amendments had the effect of reducing the role of the VP(A) in such cases and may well have been a reaction against the tendency toward centralization in the report.

Recommendation 15

This recommendation provided for retraining of faculty members, and was approved as amended. The amendment was proposed by the current president of TUCFA and Zwirner, and was intended to ensure that the faculty members taking retraining leave would be protected against any additional financial costs.

Recommendation 16

This proposal was approved as presented, and ensured that current faculty members would be considered when faculty vacancies occurred in other departments or faculties.

Recommendation 17

This recommendation was concerned with the redistribution of individual faculty member's teaching and research workloads, and was defeated.

Recommendation 18

This called for a review of administrative processes and was referred to the president as part of a more general review of the cost and efficiency of administration at U of C.

Actors

Three members of the Krueger Committee again took active roles in the process (Figure 31). Krueger introduced the report to GFC and then played an active part in discussion of specific recommendations. He appeared to avoid advocating too strongly any of the recommendations with the exception of 1 and 2. Rather, he adopted the role of providing information and clarification at the request of the chairman or individual members. This stance was interpreted by Zwirner as demonstrating weak leadership by not influencing GFC's consideration of the report. It could also be interpreted as showing sound political judgement, particularly after Krueger had achieved his major goal of a resource reallocation mechanism.

Hyne spoke at GFC during the initial debate on the report. His




Figure 31 Event 6: Focus on actors

comments seemed primarily intended to convince GFC of the need to demonstrate to the government and society that the university is prepared to manage its own affairs by taking some very difficult decisions. Following this initial statement Hyne did not enter the debate on any of the specific recommendations.

Zwirner was again involved in his role as an elected member of GFC although he was no longer president of TUCFA. He proposed several amendments to motions and spoke on several occasions demonstrating the same concerns as have been discussed earlier. During these latter stages of the system he worked closely with other members of the TUCFA executive and had considerable influence on the positions taken by that body in both their written response to the report and their presentations at GFC.

Chapman's role in the process was described briefly during the last event. He continued to influence decisions relating to the integration of spring/summer, both directly through statements at GFC and indirectly through individual discussions with other members of the council. An example of this indirect influence came when a faculty member of FCE made a presentation to the TUCFA executive and succeeded in having TUCFA reverse its position on the recommendation. Whereas TUCFA had accepted the recommendation without comment, after the representation a new position paper opposing the integration proposal was drawn up and distributed just prior to the GFC meeting.

Wagner had recently succeeded Cochrane as president of U of C and during this event became involved in the process as the chairman of GFC. During an interview, Wagner described his view of both the issues

in this specific case and the general process of university policy-making (Wagner, January, 1980:p.c.). He considered the primary issue faced by the Krueger Committee, and subsequently by GFC, as one of rationalizing the budget process of the university. He felt that with a proper position control mechanism, funds could be transferred effectively from one program or department to another in response to changing needs. He also saw position control as a solution to the problem created when positions became vacant part way through a budget year. Under the previous procedure the money attached to those positions would remain unspent in the departments until the end of the budget year, thus resulting in a pool of unexpended funds. Under a position control mechanism, such funds would immediately revert to the "central pool" and be reallocated where needed.

A secondary issue identified by Wagner was the need for an effective vehicle for implementing the recommendations approved by GFC. He viewed the role of GFC as one of approving broad policy statements, whereas he and the other administrators should be responsible for determining methods for carrying out the policies. While this is consistent with the traditional division of responsibilities between legislating and administrative components of an organization, it is at odds with several of the responses to the Krueger Committee report. These respondents did not want to endorse or oppose a particular policy until they knew how it was going to be implemented, thus forcing consideration of implementation procedures by the legislating body.

Wagner also discussed his view of the role of committees and councils in the policy-making or governance process in universities.

He stated that while such groups were necessary to give credibility to certain policies, they probably did not produce better decisions than if the decisions were made by one or two individuals. As an example, he suggested that two people could do all the work of the Budget Committee in far less time but, although the budget may be equally as good, it would not be accepted by the university as a whole. In making these observations, Wagner did not suggest that the governance process should be organized differently. Rather, he said that this requirement to involve the many constituencies in decision-making is the "nature of the beast" and administrators must learn to accept and live with the system.

Many other individuals took active parts in the debate of the recommendations at GFC. In most cases they represented previously identified interest groups or specific administrative offices and brought forward arguments or concerns which had already been presented in the formal responses to the report. It was not obvious within the context of GFC which other individuals were particularly influential.

Issues

Essentially, all of the issues present in the final event had been identified at some previous step in the process. Two issues that received some additional attention were those of implementation and the process of decision-making within GFC. Wagner had a particularly important role in both these issues and appeared to be influential in directing the process of GFC and in determining the implementation strategy, especially the position control mechanism. At a point when it appeared the discussion might get bogged down on the question of

implementation, he suggested that between meetings of GFC he would meet with the chairman of the Budget Committee and other key individuals and come back with a recommendation to GFC. At the next meeting the mechanism adopted was an effective compromise which avoided some potential conflict and expedited the process of GFC.

The formal nature of GFC as a legislating body dictates the framework within which the process must proceed. This framework is the result of the formally adopted rules of order and the precedents established in practice. However, within this framework GFC retains considerable latitude for disposing of specific issues or decisions, and this results in much of the discussion focussing on the process rather than on the substance of a particular recommendation. In this case the fairly complex set of recommendations presented to the council absorbed considerable time and effort throughout the discussions.

Outcomes

The primary outcomes of this event are also the major outputs of the full PMS. The policy statements contained in Appendix J were the final statements authorized by either GFC or the BOG and marked the completion of the PMS as it was defined in the conceptual model. These policy statements now become part of the operating environment, as shown in Figure 30 (on page 186) to be implemented either by means established in the policy statements themselves or through mechanisms developed within the administrative structure.

Secondary outcomes of this event related to the three contiguous PMSs shown in Figure 30 (page 186). The first of these had as its

central decision-making body the APDC and attempted to formulate revisions to the U of C Handbook for Faculty. This system had been operating prior to the initiation of the focal PMS and could be considered a contiguous and parallel system. GFC obviously considered that the dismissal recommendation of the Krueger Committee should be dealt with by the contiguous PMS and referred it to the APDC after very little debate and with no direction to the committee.

The second contiguous PMS involved the determination of policies relating to spring and summer sessions. The new policy-making system quickly dropped the issue of integration and began to focus on ways of modifying spring and summer sessions better to meet the needs of the part-time students. The establishment of this contiguous PMS effectively neutralized the threat posed to FCE and to individual faculty members' workloads, even though no formal rejection of the integration proposal was ever recorded at GFC.

The third contiguous PMS was initiated by Wagner when he appointed the ad hoc Program Review Committee. This committee was to complete a survey of all major programs offered at the university and was to establish a set of priorities which would serve as a guide for the decisions of the PAC. In addition to providing this list of priorities, the committee would obviously serve the needs of Wagner by providing an opportunity for him to become familiar with programs throughout the institution.

SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the detailed data describing the

six events in the case. Within each event the environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes were described in accordance with the PMS model. The model also provided the basis for the data interpretation and analysis, which were presented in narrative and symbolic form, along with the descriptive data. To provide a summary of the process a composite model was prepared and is presented in Appendix K. This diagramatic representation of the PMS attempts to show the integration of the major activities and issues within the operating environment of the system.

The final chapter briefly summarizes the findings of the study, presents conclusions about university policy-making, and suggests a number of implications for practice and further research.

Chapter 6

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

A number of specific questions were posed when the problem was stated in Chapter 1. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings relating to each of those questions, to draw some general conclusions about policy-making in universities, and finally, to suggest several implications for those involved in university policy-making.

FINDINGS

The questions from Chapter 1 are restated below and followed by brief summaries of the data (collected during the study and reported in Chapter 5) which related to each question.

A. The Environment

1. *What particular stresses in the environment evoked the policy-making system?*

The university was reacting to a combination of societal stresses including a static total enrolment, shifting student demands among programs, restrictions on government funding, and a perceived lack of confidence in the university. These features in the environment created stresses in the operating environment of the organization which eventually caused the policy-making system to be initiated. The dominant stress in the operating environment appeared to be

the inability of the management system either to reallocate faculty resources among programs or to curtail the growth in the total number of faculty.

2. *How did the environment influence the process that developed within the policy-making system?*

The PMS was affected in many ways by features of its environment. For example, the reactions of the administration constituency in Deans' Council resulted in a modification of the initial policy statement and the challenge by TUCFA (representing the faculty constituency) completely redirected the process. Through incidents such as these the environment determined, in large degree, the nature of the process and the specific steps the process would take. However, the degree of influence of the environment was not uniform throughout the process since the boundary of the system varied considerably in its permeability from one event to the next.

3. *How did other policy-making systems interact with the focal system?*

The focal system had interaction with several contiguous PMSs. For example, the initial diagnosis of the problem by the faculty constituency was influenced by the activities of a PMS focusing on the promotion and salaries of full professors. Toward the end of the process at least two new PMSs were initiated by actions within the focal policy-making system.

B. The Process

1. *What major activities were undertaken during the process? Can these activities be categorized in terms of their function in the policy-making process?*

Six major events were identified using a classification system adopted in the conceptual model. The classification was based on function and appeared to serve the needs of the study. The major events in the process were: problem recognition and diagnosis, the first development phase, the major interrupt, the second diagnosis and development phase, evaluation, and choice and authorization.

2. *In the early stages of the process, what attempts were made, if any, to predetermine the activities that would be undertaken in order to arrive at a policy?*

When the issue was initially identified by the president and the VP(A), they decided the route the policy-making should take. This route involved the VP(A) obtaining the Deans' Council input, then returning the proposal to the president who would (presumably) transmit it to the Board of Governors for approval. When Krueger and Cochrane discussed the problem they agreed in general terms what steps would be taken but did not formally document the proposed process. It appears the major decision was whether to develop the policy through the administrative structure (involving DC) or to process it through the "academic" structure (involving General Faculties Council).

3. *How closely was the process followed? For what reasons did the actual process deviate from the planned process?*

The process deviated from the planned route when the faculty constituency, through the president of TUCFA, challenged the authority of DC and succeeded in having the matter brought to GFC. From that point, the general process was controlled primarily by the decisions of GFC and GFC (Exec.) who determined which committees would become involved, when outside input would be sought, and how the proposals would

be authorized.

4. *For each of the major activities identified:*

- (a) who were the actors involved and in what way did they participate?*
- (b) what issues were perceived by the actors?*
- (c) had the environment changed significantly from the previous major activity?*
- (d) what were the boundaries of the policy-making system and had they shifted from the previous activity?*

The policy-making process was divided into six major activities or events, using a classification system adapted from Mintzberg et al. (1974) and incorporated into the conceptual model. These events were 1) problem recognition and diagnosis, 2) the first development phase, 3) the major interrupt, 4) second diagnosis and development phase, 5) evaluation, and 6) choice and authorization.

Each event was briefly described in Chapter 4 and then described in detail in Chapter 5. The data referring to actors and their activities, actors' perceptions of issues, the environment, and the shifting of the system's boundaries are all included in Chapter 5 and were considered too extensive to repeat in this section.

C. The Actors

1. *On what basis were actors included in or excluded from the process?*

Actors tended to be included on the basis of either their position in the administrative structure, their identification with a specific constituency, or their membership in a contiguous PMS. The basis for inclusion changed with each event, dependent upon the nature of the activities. For example, a number of actors were included in

the second development phase because they represented particular constituencies but were excluded from the succeeding events when their report went to GFC.

2. *Did the actors perceive themselves and others as representing specific interest groups?*

For the most part, the actors did perceive themselves and others as representing particular interest groups. This perception was tempered, however, with a view that they each also represented the common interests of the institution.

3. *Were the actors predisposed to particular policy alternatives and to what extent did they feel the final policy statements incorporated their preferences?*

The administrators appeared to be the only actors with predetermined policy preferences. While the president of TUCFA also was predisposed toward certain positions, his input tended to be more protectionist in nature (i.e. defending the faculty constituency) rather than being in favor of specific new policy alternatives. Many of the actors in the PMS had no previous knowledge of the issues and therefore held no initial preferences.

4. *Did the actors adopt strategies through which they could influence the outcome of the process? Did other actors recognize such strategies?*

A number of strategies were adopted, the most obvious being the strategy of Zwirner to move the locus of decision-making from Deans' Council and the administrators to GFC where the faculty could exert more influence. Another example was the strategy of Chapman to defeat the proposal recommending integration of spring/summer programs. Other minor strategies were adopted by actors in the Krueger committee; specifically, there were those involving Hyne/Woods and Zwirner/Symons.

For the most part, actors did not recognize the use of strategies or were reluctant to "accuse" a colleague of adopting a strategy. This appears to reflect the attitude that decisions should be reached through a rational, collegial process and that any attempt to "strategize" should be viewed in negative terms.

5. *Were the actors perceived by themselves and other actors to have more or less power in relation to specific issues and in relation to other actors?*

Attempts were made during the data collection interviews to have actors assess the relative levels of power exerted by themselves and others. Although several actors were reluctant to make such assessments (perhaps another manifestation of the collegial ethic) there was general agreement that the administrators exercised the most power, followed by the faculty representatives and then the students. The level of power also appeared to be dependent upon the nature of each specific issue. Where the issue was acknowledged to be a legitimate interest or within the decision-making prerogative of one group or individual then that person or group could more easily influence the process.

D. The Issues

1. *How was the primary issue initially identified and through what means did the issue become the legitimate focus of a policy-making activity?*

The VP(A), Krueger, identified and diagnosed the problem with the assistance of the OIR and then had it legitimized as an issue by the university president.

2. *Were the issues clearly defined when the process began and did the definitions remain constant or were they redefined during the course of policy development?*

The issues were clearly defined by Krueger but lost much of their clarity as new actors were introduced to the system. Each actor had his or her own perception of the major issue, which in some cases bore little relationship to the initial issue. It was possible, however, to identify the major issues that surfaced in each of the six events. These issues were not necessarily redefined in the process, but, rather, were given higher or lower priorities depending upon the influential actors in each event. In the major development activity (the Krueger committee) the definition of the issues was expanded to include virtually all the concerns of the committee members.

3. *How were the issues interrelated, both within and between the system and its environment?*

Most issues were clearly related because they originated from the same stresses in the operating environment; however, the differing emphasis on particular issues appeared to be related to the roles of the actors in the environment. In other words, although actors may have accepted all the issues as being legitimate they placed special importance on the one or two issues which directly affected them or their constituency.

E. The Outcomes

1. *Did the actors perceive that the outcomes (or policy statements) resolved the issues as they had identified them?*

One difficulty in analysing the outcomes was the tendency for actors to invert issues and outcomes. For instance, the integration of spring/summer became an issue for some actors, whereas it was clearly a solution or possible outcome related to the issue of resource reallocation. The question of whether the outcomes resolved the issues

therefore became problematic. The only actors who felt strongly that the major issue was resolved were the vice-president and president, who felt that the position allocation mechanism would resolve the resource reallocation problem. Several of the actors had not followed the process after they were no longer directly involved and had no opinion on the possible effects of the policy statements.

2. *In what manner were the outcomes interrelated?*

The outcomes tended to be "clustered" around a number of remedial or ameliorating activities. Each of these groups of outcomes was internally interdependent so that if the main recommendation was not acted upon the others could have no effect. However, there was little dependence among the clusters of policy statements, thus allowing for the rapid implementation of one activity and the postponement of another with no ill effects.

3. *To what extent were the outcomes logically consistent?*

The outcomes appeared to be logically consistent to the extent that the implementation of any one policy would not negate the benefits of implementing the others.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are presented under three headings. First, there are those conclusions relating to the ability of selected models to explain policy-making as it is practised in universities. These are followed by conclusions about the effectiveness of several methodological approaches to the study of university policy-making. Finally, there are a number of conclusions drawn from specific phenomena

observed during the case study.

Descriptive Models of Policy-Making in University Governance

The conceptual model developed for the study incorporated aspects of several models of policy-making which were reviewed in Chapter 2. The data presented in Chapter 5 described the processes operating within the specific policy-making system and formed the basis for conclusions about the applicability of particular models to university governance. The first five of these models are presented below with summaries of their main features and assessments of their utility as explanations of policy-making in university organizations.

The bureaucratic model. This model is based on a rational distribution of power and authority within a strictly hierarchical structure of offices. Individuals operate on the basis of the authority attached to their offices and within the bounds determined for those offices. Decisions are made through a rational process which assumes access to pertinent information, agreement on organizational goals, and the objectivity of the decision-makers. Although the bureaucratic model does not exist in the ideal form as originally proposed, it has been offered as one explanation of organizational phenomena in universities. Existence of particular features of the model indicate the degree of "bureaucratization" of the organization.

Several observations can be explained through the application of the bureaucratic model. For example, the identification and diagnosis of the issue was undertaken initially by the officer responsible for that operating area. He adopted a rational approach through the

collection of pertinent data, examination of alternative solutions, and selection of the most promising policy. In another instance, the president's actions conformed to the bureaucratic model when he decided to bypass the General Faculties Council and take a proposed policy directly to the Board of Governors. He apparently assumed that he had the authority for such action because of the position of his office in the hierarchy.

Therefore, it is concluded that *the bureaucratic model was helpful in the explanation of university policy-making in this instance because specific examples of bureaucratic phenomena were identified.*

The collegial model. The principal feature of this model is the existence of a concern for the well-being of the institution that transcends individual objectives and results in decision-making through consensus. The separate constituencies that exist within the university may have individual objectives but these will be relegated to a lower priority if they conflict with the goals of the total university community. The consensus model of decision-making implies the positive endorsement of policy alternatives and rejects the use of compromise or "majority rule" procedures.

Most actors in the study subscribed to the principle of collegiality and supported it as the most appropriate model for university governance. However, no evidence was found of a truly consensus model of decision-making in the policy-making system. Even in the operation of the major committee, where no formal voting procedures were adopted, certain members felt the process was one of individuals submitting to the apparent will of the majority, rather than decision by consensus.

Another implication of the collegial model is the existence of a "community of peers" within which individuals can influence the decision-making process on an equal basis. In this study it was apparent that the influence or power exerted by individuals differed depending on the constituency or administrative position they represented. The degree of influence appeared to be a function of the accessibility of information, the experience of the individual, and the time available to devote to the process. Since the administrators had advantages in all three of these areas, it is understandable that they exercised more power than faculty or student participants. To the extent that this power imbalance exists in universities, it is difficult to accept the applicability of the collegial model.

The acceptance of collegiality as a normative model of policy-making has had obvious effects however, particularly on the structure of the permanent decision-making bodies within the institution. Councils and committees, such as the General Faculties Council, have representatives of faculty, students, and administration, which presumably creates an opportunity for all constituencies to equally influence decisions. This study tends to demonstrate, however, that the creation of such opportunities does not necessarily result in a "community of peers" when measured by the degree of influence or power of each participant. Further, the collegial model, as defined in the literature, is only operative in university policy-making as a normative guide in the design of participative decision-making groups. In other words, *while the collegial ideal may guide the development of a structure for policy-making, the study indicated that the process did*

not incorporate the essence of collegiality which implies consensus decision-making by a community of peers.

The political model. This model represents the university as a political system within which definable interest groups compete for resources and power. The applicability of the model will be assessed through an examination of the six underlying assumptions presented in Chapter 2.

1. Few people become involved in the process. This assumption was borne out by the study. The number of key actors (those directly involved in the decision-making process) tended to remain small until the issue was brought to GFC and BOG for authorization. In fact, in attempting to expand the number of interviewees by asking each actor to name other influential participants, the network did not expand much beyond the initial network of ten to twelve individuals.

2. Those who participate move in and out of the process. This "fluid participation" was found to be a feature throughout the evolution of the system. The only actor who was involved through all major events was Krueger, the key actor.

3. Interest groups, with differing goals and values, exist in universities and participate to the degree their interests or relative positions are threatened. The interjection of the faculty constituency in event 3 was the direct result of a threat to the security of certain members of that group (i.e. those on limited term appointments). Throughout the process, the TUCFA representatives perceived the protection of this group as the major issue and were willing to support other proposals only as long as their security was not threatened.

One other interest group, the students, did not perceive a threat in the policy issues or proposals and did not participate in the process until invited to do so. Their participation tended to be of low influence and lasted for only the development phase of the policy-making system. The study, therefore, supports the assumption that interest groups exist and their participation is directly related to the perceived threat to their security.

4. In the university, conflict is natural and can be viewed as a positive force promoting desirable change. Actors in the study tended to view conflict as a "fact of life" in university governance but did not explicitly ascribe a negative or positive value to it. The decision-making mode, particularly in Deans' Council and the Krueger committee appeared to be one of "conflict avoidance" which may indicate an unstated belief that conflict is not a positive force and should be avoided through compromise. Therefore, the study supports the assumption that conflict is "natural" in a university setting but that it is not viewed by participants in policy-making as having a positive value.

5. The exercise of power by interest groups places severe limitations on formal power, leading to compromise decisions. The power of the administrators to make unilateral decisions was apparently limited by the action of interest groups in this case. The final policy statements authorized by GFC and BOG, however, contained all the mechanisms sought by the key administrative actors in the first instance. The president, representing the formal power structure, also asserted the right of the administration to take unilateral action should the GFC not support certain key policy proposals. It is,

therefore, not completely clear that the exercise of power by the faculty interest group restricted the formal power of the administrators. What is clear is that action by the faculty constituency lengthened the process by causing the issue to be considered by a new group of actors in a completely different arena. Consequently, the assumption is supported to the extent that the administrators were unable to adopt a policy within their own relatively short time frame but is not supported to the extent that the administrators did eventually achieve their stated policy objectives.

6. External interest groups exert a strong influence over the policy-making process in universities. Data collected in this case did not reveal any direct influence by external interest groups in the policy-making system. However, the perceived threat of increased government control or intervention in the internal affairs of the university was expressed several times by certain actors and may have indirectly influenced the process. This expression of concern tended to be used as a justification or motivation for taking decisive action on a policy issue. Although Krueger, the main actor, employed such rhetoric in public statements, he personally believed that the actual threat of government interference was extremely remote.

The assumption, therefore, is supported only to the extent that the perception of potential overt action by an external interest group can influence the behavior of actors in a policy-making system.

In summary, the study supported, in whole or in part, each of the six underlying assumptions of the political model. It can therefore be concluded that *within the policy-making system in this study,*

the political model was operative and was valuable in providing an explanation of many of the observed phenomena.

The organized anarchy model. For this model to apply there should be evidence that the organization is an organized anarchy (that is, has problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation of members) and employs the "garbage can" model of decision-making. The garbage can analogy is based on the proposition that within an organized anarchy, problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities are thrown together and decisions are the result of a random "sticking together" of these elements.

The study definitely supported a conclusion that the university is an organized anarchy as defined in the literature. The goals were often in conflict or were difficult to clearly define; the actors were unsure of the optimum method of accomplishing their goals; and, as was shown in the discussion of the political model, there was fluid participation of actors.

There was also evidence that the garbage can model of decision-making was operative. For instance, particular recommendations in the Krueger report were closely related to or "stuck to" specific actors; however, these recommendations were not closely related to the major issues and consequently were not authorized for adoption. (Examples would be the recommendations for spring/summer integration and the review of administrative processes.) In the garbage can model this would be an example of "oversight," where a choice is made without attention to existing problems.

The case can also be viewed as support for the hypothesized relationship between organizational slack and the decision structure of the organization, as reviewed in Chapter 2. The process was initiated because of a reduction in organizational slack (i.e. restricted funding) and resulted in a centralization of decisions relating to academic appointments, or a shift toward a hierarchical access structure. This relationship is consistent with the model.

There is contrary evidence, however, which suggests the decision-making processes were not as random or haphazard as is suggested in the organized anarchy model. For instance, in the initial stage of problem identification and diagnosis OIR conducted a systematic study of the quantitative dimensions of the problem, examined solutions at other institutions, and projected the future impact of the problem. In another instance, one of the threatened organizational units, the Faculty of Continuing Education, developed a deliberate strategy for influencing the process and managed to turn the situation to their own benefit. Neither of these events was a random occurrence but rather was the result of conscious decisions by actors within the system.

The conclusion, therefore, is that *while the organized anarchy model does apply to the extent that many observations appeared to fit within the model's definition, there are other phenomena which cannot be adequately explained by the model.*

Incrementalism. This model, taken from the policy sciences, argues that new policies are incremental adjustments to existing

policies and practices. These minor adjustments are made after consideration of a relatively small number of alternatives and after only limited examination of possible consequences.

Krueger, when presenting his committee's recommendations to GFC, made clear his support of the incremental approach. He was supported in this approach by other actors who expressed concern that the recommendations must not deviate too far from the status quo if they were to receive authorization. This model might also explain why the recommendations regarding dismissal procedures were not acted upon, or even discussed in detail at GFC, but were quickly referred to another committee. They were, perhaps, more than an incremental adjustment and therefore could not be considered within the normal processes of the General Faculties Council.

The study therefore supports a conclusion that *the model of incremental policy-making is applicable to university governance.*

In summary, all the models reviewed in Chapter 2 and summarized above are to some extent applicable and useful in the explanation of policy-making in universities. Further, none of the models, by itself, offers a complete explanation of the phenomena observed in the study. Each model reflects the particular theoretical perspectives of its proponents and contributes to our total understanding by illuminating a new dimension of the problem.

Methodological Approaches to the Study of University Policy-Making

The final three models included in the review of literature served as guides to the conceptualization and development of the

policy-making system (PMS) model adopted for the study. The purpose of this section is to review the contributions of these three approaches to the development of the conceptual model and to assess the utility of the PMS model as a methodological tool in the study of university policy-making.

The public policy flow model. The major contribution of this approach was the conceptualization of policy-making as a process separate from, yet interrelated with, the more permanent decision-making bodies in the organization. The process was viewed as an interactive network controlled by the power arrangements among the various components and interacting with significant elements of the environment. Policy-making was conceived as a random, multi-channeled process which could only be understood through the examination of the phenomenon using orderly field research techniques.

The public policy flow model was judged to have provided a valuable theoretical underpinning to the study's conceptual model.

The policy system as a vehicle for decision-making. This approach combined the concept of a dynamic policy system focussing on a set of related issues, with a number of useful analytical conventions. Its major contribution to the PMS model was its differentiation of the environment into constituencies, contiguous policy systems, and the operating environment. In addition, it demonstrated how a policy system is imbedded in higher level systems and how contiguous systems can interact with the focal policy system. This model also emphasized the identification of communication links among actors as an essential

step in describing the operation of the policy system.

The structure of unstructured decisions. This approach to strategic decision-making provided a means of analysing the temporal dimension of the system. From the detailed examination of a number of cases Mintzberg et al. (1976) developed a classification system that accommodated the frequent "looping" of the decision process and also allowed for the complete omission of particular phases which are considered essential in the purely rational process. Within each phase a number of routines were described which provided a further classification system for the activities of actors within the system.

The policy-making system (PMS) model. This was the model adopted for the study as a guide to the collection and analysis of data. The model is essentially a synthesis of the three models reviewed above with the addition of a number of conceptual and methodological features. The first addition was the identification of the three primary system components as actors, issues, and processes. It was determined that a description of the system's environment plus these three classes of components and their interrelationships would constitute the essential description of the system. To facilitate the systems analysis two sets of conventions were developed to symbolically represent the major features of the PMS. These two symbolic models, one focussing on process and the other on actors, were described in Chapter 3 and utilized throughout the presentation and analysis of the data in Chapters 4 and 5.

The PMS model was developed as a methodological tool which

would facilitate the investigation and analysis of the policy-making process while still allowing the interpretation of the process according to previously proposed models (e.g. bureaucratic, political, etc.). Consequently, the model did not predetermine the nature of the decision-making process but allowed for the observation of any number of different processes.

It is the conclusion of the researcher that *the PMS model provided an extremely useful methodological tool for the investigation of policy-making in universities*. While it provided a means for isolating a particular case of policy-making through its incorporation of the concept of temporary systems, it also provided guidance in the analysis of the interchange between the focal system and its environment. It incorporated a means of classifying the many activities in the system while still providing the flexibility required to describe a complex cyclical process. It provided a means to categorize actors according to their roles in the environment while still facilitating the description of their participation within the policy-making system. *Perhaps its greatest utility, however, was its ability to provide direction and guidance in the conduct of the research without focussing the study so narrowly that significant data, just beyond the boundary of the conceptual model, would be overlooked.*

The Substance of the Case

While the conclusions drawn thus far have related primarily to the applicability and utility of various models employed in the study, it is also appropriate to form conclusions regarding the substantive

dimension of the case. These conclusions will be discussed under the headings of environment, process, actors, issues, and outcomes.

Environment. One of the actors suggested that the U of C was attempting to solve the Ontario universities' problems. The implication was that in the affluent community of Calgary, Alberta the problems of restraint that vex the rest of the country cannot be present. This perception was at odds with the perceptions of other actors who saw fiscal restraint as a real problem that must be dealt with through firm policy decisions. It was impossible to determine within the limitations of the study the extent to which this variation in perceptions of the environment affected the policy-making system. However, it is reasonable to conclude that *actors expressed differing interpretations of the environment, which undoubtedly affected their perceptions of the issues and their behaviour in the policy-making process.*

The operating environment within the U of C exhibited characteristics which are undoubtedly found in many other North American universities. In particular, the resource allocation processes were developed in a period of rapid expansion and were no longer effective in a period of decline or "steady state". The fact that this incongruity prompted a major policy-making effort led to the conclusion that *the processes within a university's internal operating system are directly affected by conditions in the institution's environment and that it is unlikely that procedures or practices designed to meet one set of environmental conditions will be adequate for all others.* These conclusions are entirely consistent with the concepts of open systems

which emphasize the interdependence between a system and its environment.

This interdependence was also observed between the policy-making system and the operating environment. The boundary of the PMS was deliberately kept impermeable during events two and four through decisions of the key actors to conduct their meetings in private. Participants were admonished to keep all discussions confidential and to not solicit input from their constituencies until after release of a formal report. Both events were followed by severe negative reactions. The decisions by the Deans' Council in event two were successfully challenged by TUCFA, representing the faculty constituency, and the process was redirected to a course that took considerably longer than the one originally plotted by the key actors. After event four, the Krueger report came under attack from many quarters, frequently from persons unaware of the background to the problem or the rationale for the recommendations. This created a somewhat hostile atmosphere and caused some persons in the environment to question the administrators' motives. These instances are the basis for the tentative conclusion that *deliberately decreasing the interactions between a PMS and its environment may result in a lengthening of the entire process and an increase in the possibility of confrontation and conflict.*

A final conclusion in this area concerns the relationship between a PMS and contiguous PMSs in the environment. Within the study several examples emerged of the initiation of new policy-making systems addressing issues which were identified during the course of the focal system. These new PMSs were not foreseen by actors in the system but

tended to be a reaction to events which immediately preceded their initiation. It therefore appears that *every PMS has the potential to initiate new PMSs, which may develop on a course independent of the initiating system.*

Process. Data collected in this study described many features of the policy-making process. In general, it was found to be complex, unpredictable, cyclical, and, at times, uncontrollable. The nature of decision-making varied between rational, political, haphazard, and to some extent, collegial. Nevertheless, within this complex description certain features appeared to stand out and have formed the basis for several conclusions.

The first conclusion relates to the extent to which the process can be controlled. It would be an overstatement to suggest that the entire process is uncontrollable; rather, it seems the control shifts from person to person or from group to group. In the initial phase of problem identification and diagnosis, the administrators controlled the process and were in a position to suggest the further steps the process should take. However, control shifted from the administrators when the political nature of the issues became apparent and the faculty constituency disrupted the planned process. At that point GFC took control and appointed the Krueger committee. The administrators exercised considerable control in the committee but lost it when the report went to the GFC (Exec). In the authorization stage the administrators were back in control to the extent that they controlled the activities of GFC and the Board of Governors.

It is reasonable to assume that the loss of control in event three, the major interrupt, resulted in the process taking many extra months before Krueger, the key administrative actor, was able to achieve his main objective of a position control mechanism. It is also possible that the interruption could have been avoided had the process been designed to include TUCFA in the initial stages. Based on the above observations it is concluded that *the extent to which administrators can exercise control over the policy-making process is limited by their capacity to foresee and accommodate the political nature of the process.*

The next conclusion also relates to the political dimension of the process. Two particular activities demonstrated the effectiveness of political action in redirecting the process in the PMS and consequently in affecting the outcomes. The actions of the TUCFA president, which have just been referred to, resulted in greater faculty input into the decision-making and eventually resulted in policy statements which did not negatively affect the limited term appointees. The faculty constituency therefore accomplished its major goal through the strategic application of its political power.

The second activity was that of the dean of the Faculty of Continuing Education who perceived a threat to his faculty in one of the recommendations of the Krueger report. The deliberate strategy of FCE to distribute counter arguments and to enlist support for their position, assisted in the defeat of the recommendation at GFC and the initiation of a contiguous PMS which was considered a direct benefit to FCE. The conclusion supported by these observations is that *planned*

political activities, using the legitimate structures and process of the organization, can significantly alter the process and outcomes of a policy-making system.

The final conclusion about the policy-making process relates to the use of information and information sources. In the early stages of the process, when there were very few actors, the information available came from two main sources--the data belonging to each individual actor and the data collected by organizational units who had been assigned the task (particularly OIR). These data were pooled, analysed, and summarized for the use of the actors and were influential in defining the issues and in the initial exploration of alternative solutions. However, when the responses to the Krueger report were received they were merely circulated to all members of GFC without any attempt to analyse or summarize. It is likely that some members did not read the responses and that others were not able to reasonably assess the contradictory arguments. This resulted in a situation where decisions were influenced less by the descriptive and evaluative data available, and more by the individual interests of actors and their ability to present persuasive arguments on the floor of GFC. This is not meant to be an evaluative statement but rather an objective observation on the nature of legislative bodies such as the General Faculties Council. If this observation about GFC is accurate it raises the question--at what stage in the process should reactions to proposed policy statements be sought? If the responses in this case had come to the Krueger committee prior to the report being formally released, would the process and the outcomes have been more effective? Prompted by these observations

and questions, the following tentative conclusion is proposed: *the effectiveness of evaluative or analytical data is dependent upon the phase of the policy-making process at which they become available.*

Actors. Several conclusions relating to actors were stated in the discussions of the bureaucratic, collegial, and political models of university governance. In summary, the conclusions were that *actors often acted on the authority of their administrative offices, they subscribed to the collegial ideal in policy-making, very few actors actively participated, there was "fluid participation" by actors, and the actors often represented interest groups in the environment.*

A further conclusion stresses the importance of a single key actor to the policy-making system. The only actor who was actively involved throughout the entire case was the VP(A), Krueger. It is quite possible that his determination and continuing efforts were largely responsible for the progress of the system, particularly after it was rerouted by the challenge from TUCFA. If Krueger had not accepted the position as chairman of the committee and then vigorously moved along the business of the committee, progress toward new policy statements could have ceased. The conclusion, therefore, is that *the initiation, process, and outcomes of a policy-making system can be largely dependent upon the activities of a single key actor.*

Issues. The main issue was defined quite clearly when the PMS was initiated by the president and vice-president. However, as actors were added to the system, new issues, perceptions, and interpretations emerged. Even after considerable discussion (as in the Krueger

committee) the various perceptions or interpretations of the major issue did coalesce. This led to the conclusion that *as the number of actors in a policy-making system increases, the complexity and variety in the actors' perceptions and interpretations of the issues also increases.*

This increase in the complexity and variety of the issues was not apparent to all actors and did not prohibit progress toward acceptable policy statements. Within the Krueger committee there appeared to be a willingness to accept most issues raised by actors, to add them to the agenda, and to propose policy statements dealing with them. It was therefore concluded that *lack of agreements on the major policy issue does not prohibit progress toward acceptable policy statements.*

The final comments on issues relate to the specific issues in the case study. The major issues of resource allocation and faculty renewal during a period of retrenchment are certainly not unique to The University of Calgary. These issues found their roots in environmental conditions which exist, often in greater severity, in most other university communities in Canada. Similarly, the additional issues raised throughout the policy-making process most likely have their counterparts in other institutions. This led to the conclusion that *the issues addressed in this policy-making system were critical to The University of Calgary and are to some degree representative of the major issues facing public Canadian universities.*

Outcomes. The policy statements authorized by the General Faculties Council or the Board of Governors were defined (in the PMS

model) as the outcomes of the policy-making system. The first observation of these policy statements is that they are not unique solutions, but rather, are policies which were suggested, and in many cases adopted, by other universities. Two proposed policies which were uniquely designed for the U of C (spring/summer integration and dismissal procedures) met with no success at the authorization stage. While this may be a reflection of the quality, or estimated effectiveness of the proposals, it may also be related to the lack of experience with the policies at other institutions. If so, it may be reasonable to conclude that *universities are more likely to adopt policies which have been tried elsewhere than to develop unique policies.*

Further analysis of the outcomes revealed that many of them were suggested from within the administrative structure of the university and, in fact, were referred to in documents which predated the PMS. The Office of Institutional Research, in particular, had outlined several policy solutions in correspondence with the VP(A). This process is consistent with the bureaucratic model and suggests the conclusion that *policies often originate from persons in the formal administrative structure of universities, rather than from interest groups in the constituencies.*

The nature of the relationships among the policy statements proposed for authorization was noted in Chapter 5. The proposals tended to be "clustered" around a number of principal recommendations. Within each cluster the proposals were interdependent whereas there was little dependence between each group of recommendations. The consequence of this relationship was that each cluster of proposals could

be treated independently when being considered for authorization and that rejection of one set of policies would not prejudice the possible acceptance of the others. It is therefore concluded that *within university policy-making systems proposed policy statements are "loosely coupled" thus reducing their interdependence during authorization and implementation.*

The Nature of Policy-Making in Universities

The previous sections referred to specific dimensions of university policy-making. The following conclusion is an attempt to synthesize those specific conclusions into a more general statement concerning the nature of policy-making in universities.

Policy-making in universities can be viewed as a network of policy-making systems, each of which is temporary in nature and is initiated in response to stresses in the institution's operating environment. Each policy-making system is itself a network of issues and actors who function in interaction with their environment, progressing in a heuristic manner toward a vaguely defined policy goal.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of the study are presented in two categories. The first consists of implications for those involved in the practice of policy-making in universities. The second group of implications is intended for those interested in research in the fields of university governance, public policy-making, or organizational theory.

Implications for Practice

If the description of university policy-making developed in this study is accurate, there are several implications for those involved in the process. The first implication is for those with responsibility for designing the structures and processes by which policies are developed. If policy is perceived as the output of a static, rational structure, then organizational planners need only design one or two structures, each focussing on a different type of policy, and route all policy issues through these structures in a predetermined, sequential process. For instance, all academic issues would follow a process through GFC, standing committees, faculty councils, etc.; whereas, financial issues would pass from the president to the Board of Governors to standing committees and finally back to BOG for authorization. The view of policy-making proposed in this study implies that while it is necessary to have permanent structures with authority to adopt policy, efforts should be made to design processes which are unique to the issue being considered. Planning for policy development then becomes an ongoing process which recognizes the particular characteristics of an issue and attempts to design a structure and a process to match those characteristics. The design, however, should recognize the heuristic nature of the policy-making process and specify only in general terms what process should be adopted.

The nature of the process also has implications for policy-makers in terms of how they participate in the system. The conclusion that several models of policy-making can all be operative in a single

PMS implies that an actor can choose the model which best fits the situation. It further implies that if an actor misconstrues the situation and chooses the wrong model, he will be less effective in his attempts to influence the system's outcomes. Therefore, the participant should become knowledgeable of the variety of behaviours that are possible and sensitive to the factors in the process that would indicate the most appropriate behaviour. For instance, a situation involving issues sensitive to recognized interest groups calls for a political process involving bargaining and compromise, rather than bureaucratic action which may incorporate unilateral decision-making.

The study also pointed out the importance of the environment in determining the process and outcomes of a PMS. Actors should consider the options for involving individuals or groups from the environment. At what stage should particular interest groups become involved--in the diagnosis of the problem, in the development of proposals, or only during evaluation? The case demonstrated that political confrontation can occur if constituencies are not involved during the appropriate phase. This potential for confrontation also raises the question of the appropriateness of confidentiality during the process. Perhaps administrators, in particular, can reduce the likelihood of confrontation by encouraging open discussion throughout most, if not all, phases of policy-making.

While the preceeding paragraph stressed the effect of the environment on a policy-making system, the reverse effects should also be considered. At several times during the case, contiguous PMSs were

initiated through activities within the focal system. Participants should be aware of this possibility and be alerted to the threat or opportunity presented by such occurrences. Such "spin-off" systems can become a drain on the time and energy resources of key actors and as such should be avoided. In other instances, however, an opportunity may be presented to address a situation which had previously been difficult to raise as an issue.

The implications of the study for participants in university policy-making can be summarized as follows: actors should be sensitive to the complexities and dynamics of each situation and should choose their behaviour accordingly; they should not expect to predict precisely the process or outcomes of a policy-making system, nor should they expect to control it completely; and, they should be aware of the interactions between a PMS and its environment and should attempt to maximize the benefits of the interactions.

Implications for Research

Several of the previously stated conclusions suggest relationships between two or more variants. These relationships should be subjected to further exploration and experimentation before they can be accepted within a broader theoretical framework. The most promising of these relationships are stated below in the form of hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: *The behaviour of actors in a policy-making system varies according to their perceptions of the environment.*

Hypothesis 2: *A decrease in the number of interactions*

between a PMS and its environment increases the total length of the process.

Hypothesis 3: A decrease in the number of interactions between a PMS and its environment increases the amount of confrontation and conflict among the actors in the PMS and between those in the PMS and the environment.

Hypothesis 4: The extent to which administrators can exercise control over the policy-making process is limited by their capacity to foresee and accommodate the political nature of the process.

Hypothesis 5: The effectiveness of evaluative or analytical data is dependent upon the phase of the policy-making process at which they become available.

Hypothesis 6: As the number of actors in a policy-making system increases, the complexity and variety in the actors' perceptions of the issues also increases.

Hypothesis 7: Most policies originate from persons in the formal administrative structure of universities, rather than from interest groups in the constituencies.

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APPENDIX A

THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name:

Title and Organizational Responsibility:

Involvement in Case:

Began - Date, first activity

Reason for involvement

- due to position
- appointed by
- voluntary

Nature of Involvement:

- full time or part time - how much time?
- committee member
- formal/informal
- etc.

End of Active involvement

- date, last activity

The Issues:

- What was the major problem the policy was intended to address?
- Were there any related problems or issues?
- Did the problem change during the process?
- What caused this to be a problem at this particular time?
- Were there pressures from outside the institution?
- What would have been the consequences if no action had been taken?

The Process:

- Was the manner for arriving at a policy decided before any action took place?
- If so, what was the process to be?
- Did the process follow this course?
- Describe the actual process: (Probe for detail)

- Were certain steps in the process particularly inefficient or ineffective? What were they?
- If you were able to redesign the process how would you set it up?
- What information was used in developing the policy?
- Were a wide range of alternatives considered?
- Where did the alternate choices originate? (active or passive searching)
- How were decisions reached at various stages in the process?

The Participants:

- With whom did you have the most direct contact in consideration of this (these) issues? (several names)
- Were there others who were not directly part of the decision making who contacted you directly?
- Who were the most influential persons in determining the final policy? What was their interest in the issue(s)?
- Did they use any particular strategy for influencing decisions?
- Did you adopt any particular strategies?
- Were there specific interest groups that would be affected by the policy decisions?
- Who were their representatives (spokesmen)?
- Which of these groups was the most influential, the least?

The Outcome:

- Do you think the final policy will resolve the issues it was supposed to?
- If not, where is it deficient?
- What changes would you like to see?

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES OF INITIAL INTERVIEWS

*Chapman, R. S., Dean, Faculty of Continuing Education	Nov. 27, 1979
Graham, J. R., Vice-President (Academic), U. of C. Students Legislative Council	Dec. 13, 1979
*Krueger, P. J., Vice-President (Academic), U. of C.	Dec. 17, 1979
Lucas, A. R., Professor, Faculty of Law	Nov. 30, 1979
McNeill, J. L., Associate Professor, Dept. of Educational Foundations	Dec. 5, 1979
Ronaghan, B. M., U. of C. Graduate Students Association	Dec. 6, 1979
*Sheehan, B. S., Director, Office of Institutional Research	Nov. 22, 1979
Sinkey, M. S., Librarian, U. of C.	Nov. 29, 1979
Symons, G. L., Assistant Professor, Dept. of Sociology	Jan. 24, 1980
Vanderberg, R., Executive Secretary, U. of C. Faculty Association	Nov. 20, 1979
Wagner, N. E., President and Vice-Chancellor, U. of C.	Nov. 23, 1979
Woods, J., Dean, Faculty of Humanities, U. of C.	Nov. 30, 1979
*Zwirner, W. W., Associate Professor, Dept. of Educational Psychology and President, U. of C. Faculty Association	Nov. 14, 1979

*Indicates that follow-up interviews were conducted

APPENDIX B

THE KRUEGER REPORT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

REPORT OF G.F.C. AD HOC COMMITTEE

ON

APPOINTMENT POLICIES

P. J. Krueger, Chairman
J. Graham
J. B. Hyne
A. Lucas
J. L. McNeill
B. Ronaghan
M. Sinkey
G. L. Symons
J. Woods
W. W. Zwirner
B. S. Sheehan (O.I.R.)

February 5, 1979

ATTHE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY(A) INTRODUCTION

At its 160th Meeting the General Faculties Council considered a brief from Dr. W. W. Zwirner which included the following:

"It is recognized that the appointment policy at the University of Calgary should be studied carefully in the light of:

1. Provincial restrictions on funding;
2. Proposed new funding policies;
3. The different ageing problems at the University of Calgary from, for example, the University of Alberta;
4. Changes in University goals and philosophy;
5. The potential contribution which an active, vigorous University of Calgary can make to the Province of Alberta."

Subsequently G.F.C. approved the following motion:

"That G.F.C. establish an ad hoc committee which will consider University appointment policies, giving consideration to the problems mentioned in Mr. Zwirner's brief, and that the committee will report back to G.F.C. no later than December 31, 1978."*

In order to focus attention more clearly on some of the key issues on which early agreement was deemed to be essential, the ad hoc Committee considered the following. Planning for the University of Calgary over the next five years is based on the assumption that total student enrolment will

*At the request of the Chairman of the Committee, the reporting date was subsequently revised to January 31, 1979.

not grow significantly, if at all, However, there is substantial evidence of internal shifts of student enrolment between Departments and Faculties, which will have to be accommodated, at least to some degree, depending on resource restraints. The period of fiscal restraint in which the University of Calgary finds itself is likely to continue for the near future, with uncontrollable continuing cost increases which are likely to continue to exceed the total amount of revenue available to the institution from government grants and tuition fees. This is not to say that the institution should not continue to strive for a higher level of government funding, adequate to meet the role that the University can and should play in the development of the Province of Alberta -- indeed it must do so at all levels -- but at the same time the University must be prepared to meet whatever problems it has within the existing restraints. To demonstrate that it was doing so, and had developed viable operational mechanisms, would enhance the credibility of the University in the eyes of provincial legislators, and society at large. Sufficient incremental funds to solve our problems may not be an option open to us.

The principal resource of a University is its faculty, and approximately 58% of the current operating budget of the University of Calgary is attributed to academic salaries (E-1 portion of the operating budget). Continual renewal of the faculty is essential if the University is to remain vibrant, and to capture the essential new ideas of each successive generation of graduates. This renewal is readily achieved under high growth conditions; under no-growth conditions mechanisms must be devised to achieve this renewal, or to suffer the consequences of overly rapid collective ageing of the faculty. At the present time the re-filling of vacancies created by retirements, resignations and death would only lead to an annual "renewal" of about 3%, which is too low.

The Committee clearly recognized that this lack of flexibility and mobility in the faculty was the most important academic issue which this University faced at present, that it was a problem which had to be addressed and solved, and that solutions must be formulated through our normal academic decision-making processes. Failure to do so may mean that "solutions" may be

imposed, either through restraints set by the Board of Governors which have to be translated into "personnel policies", or through legislation responding to the perceived societal views of the University. The appointment policies of the University will have to serve the maximum common good of the University community; in doing so some of them may work to the disadvantage of individual faculty members.

(B) ENROLMENT PATTERN AND ACADEMIC STAFF, 1973-78

Table 1 and Figure 1 show university enrolment and academic staff figures for this period.

Following the explosive growth in the 1960's, the enrolment of full-time students at the University of Calgary levelled off in 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73, and then increased again to an all-time high of 10,950 students in the Fall of 1975. Since that time it has been settling slowly but steadily, and the projection for the Fall of 1979 is for a further enrolment reduction to a projected figure of 10,300 full-time students (see Appendix I).

Table 1 also indicates that part-time student enrolment in the Fall/Winter and Spring/Summer Sessions has been fairly constant in recent years. It should be noted that part-time student enrolment expressed as a percentage of full-time student enrolment in Alberta universities has declined relative to the Canadian average, and now stands at slightly more than half the national figure (see Appendix II).

During periods of rapid growth, the University of Calgary was frequently unable to keep pace with the recruitment of regular full-time academic staff. This was particularly so from 1972 to 1975, when the full-time student enrolment increased by 24.7%. Thus academic staff recruitment since 1975 has been necessary to decrease the student to staff ratio in order to meet the University's objectives of high quality instruction, to meet specific area requirements as the diversity of course offerings increased, and to staff new programmes. While sessional instructors and graduate

TABLE 1STUDENT ENROLMENT AND ACADEMIC STAFF, 1973-78

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
<u>Board Appointees:(¹)</u>						
Initial Term	179	137	168	158	110	100
Without Definite Term	<u>571</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>646</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>753</u>	<u>771</u>
Total F/T Perm.	750	776	814	847	863	871
Full-Time Limited Term	<u>84</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>214</u>
TOTAL	834	891	949	1003	1038	1085
<hr/>						
<u>Total F/T Equivalent(^{2,3})</u>						
Academic Staff	1123	1195	1278	1325	1374	(1385) ⁽⁴⁾
<hr/>						
<u>No. of Students:(²)</u>						
Full-Time	9278	9578	10950	10864	10819	10644 ⁽⁵⁾
Part-Time (Fall)	3016	3175	3389	2977	2993	3058 ⁽⁶⁾
Part-Time (Spring/ Summer)	4416	4375	4771	4721	5400	5296 ⁽⁷⁾

NOTES: (¹) from Academic Staff Reports to Board of Governors, December of each year

(²) from Fact Book, May, 1978 (O.I.R. Report 122) and O.I.R. Academic Data Book, January 3, 1979

(³) includes full-time equivalent of sessional instructors, GA(T)'s, etc.

(⁴) budget; unfilled positions not subtracted

(⁵) O.I.R. projection, Fall, 1979 = 10,300

(⁶) O.I.R. projection, Fall, 1979 = 2,900

(⁷) O.I.R. projection, Fall, 1979 = 5,100




Figure 1. Full-time student enrolment and academic staff in different appointment categories at The University of Calgary, 1973-1978.

teaching assistants make a significant contribution to the teaching strength of the University, the regular full-time permanent academic staff and full-time limited term appointees have the dominant leadership role. Table 1 shows both the total full-time equivalent academic staff and the total number of Board appointees from 1973-78.

Recent comparisons of the weekly student hour load per F.T.E. academic staff member at a few selected universities indicate that the instructional workload at the University of Calgary is comparable to that at the University of Alberta and McGill University (Table 2, 1977-78 data). This suggests that at this time in the development of the University of Calgary appropriate measures may have to be taken to ensure that the percentage of resources devoted to academic staff, and the consequent long-term fiscal commitments, are suitably constrained in a firm but sensitive manner (see Appendix III). This is not to say that a further increase in student/staff contact is undesirable, but that there are vital trade-offs between academic staff, support staff and other expenditures. High quality programmes require that Departments, Faculties and the University do not over-extend themselves by expanding the number of courses/programmes offered beyond the ability of the institution to support them adequately. It should be borne in mind that:

- (a) academic staff salaries and fringe benefits represent 58% of the University operating budget (fiscal year 1978-79),
- (b) many components of the operating budget, e.g. utilities, library books and journals, imported supplies, etc. have been subject to excessive inflationary increases in recent years, and some have suffered further from the devaluation of the dollar,
- (c) in recent years the increases in the continuing costs of the University operating budget have exceeded increases in revenue, and appropriate budgetary adjustments have been necessary,
- (d) there are significant shifts in the enrolment "mix" to which the University must respond by re-allocation of resources, and
- (e) increasing demands for accountability place concomitant demands on financial resources to meet those requirements.

TABLE 2

TOTAL WEEKLY STUDENT HOURS PER FTE TEACHING STAFF
AT A SAMPLE OF UNIVERSITIES¹ 1977-78

<u>UNIVERSITY</u>	<u>WEEKLY STUDENT HOURS/FTE STAFF</u>
Alberta	187
Calgary	186
McGill	187
Saskatchewan	234

¹ Data is for total university excluding Faculties of Medicine, Dentistry and Continuing Education.

FTE teaching staff - The number of university-funded full-time faculty plus the full-time equivalent of part-time faculty, the latter being based on full-time workload or full-time salary, as appropriate to the institutional practice on determining FTE data. The count includes deans, directors, all professorial ranks, lecturers, graduate teaching assistants, instructors, other temporary or permanent faculty and faculty on leave with university financial assistance. As a general rule, a graduate teaching assistant who receives the maximum stipend could be considered one-third of an FTE.

The current budgetary policies of the University were developed during a period of rapid growth and reflect a highly decentralized operation. This mode has served us well during the growth period, but is not necessarily the best procedure for the future. In the preparation of their operating budget, Heads and Deans respond to budgetary allocations set by the University Budget Committee by ordering the priorities for their academic unit, including continuing and new academic staff positions, within the financial constraints applied. Should a vacancy occur for any reason after the budget becomes operational on April 1st, there is no formal mechanism requiring a review of that vacancy at the University level to determine whether re-filling can indeed be justified in that unit, or whether the vacancy should be closed down (in the interest of the University as a whole).

Apart from vacancies which are carried in the budget because of recruitment difficulties, natural attrition (retirement, resignation, termination, permanent disability, death) has led to the following number of vacancies in the regular full-time permanent academic staff in recent years:

Fiscal 1976-77:	30 vacancies	(3.0%)
Fiscal 1977-78:	27 vacancies	(2.6%)
Fiscal 1978-79:	36 vacancies	(3.3%) - as of 79-01-17
3-year average:	31 vacancies	(3.0%)

RECOMMENDATION (1)

The Committee recommends

(a) *that, except as indicated by Recommendation (10), any further growth in the combined total number of regular full-time permanent and full-time limited term appointments be justified by an increase in overall student enrolment,*

and

(b) *that a workload increase in any unit that is not accompanied by an increase in the University's total student enrolment, or any other academic requirement which justifies an additional appointment, be dealt with by the internal redistribution of vacancies.*

The University Budget Committee would be charged with the responsibility to conform to this policy in establishing the operating budget for all units, and would take into consideration the full-time limited term contracts with expiry dates in the coming fiscal year.

RECOMMENDATION (2)

The Committee recommends that, effective April 1, 1979,

(a) *all funds released by vacancies which occur among the regular full-time permanent and full-time limited term appointments be centralized and placed under the direct administrative control of the Vice-President (Academic),*

and

(b) *that the Vice-President (Academic) shall initiate recommendations for the re-allocation of such funds to E-1 budgets (academic salaries), for action by the University Budget Committee.*

In establishing the operating budget allocations to individual units and in monitoring the preparation of the line item budgets by Heads/Deans, the University Budget Committee acts on established priorities, and identifies areas or units that are overstaffed or understaffed, as well as the relative magnitudes of these resource imbalances. The University Budget Committee completes its task in February or March, and allocates funds in anticipation of certain projected enrolments. Subsequently actual enrolments and/or unexpected vacancies may permit a budgetary realignment which would correspond more closely to what the University Budget Committee would have liked to achieve in the first instance, but felt it was unable to achieve because of the continuing nature of the appointment(s) involved. The shift of faculty positions is recognized as being at once the most important and the most difficult in the process of re-allocating resources. It is therefore important that the University be able to capitalize on every opportunity which arises to effect such re-allocation to the extent that it is deemed necessary.

(C) FULL-TIME LIMITED TERM APPOINTMENTS

The General Faculties Council has previously expressed its disapproval of the "80/20 Guideline". In March, 1975, G.F.C. passed a motion asking the Board of Governors "to remove the 80/20 Guideline with respect to further appointments at The University of Calgary and, in the event of the removal of the 80/20 Guideline, arrive at a policy decision with respect to clarifying the appointment of those people currently on terminal appointments". Council's request was considered by the Board, but in January, 1976, the Board determined that the 80/20 Guideline should be preserved.

It would clearly be undesirable for the University to have 100% of its academic staff on appointments without definite term, since this would eliminate all flexibility and make the institution unable to respond to shifts in programme and workload demands. Currently the 80/20 Guideline established by the Board of Governors ensures that no unit which has 80% or more of its academic appointments on the "tenure track", i.e. on initial term appointments or appointments without definite term, is allowed to make further appointments of that type, even if an appointment can be justified by specific programme requirements or workload and is authorized in the budget. Consequently the proportion of full-time limited term appointees has grown significantly (Table 1). The Board policy allows such appointees to be considered for an initial term appointment following completion of a limited term contract, if the need for the position in that unit continues to exist. That allows this group of faculty members limited access to tenurable positions, as Heads and Deans have been reluctant to make such recommendations, given the uncertain long-term enrolment and budgetary outlook. Since March, 1978, such recommendations have been taken to Deans' Council, for advice to the President. The Committee believes that when vacancies do occur, for any reason, the full-time limited term appointees must be given the first opportunity for consideration for initial term appointments, if such can be authorized.

The Committee recommends that, for the immediate future, the academic staff profile of the University be monitored carefully, in the light of other recommendations in this Report.

RECOMMENDATION (3)

The Committee recommends
that the Vice-President (Academic) be required to report to G.F.C. annually in December on the total academic staff profile of the University, including data on changes in the number of Board appointees in the various categories and ranks, in order to maintain an ongoing scrutiny of the composition of the faculty and the potential ability of the University to respond to change.

RECOMMENDATION (4)

The Committee recommends
that, whenever new academic positions are authorized in the budget or the re-filling of vacancies is authorized, and an initial term appointment is to be made and is permitted under the Board policy, that any limited term appointees eligible for such a position be given first consideration.

RECOMMENDATION (5)

The Committee recommends
that when full-time limited term appointments are recommended, and the unit concerned has the capacity to offer an initial term appointment, the head of the unit making the recommendation must provide an explanation to the Dean and/or the Vice-President (Academic) as to why an initial term appointment was not recommended.

(D) RETIREMENT

Table 3 compares the age profile of the full-time academic staff at the University of Calgary with that at the University of Alberta, based on 1977-78 data. As may be expected, the high recruitment rate required during the period of rapid growth at the University of Calgary now leads to an age distribution profile which is more sharply peaked in the 36-40 and the 41-45 year age brackets than is the profile at the older institution. The net result is that a lower percentage of faculty members at the University of Calgary will reach the normal retirement age of 65 in (say) the next ten

TABLE 3

AGE STRUCTURE OF FULL-TIME ACADEMIC STAFF AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
AND UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, 1977-78

Age Group	Alberta		Calgary	
	No.	%	No.	%
Younger than 30	124	7.7	69	6.9
31 - 35	320	19.9	196	19.7
36 - 40	367	22.8	246	24.7
41 - 45	272	16.9	194	19.5
46 - 50	212	13.2	127	12.7
51 - 55	164	10.2	100	10.0
56 - 60	111	6.9	42	4.2
61 - 65	39	2.4	22	2.2
Older than 65	2	0.1	1	0.1
<hr/>				
TOTAL	1611	100.0	997	100.0

(Source: "The Age Structure and Anticipated Retirement and Replacement Demand for Full-Time Faculty by Province and University", Statistics Canada, May 15, 1978)
 Canada, May 15, 1978)

years than at the University of Alberta. Only 8.0% of the academic staff at the University of Calgary was expected to reach the normal retirement age of 65 from 1978-87, versus 11.0% at the University of Alberta.*

Unless the sharply peaked age profile at the University of Calgary is blurred over time through the application of an appropriate replacement and recruitment policy, or by early retirement options from age 55 on, large numbers of faculty members will eventually retire in a relatively short time span. If this occurs when university enrolment is again on the upswing in the early and mid-1990's, severe recruitment problems may again beset the Canadian university scene. Ideally the age mix should be one which produces a steady retirement rate which, when combined with resignations and mortalities, provides for a significant on-going renewal of the faculty, and for the infusion of members of successive classes of young graduates in all disciplines into the faculty.

As indicated in Section (B), our recent experience is that only about 3% of our regular full-time faculty positions become vacant each year by natural attrition. This provides very little flexibility with respect to changes in the mix of students, is insufficient to provide for an adequate amount of faculty renewal, and will not permit us to stabilize the average age of the faculty at a reasonable value. The Committee therefore examined a number of schemes which might be encouraged, in the hope of offsetting the above aspects in the current near "steady state". While none of them are perceived as making large contributions to the solution of this problem, taken collectively they may have a significant effect.

The new Universities Academic Pension Plan which came into force July 1, 1978, makes provision for certain types of service elsewhere to be established as pensionable service under generous financial arrangements, and

*"The Age Structure and Anticipated Retirement and Replacement Demand for Full-Time Faculty by Province and University", Statistics Canada, May 15, 1978. This study assumed that all vacancies were re-filled with individuals of the same age.

also for the voluntary retirement with an unreduced pension of any staff member after reaching the age of 55 whose pensionable service is not less than ten years. William M. Mercer Limited (pension plan consultants) have suggested, that from age 55 to 65, five percent of those eligible to retire in a given year will elect early retirement. If this estimate proves to be reliable, then the University of Calgary may expect a further 5 vacancies per year, in addition to those created by normal attrition. While this number is not large, it is approximately equal to the number of normal retirements which we may expect annually in the immediate future!

The Committee notes that, given the relatively recent introduction of the new Pension Plan, faculty members generally are not fully aware of the provisions of the Plan. Suggestions as to how this might be remedied included the following:

- the preparation and distribution of an information package, to include carefully chosen examples, giving details of purchase and transfer of credit for service elsewhere, and benefits for normal and early retirement;
- enlisting the help of Department Heads to ensure that faculty members who are approaching 55 or are in the 55-64 year old age bracket are aware of the early retirement features of this plan.

RECOMMENDATION (6)

The Committee recommends

that the University continue to provide more detailed Pension Plan information to faculty members, stressing in particular the arrangements available with respect to the establishment of certain types of service elsewhere as "pensionable service" under the Plan, and outlining the early retirement option.

(E) RANK OF PROFESSOR EMERITUS

Recognizing that many faculty members electing early retirement are likely to engage in other careers on a full-time or part-time basis, the Committee notes that this option may well be attractive to some senior academics who wish to pursue their scholarly work or research at a highly productive point in their career. Early retirement may also be attractive to some faculty members whose complete departure from the scene would be a great loss to the institution. While the rank of Professor Emeritus is authorized by G.F.C. and the Board, and such appointments have been made on normal retirement, the criteria for such appointment and the benefits associated with it (e.g. library privileges, use of office/lab space if circumstances permit, access to computing facilities) have not been spelled out, nor is it clear if our present policy applies to those retiring as early as 55.

An appropriate policy which encouraged the pursuit of post-retirement scholarly activity might encourage some early retirements, and be of great benefit to the University, without significant incremental costs.

RECOMMENDATION (7)

The Committee recommends

that the Vice-President (Academic) initiate appropriate steps to develop criteria and guidelines for the appointment of retired faculty members to the rank of Professor Emeritus, as well as appropriate benefits accruing to that rank, for approval by G.F.C. and the Board of Governors.

(F) SECONDMENT OF FACULTY

While faculty members are currently eligible to apply for leave without pay in order to take up specific activities outside the University for a stated period, the attitude toward such requests has in the past frequently been one of benign tolerance and not of enthusiasm, particularly during the high growth period. Some faculty members have much to offer

government, industry, business, and other agencies and organizations. The Committee is of the view that the University should actively encourage and initiate such leaves, including formal secondments from the University to the receiving institution (if appropriate), whereby the receiving institution would assume the full salary and benefit costs pertaining to the appointee.

RECOMMENDATION (8)

The Committee recommends

that where it can be accomplished without serious detriment to established programmes, leaves of absence and secondments (where appropriate) of faculty members to other institutions be actively encouraged by the University.

(G) PART-TIME CONTINUING FACULTY APPOINTMENTS

Several previous attempts to develop descriptions of this type of appointment category failed to obtain the necessary academic approval. The Committee examined the relevant records and explored the positive and negative features of such appointments. It was recognized that such an appointment category would be particularly applicable in fields where faculty members were eminently employable outside the University (e.g. Engineering, Law, Management, Social Welfare, Environmental Design, Medicine). Such appointments might provide the mechanism for individuals who wished to pursue very extensive consulting, and hence could not render "full-time" service to the University. From the faculty member's perspective, it might be used for the development of a second career preceding retirement (early or normal). From the University's point of view, this would be a mechanism whereby:

- (i) a staff member in a "professional" Faculty could develop excellent on-going linkages with industry, the professional community, etc. and thereby enrich the experience of students in the University,
- (ii) a faculty member whose scholarly work related directly to a professional field might acquire greater access to agencies which would benefit his/her research and scholarship, and
- (iii) considerable re-distribution of available salary resources might be effected.

The Committee is of the opinion that terms of appointment should be developed for the following types of continuing part-time appointments:

- full-time employment for less than 12 months of the year
(but not less than 8 months per year);
- part-time employment (but not less than 50% time commitment)
on a 12 months/year basis.

These terms of reference should incorporate the following conditions:

- (a) that such part-time appointments be available only to individuals who have attained an appointment without definite term;
- (b) that the transfer of an individual from a regular full-time appointment to a continuing part-time appointment be by mutual consent, requiring the agreement of both the individual and the University;
- (c) that such transfers from a regular full-time appointment to a continuing part-time appointment may be for a specified term, e.g. 3 years, as agreed upon by the individual and the University, following which the individual would again revert to a regular full-time appointment;
- (d) that except as provided for under (c), a transfer from a continuing part-time appointment to a regular full-time appointment be by mutual consent, requiring the agreement of both the individual and the University;
- (e) that pension and other benefits available to regular full-time appointees be in proportion to the fraction of full-time service rendered by the individual, and
- (f) that an individual holding such a continuing part-time appointment have the option of maintaining pension and other benefits at his/her cost for the non-University portion of his/her appointment, up to the level that would be provided for a corresponding regular full-time appointee.

In recommending the above conditions the Committee adopted a conservative position, which could be revised on the basis of experience. In restricting these continuing part-time appointments to individuals holding an appointment without definite term, problems associated with tenure considerations where there is only a part-time commitment to the University are avoided.

The Committee discussed the possible negative features of this type of appointment, and concluded that if the potential dangers and abuses were recognized they could be avoided. Clearly no unit should be permitted to have too many such appointments. There might be a lack of commitment to research and scholarship, but by proceeding to this type of appointment only from an appointment without definite term the scholarly profile of the appointee would already have been established and would be known. With respect to permitting such appointees to supervise graduate students, each case would have to be assessed on its merits by the Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies, depending on the circumstances. It would have to be recognized that such staff would be unavailable for planning, student counselling, committee work, etc. at certain times. Further, the matter of assessment of these appointees with respect to salary increments and promotion would have to be clarified.

It should be noted that the provision of pension and other benefits for this type of appointment as outlined in (e) and (f) above will require approval by the Pension Board and changes/amendments to various benefit policies.

RECOMMENDATION (9)

The Committee recommends

that the G.F.C. approve in principle the establishment of a new class of continuing part-time academic appointees, and that the G.F.C. recommend that the Board of Governors also approve this proposal in principle, with the understanding that detailed terms of reference for this appointment class will be prepared by the Associate Vice-President (Academic Administration), for consideration in the normal manner appropriate to Faculty Handbook amendments.

(H) INTEGRATION OF SPRING/SUMMER SESSION AND OFF-CAMPUS COURSE OFFERINGS
INTO REGULAR WORKLOAD

Traditionally the University of Calgary followed the policy inherited from the University of Alberta, in treating the Fall and Winter Session instructional workload as the "normal" instructional workload of faculty members, with additional honoraria being paid for Evening Credit, Summer Session and off-campus instruction in those courses where visiting instructors were not employed. In 1974 the University of Calgary integrated on-campus Evening Credit instruction into the normal workload and terminated the payment of honoraria for this endeavour. However, instruction in the Summer Session (and in the Spring Session which was subsequently introduced) continues to be subject to the payment of honoraria if our own faculty members are involved, this being treated as an "overload" which places extra demands on a faculty member during that time of the year when research and scholarly and creative activities are normally at their peak. Departments and Faculties therefore view the normal instructional workload of a faculty member as originating in the Fall and Winter Sessions (with the exception of graduate student supervision).

Off-Campus Evening Credit instruction is at present also covered by the payment of honoraria, plus the payment of expenses and an allowance for travelling time where this is significant.

The Committee is of the opinion that viewing Spring/Summer and Off-Campus Evening Credit instruction as "extra to load", and the payment of honoraria to our own faculty members for such instruction does not represent the best use of the funds available for this purpose, particularly at a time when the University is under pressure to increase the rejuvenation rate of the faculty, when the Fall/Winter Session enrolment is declining steadily and is likely to continue to do so in the foreseeable future, and when some economies will have to be effected in order to accomplish the academic objectives of the University. The Committee has examined the 1977 Summer, 1978 Spring, and 1977-78 Off-Campus Evening Credit programme statistics and considers the course offerings, enrolments, and budgetary data pertaining to these as being typical of recent years. Appendix IV summarizes the number of

courses that were offered (361 full-course equivalents), and shows that 65.0% of the instructors who received honoraria were from our own regular faculty while 35.0% were visiting instructors. Some 208 full-course equivalent lecture sections per annum are therefore taught by University of Calgary instructors on an "overload" basis in a typical year.

It is shown further in Appendix IV that the total amount allocated annually to honoraria for our own faculty members could be translated into some 24 new regular junior faculty appointments. With these additional staff resources, incorporation of Spring/Summer Session/Evening Credit into the regular workload would require an adjustment (decrease) of some 3.5% in the Fall/Winter Session section hours to maintain present average faculty workloads. It is argued that this could be accomplished, if necessary, by a reduction in the number of low enrolment sections offered, where these are not critical components in academic programmes.

The advantages of this proposal include the following:

- (a) Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus Evening Credit instruction will be accorded the same status as Fall/Winter Session instruction.
- (b) An integrated approach to a faculty reward system will be achieved, whereby Spring/Summer/Off-Campus Evening Credit instruction will no longer be regarded as an activity for which the faculty member has already been paid "extra".
- (c) Participation in Spring/Summer Session instruction would likely more nearly reflect the rank distribution of faculty members; at present junior members of the faculty are much more heavily involved.
- (d) The further development of Spring/Summer and Off-Campus offerings (e.g. downtown) may be stimulated, increasing the opportunities for part-time students and students from older age groups which now have a low participation rate. A practical incentive for the unit concerned would be the inclusion of these workloads in the data used by the University Budget Committee. (At present the Fall Session enrolment statistics are used, as of December 1st in any year.)
- (e) Some students may be able to take up employment during either the Fall or Winter term, when there is less competition for that type of

short-term employment, and proceed with their educational programme during the balance of the year (assuming that Spring/Summer offerings could be expanded and the sequencing of courses improved).

- (f) In fields where enrolment is limited this increased flexibility will increase our ability to respond to student demand, through greater year-round use of certain facilities.

In presenting the following recommendation, the Committee is concerned that there be no decline in Spring/Summer Session offerings as a result of a major policy change, and is confident that the leadership of Deans and Heads in planning faculty workloads will alleviate anxieties which this proposal may raise. It should be noted that this recommendation opens up the possibility for staff to have an uninterrupted period of research activity during the September-December or January-April segments of the year by carrying regular instructional duties during the May-August period.

RECOMMENDATION (10)

The Committee recommends

that, without prejudice to the accepted norms of teaching load, Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus Evening Credit course instruction be incorporated into the regular teaching load of the academic staff, and

- (a) that honorarium payments to our own staff for such instruction terminate as such incorporation proceeds,*
- (b) that the funds normally available for the payment of such honoraria to full-time members of the academic staff be utilized for the purpose of creating new junior academic staff positions in areas that can justify such new positions on the basis of staff loads assessed on a twelve-month basis,*
- (c) that the methods used for the establishment of an annual data base for budgetary and other purposes (e.g. Fact Book) be revised to reflect the total instructional workload of academic units,*
- (d) that this policy be implemented in a step-wise manner but as rapidly as possible, with complete conversion to be effected by April 1, 1982,*

- (e) *that in the interim, commitments made to individual faculty members be honored, but that this policy be implemented as rapidly as teaching loads permit, with the understanding that only Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus Evening Credit workloads generated under the new policy can be credited to the workload statistics generated for any unit, and*
- (f) *that individual academic units may continue to employ visiting instructors (i.e. not from the regular full-time academic staff) but will be required to budget for these costs.*

RECOMMENDATION (11)

The Committee recommends

that the Faculty of Continuing Education retain responsibility for the co-ordination of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, with the objective of facilitating and enhancing the development of these to the extent that budget allocations permit and student demand warrants.

RECOMMENDATION (12)

The Committee recommends

that, in recognition of the potential importance of the further development of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, particularly with respect to the degree programmes of part-time students, the G.F.C. direct that each Faculty review its recent history of such offerings and develop policies and long-range plans. It is anticipated that, subject to student demand, Faculties will plan increases in the Spring/Summer and Off-Campus course offerings over time, these developments to be monitored by the Faculty of Continuing Education and reported annually to G.F.C.

(I) UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE: DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE

The tenure system was developed as a means of protecting academic freedom, so that faculty members could freely seek the truth and state their findings without fear of economic reprisals. Such a system is indispensable if the university is to perform its primary functions of discovery and dissemination of knowledge successfully, unfettered by direct or indirect censorship. However, the tenure system can only be maintained and justified on the basis of the level of performance of the faculty member who holds an appointment without definite term. Just as there is strict quality control in the granting of such an appointment in the first instance, there must be procedures to monitor the performance of tenured members of the faculty. The University Handbook for Faculty includes approved policies for the granting of an appointment without definite term, and for the subsequent mandatory annual evaluation and assessment. The Committee now recommends that operational procedures be established which would require the initiation of steps leading to possible dismissal for cause when sustained unsatisfactory performance is documented.

The key elements of the recommendations presented here are:

- adequate documentation of continued unsatisfactory performance through the established annual assessment process, and
- a requirement that the established procedures for dismissal for cause be initiated when clearly defined *prima facie* grounds for it exist.

Some discretionary judgement on the part of Deans is expressly allowed for, but such discretion is constrained by accountability to the President. It is essential that Heads' annual assessments be well-evidenced, as the standard circumstances may reasonably allow, and that Heads and Deans relate their recommendations to such evidence. In particular, there must be mandatory teaching evaluations (as part of the total assessment) which include appropriately constructed student surveys administered by the individual Faculties concerned. Moreover, Heads must annually review with each member of the Department or Division concerned, his/her responsibilities for the coming academic year, and shall advise the faculty member in

writing of any changes in their assignments or responsibilities.

The procedures presented speak only to the *prima facie* grounds for dismissal, and leave ample room for a determination that such grounds do not in fact exist, and for this determination to be made in advance of the initiation of any dismissal proceedings.

It must clearly be recognized that the less than satisfactory performance of contractual responsibilities is a serious matter that requires determined and fair institutional address through policies established by G.F.C., and rigorous application of these by Heads, Deans, Faculty Promotions Committees and the General Promotions Committee.

The General Promotions Committee has recently determined that an annual assessment which leads to an award of zero increment units represents "unsatisfactory career progress", that an award of 0.4 units (basic "career progress adjustment") represents "satisfactory career progress", and increment awards in excess of 0.4 units represent meritorious performance. Furthermore, G.P.C. has determined that only increment awards of zero or 0.4 units or greater will be recommended to the President.

Operational Procedures Concerning *Prima Facie* Cause for Dismissal on Grounds of Either Incompetence ^{or} Persistent Neglect, or both, for Appointees Without Definite Term

- (i) It is assumed that the dismissal procedures in the current Handbook for Faculty are operational, or that G.F.C. will have approved revised general policies and procedures concerning dismissal for cause.
- (ii) Even if such policies and procedures were perfectly conceived and formulated, they would be of little value if the relevant officers of the University did not have an adequate practical sense of how and when to implement them.
- (iii) Dismissal for cause is interpreted to be applicable where there is a judgement of incompetence or persistent neglect, of a faculty

member's duty to his/her students or discipline.

- (iv) Assuming the continuation of the existing G.P.C. policy for increments (or some variant of it), an increment-assignment of zero for reasons other than limitations imposed by the ceiling of the rank involved* is formal acknowledgement by the University of less than satisfactory performance of a faculty member's contractual responsibilities in the relevant reporting period.
- (v) In the event that the President, acting on the recommendation of the General Promotions Committee, approves an increment-assignment of zero (signifying unsatisfactory career progress) for *two* (2) consecutive reporting periods, then *prima facie* grounds exist for dismissal for cause.
- (vi) In such a case, the Dean of the Faculty concerned or the chief academic officer of an equivalent or counterpart unit *shall*:
 - (a) *either* initiate dismissal proceedings,
 - (b) *or* convey in writing to the Vice-President (Academic) his/her reasons for not initiating such proceedings, and, in so doing, undertake to defeat the presumption of the existence of grounds for dismissal.
- (vii) In the event of (vi)(a), the Dean or counterpart officer *shall* relate the substandard "career progress adjustment" pattern, together with such other evidence as he/she may possess, specifically to a judgement of incompetence or persistent neglect or both.
- (viii) In the event of (vi)(b), the Vice-President (Academic) *shall*:
 - (a) *either* initiate dismissal proceedings and relate the substandard "career progress adjustment" pattern, together with such other evidence as he/she may possess, specifically to a judgement of incompetence or persistent neglect,
 - (b) *or* shall determine that the matter does not warrant such proceedings and convey in writing to the Dean, the Head and the

*In this case, Deans shall convey to such faculty members in writing whether the award of an increment less than the basic "career progress adjustment" does or does not reflect recognition of less than satisfactory performance.

faculty member involved his/her judgement that adequate grounds for dismissal do not at the present time exist.

RECOMMENDATION (13)

The Committee recommends

that the operational procedures described to document continued unsatisfactory performance of an academic staff member, and the consequent action leading to possible dismissal for cause, be approved.

(J) RESTRUCTURING, CONSOLIDATION AND TERMINATION OF PROGRAMMES:
REALLOCATION OF FACULTY RESOURCES AND FACULTY RETRAINING

The collegial system of University governance provides the academic staff member with opportunity for substantial input into the assignment of courses which he/she is to teach in any given year. Faculty members have usually been recruited because of their expertise in certain areas, and this is the principal determinant in the allocation of workloads.

It is accepted that circumstances may arise which make it necessary for the University to restructure a programme significantly, to consolidate several programmes into one new programme, or to terminate a programme completely. The reasons for taking this action may be varied: low enrolment and no prospect for improvement, lack of resources to recruit enough qualified personnel, programme in question deemed to be no longer appropriate to the University's instructional activity, etc. Such action is not likely to be viewed with enthusiasm by the faculty members involved, or by the administrative officer responsible for the programme. In order to ensure that steps leading to possible programme termination are indeed initiated when it is in the best interests of the University to do so, a straightforward but effective process should be developed, which brings the matter to the attention of G.F.C. fairly quickly.

During the period of rapid growth of this University there were a number of divisions of previously single disciplinary operations. During

the next decade or two reunification of some of these units might be justified on the basis of workload, student demand and administrative overhead. In some cases it might enhance interdisciplinary contacts and be desirable from an academic viewpoint. Such consolidation is also envisaged below.

The following mechanism would ensure that programme consolidation or termination steps are initiated when they appear to be in the best interests of the University:

- (a) The Dean of the Faculty writes to the Vice-President (Academic) and recommends termination of the programme or unit in question, giving the grounds for this recommendation, and outlining the impact of such a step (on students, on academic staff, cost benefits, etc.), or
- (b) The Vice-President (Academic) advises the Dean of the Faculty in writing that he/she proposes to recommend termination of the programme or unit in question, giving the grounds for this recommendation, and inviting the Dean to outline the impact of such a step.
- (c) If the Vice-President (Academic) is of the opinion that the case presented in (a) is well made, or that the Dean's response in (b) provides inadequate evidence against the action contemplated, the Vice-President (Academic) strikes a small ad hoc working group and conducts such examination of the case as the circumstances warrant.
- (d) On the basis of this examination the Vice-President (Academic) determines if there is justification to proceed further:
 - (i) if no further action is justified the case is closed;
 - (ii) if the recommendation for programme consolidation or termination is justified the Vice-President (Academic) takes it and the supporting evidence to G.F.C., which body will seek the advice of the Policy and Planning Committee before taking any action.

RECOMMENDATION (14)

The Committee recommends

that the mechanism outlined in this Report for the initiation of steps to consolidate or terminate programmes (or units) be approved and implemented.

Such programme adjustments may have a severe impact on the justified need for faculty members whose expertise lies in the area of the programme undergoing reduction. A choice may therefore have to be made between termination of an appointment because of redundancy, or agreement on the part of a faculty member to accept re-allocation to other instructional activities that might require a period of intensive re-training of the faculty member. If such re-training is reasonable under the particular circumstances, it seems appropriate that the University would provide an opportunity for it without penalty to the faculty member.

RECOMMENDATION (15)

The Committee recommends

that a new category of leave be established, specifically associated with the formal retraining of academic staff members who have been required by the University to re-direct the nature of their instructional contribution in order to meet changes in the demand patterns, and (a) that this leave be available for a period of up to 12 months with full salary and benefits, (b) that a dislocation allowance be provided, if necessary, and (c) that formal initiation of the granting of such leave rest with the University.

While faculty members generally hold appointments in their first-choice disciplinary areas, many are qualified (or could be, with relatively little effort) to teach in a related area. The University should encourage in-house mobility of faculty, so that members may move as much as possible from low enrolment areas to high enrolment areas.

RECOMMENDATION (16)

The Committee recommends

that a University policy be established whereby academic units in growth areas be required to provide evidence to the Vice-President (Academic) that the availability of staff within other related areas of the University (particularly those with declining enrolment) had been explored before off-campus recruitment to fill a vacant position is authorized.

The accepted three-fold mandate of the University is teaching, research/scholarly activity and service. The Committee recognizes that while every effort is made at the Department/Faculty level to allocate teaching loads equitably to the academic staff in the relevant unit, the research and/or scholarly involvement of faculty members may vary considerably, perhaps by individual choice. The University has the responsibility to ensure that the utilization of all resources, including faculty resources, is optimized, and this suggests that the re-allocation of a faculty member's time may be required, which should be stated as an institutional policy.

RECOMMENDATION (17)

The Committee recommends

that a University policy be established whereby academic staff members who are not significantly involved in research or service activity may be called upon to assume a higher instructional load as part of their normal appointment obligations.

(K) ADMINISTRATIVE INVOLVEMENT OF ACADEMIC STAFF

Consistent with the study of honoraria paid to University of Calgary academic staff for instruction in the Spring/Summer Session, the Committee discussed the established practice of honorarium payments to academic staff holding certain administrative appointments. It was also recognized that in some cases a reduction in the teaching load is provided to encourage faculty members to take on administrative duties at the Department, Faculty or University level. The Committee was concerned about the large amount of faculty time that was spent on administrative matters, particularly since that was time which was not available for teaching, research or service activities.

In view of the complexity of the questions raised and the limited time which could be devoted to them, the Committee was unable to make any specific recommendation, except that the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the administrative processes involving faculty members be examined in greater

detail, in the context of overall workload and compensation.

RECOMMENDATION (18)

The Committee recommends

that the University review the administrative processes involving faculty members in order to determine the most effective use of the administrative ability of academic faculty, as an integral part of their overall university contribution.

APPENDIX I

UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT IN ALBERTA:
HISTORICAL REVIEW AND PROJECTIONS

Following the explosive growth in the late 1960's, enrolment growth of full-time students at the University of Calgary is expected to be about 30% through the decade of the 1970's. Total full-time enrolment in this decade has been cyclic. The highest enrolment occurred in 1975 when it stood at 10,950 full-time students. The lowest figure in the '70's was in 1972 when only 8,780 students attended full-time. It is anticipated that the 1979 full-time enrolment will be 10,300.

Across Canada the vast majority of the full-time students attending post-secondary educational institutions are between 18 and 24 years old. Thus, over the next two decades the demographic trends of this population group and their participation in university education will have a direct impact on university staff requirements. Moreover, the rapid and sustained growth in Calgary and other centres in the province which together account for 90% of the enrolment at the University of Calgary will cause the demographics for Calgary and Alberta to differ significantly from those for Canada as a whole. The 18-24 year old population in Canada will grow approximately 1.2% per year into the early 1980's and then drop 21% by the mid-1990's and increase thereafter¹. The reduction in the same population group in Alberta, and in the Calgary region in particular, will be moderated by the in-migration to Alberta. Statistics Canada estimates that the effects of this in-migration will be to delay the reduction of the size of the 18-24 year old population until the mid-1980's, to ease the drop so that it is less than half as great as in the country as a whole, and to ensure that the population group will begin to increase in size again sooner -- in the early 1990's².

Alberta will, of course, share with the rest of Canada through the

¹ "Out of School - Into the Labour Force", Statistics Canada, July, 1978.

² Z. Zsigmond, Projections Division, Statistics Canada, January 19, 1979.

next two decades an increase in age groups beyond the 18-24 year old set as the current baby boom cohort matures. The part-time participation of the group beyond 24 years can be an increasingly important contributor to university enrolments. As the size of this population set grows, increases in participation through the provision of appropriate programs and services to these older students could be an important factor in offsetting any reduction in full-time enrolment. Traditionally, Alberta is way behind the average for the country and most regions in part-time credit enrolment (See Appendix II).

Over the past several years, the full-time enrolment at Canadian universities has been settling slowly, despite the continued increase in the 18-24 year old population, because the participation rate (university full-time enrolment per 18-24 year old population) has been declining. In 1977-78, the Alberta university participation rate for 18-24 year olds stood at the national average of 11.7%, whereas 5 years earlier it was 13.3% - well above the average for Canada³. Thus, the decline in the participation rate has been nearly offset by the increase in the traditional university-going population set, and enrolments have declined only slightly during the last few years. Most long-term enrolment projections assume that participation rates will stabilize at current levels. However, the alternatives are clear. If participation rates return to early 1970 levels, the anticipated decline in enrolment due to population ageing patterns will be lessened, but if this forecast is incorrect, the declines will be more marked than those projected in demographic trends above. Thus, to the extent that the institutions through their own action can influence enrolments by matching programmes and services to the local demand and need, the higher the participation rate. Among the desirable results of this increased service to the community would be an amelioration of what might otherwise be disruptive fluctuations in enrolments.

³ Since this cohort currently numbers about 281,000 in Alberta, this drop in the participation rate represents the disappearance of about 4500 university students in the Province.

PART-TIME FALL UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT

PROVINCE	1967-68	1968-69	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78 ¹
Newfoundland	1 077	1 263	2 093	2 862	3 708	3 478	3 819	3 543	3 288	3 225	
Prince Edward Island	472	435	807	1 068	1 197	919	1 056	812	887	854	
Nova Scotia	1 917	2 553	2 692	2 876	3 347	3 562	4 364	5 387	5 775	6 108	
New Brunswick	3 815	3 763	4 379	4 735	4 668	4 833	5 134	5 167	5 442	4 453	
Quebec	44 365	37 895	45 275	74 299	61 598	53 212	51 214	54 316	60 190	64 979	
Ontario	31 029	37 796	45 669	57 124	57 197	61 044	65 940	68 786	74 088	73 234	
Manitoba	4 044	5 617	6 731	7 523	8 558	8 483	9 653	9 878	10 573	11 870	
Saskatchewan	3 285	3 324	4 124	3 493	3 543	4 509	5 525	6 537	6 926	7 450	
Alberta	4 704	5 598	6 705	7 775	8 410	8 174	7 886	8 081	8 773	8 651	
British Columbia	4 275	5 857	6 791	6 971	7 974	4 767	6 573	7 838	9 083	10 133	
TOTAL CANADA	98 983	104 101	125 266	168 726	160 200	152 981	161 164	170 345	185 025	190 957	
The University of Calgary	1 683	2 114	2 605	2 851	3 130	3 447	3 016	3 175	3 389	2 977	2 993

PART-TIME FALL UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME ENROLMENT

PROVINCE	1967-68	1968-69	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78 ¹
Newfoundland	24.1	26.4	40.6	44.9	52.4	47.6	59.5	59.2	53.2	48.6	
Prince Edward Island	34.5	28.0	51.5	60.9	67.6	58.1	74.9	60.5	60.6	57.8	
Nova Scotia	18.4	21.7	19.3	18.4	20.5	22.1	26.7	31.2	31.5	32.8	
New Brunswick	48.1	42.0	45.6	44.8	42.6	47.2	49.0	49.2	48.7	40.3	
Quebec	56.6	58.8	67.7	119.6	98.1	81.3	75.5	77.4	78.4	83.7	
Ontario	39.1	40.7	42.0	47.2	42.6	45.2	46.6	45.8	46.4	44.7	
Manitoba	30.1	37.2	40.6	44.4	49.3	49.8	56.7	55.8	56.5	64.9	
Saskatchewan	25.9	24.0	27.6	23.6	23.9	33.7	40.8	48.1	48.3	49.8	
Alberta	25.2	24.1	25.2	26.3	29.2	29.4	27.2	26.9	27.3	26.6	
British Columbia	16.0	20.0	22.6	22.8	27.7	17.3	23.1	25.6	28.2	32.0	
TOTAL CANADA	39.0	39.2	42.6	54.5	49.6	47.6	48.5	49.1	49.9	50.7	
The University of Calgary	34.1	31.2	32.7	30.9	34.1	39.3	32.5	33.1	30.9	27.4	27.7

¹Statistics Canada data for 1977-78 are not yet available.

SOURCE: Data for enrolment 1967 through 1973-74--Statistics Canada, Education in Canada, 1973, 1974, and 1975, Catalogue #81-229 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada); for enrolment 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77--Statistics Canada, Fall Enrolment in Universities, 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77, Catalogue #81-204 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada).

APPENDIX III

FACULTY FLOW ANALYSIS

Since academic salaries and associated benefit costs represent such a large fraction of the University's total expenditures, and since they represent such potential long-term commitments, the future cost implications of this component of the budget should be studied in greater detail to guide the development of future appointment and salary policies. The basis for an appropriate faculty flow analysis was developed some time ago by the Office of Institutional Research (O.I.R. Report #1071). The University of Alberta has recently completed such a study, using an "Academic Salary Prediction Model" which is essentially a faculty flow model (U. of A. Priorities Committee Report, June 23, 1978).

The benefits of such a study go much beyond projected costs, since a number of variables can be isolated and the effect of policy changes on a number of important parameters can be established, within the limitations imposed by the assumptions that are made. Typical input for this model are alternative assumptions about:

1. Salary schedule, increment, appointment and promotion policies and practices.
2. Resignation, termination, retirement rates.

Such a faculty flow analysis may be used to study the composition and characteristics of the academic staff component of the future, and to project among other things:

1. The effect of various appointment, salary and promotion policies on the total salary and benefit cost for up to (say) 20 years in the future.
2. The projected change in the average age of the faculty over time, and how it is influenced by changes in appointment policies.
3. The number of academic positions that could be filled each year, and the effect of policy changes on the number of vacancies.

Administrative action has been taken, through the Office of the

Vice-President (Academic), to initiate the refinement of a faculty flow model and to apply it to the current academic staff complement at The University of Calgary.

APPENDIX IV

SPRING/SUMMER SESSION AND OFF-CAMPUS EVENING CREDIT PROGRAMME STATISTICS

(Summer 1977, Spring 1978, 1977-78 Evening Credit

(A) COURSES OFFERED:

Number of full-course equivalents offered:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of Honoraria Paid</u>
Summer, 1977	164	148.5
Spring, 1978	181.5	156.5
Subtotal	345.5*	305 *
Evening Credit, 1977-78	15.5	15.5
Total	361	320.5

(*Difference between these two totals comprised of "reading courses" for individual students, for which no honoraria paid.)

(B) INSTRUCTORS PAID HONORARIA:

	<u>U.of C. Faculty</u>	<u>Visiting Instructors</u>
Summer, 1977	90	78
Spring, 1978	146	57
Evening Credit, 1977-78	15	--
	251 (65.0%)	135 (35.0%)

Total number of instructors 386

(The teaching load of an instructor ranged from a single half-course to one or more full-course equivalents in the combined Spring/Summer Session.)

Spring/Summer Session/Evening Credit full course equivalent lecture sections taught by U. of C. faculty: 65.0% of 320.5 = 208

(C) BUDGETS FOR SPRING/SUMMER SESSION/EVENING CREDIT:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Academic Salary Component</u>
<u>Spring/Summer</u>		
Fiscal year 1977-78	\$998,000	\$792,575
Fiscal year 1978-79	\$966,800	\$713,450
<u>Evening Credit</u>		
Fiscal year 1977-78	\$141,300	\$ 62,295

That part of academic salary component which is paid by way of honoraria, to U. of C. faculty members teaching in the above programmes in a typical year is approx. \$500,000 - \$550,000 per annum.

(D) CONVERSION OF SPRING/SUMMER SESSION/EVENING CREDIT HONORARIA TO REGULAR FULL-TIME JUNIOR APPOINTMENTS:

Base salary, asst. prof. (78/79) + 15% for benefits =
\$18,868 + \$2,830 = \$21,698 per annum.

Honoraria paid to U. of C. faculty members would permit 23-25 new regular academic appointments: (say) 24

Workload borne by U. of C. faculty members now paid honoraria in Spring/Summer Session/Evening Credit: (from Section [B]) 208 lecture sections x 3 hrs./section = 624 section hours

Total workload of 24 new appointees using average of 10.1 section hours/acad. F.T.E. (1978-79 "actual"): 24 x 10.1 = 242 section hours

Total number section hours not staffed: 624 - 242 = 382 section hours

Since a total of 10,899 section hours were offered in the 1978-79 Fall/Winter Session, this proposal would require the following adjustment (decrease) in Fall/Winter Session section hours to maintain present average faculty workload: $(382/10,899) \times 100 = 3.5\%$

This estimate assumes that the present ratio of visiting instructors to U. of C. faculty members would remain applicable.

APPENDIX C

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 80/20 RULE

Section: 3.13

POLICY

Page: 3.13.1

80/20 Guideline

Date: 77-08

(Description prepared by the Board Secretary)

The 80/20 Guideline was first expressed in the following motion passed at the January 9, 1973, meeting of the Board of Governors:

"That ... the University adopt a policy of 'selective non-replacement' of full-time, regular Board appointments terminated through attrition, and in order to implement this policy at the level of the University Budget Committee and the various academic administrative offices, including those of department heads, as the guideline the sum of tenured and probationary staff shall approach 80% of the teaching complement exclusive of GTA's; accomplishment of the guideline shall not be at the expense of GTA funding; departures from the guideline may take place only with approval of ... the Board of Governors."

At the time the 80/20 Guideline was introduced, the University was entering a period of uncertain student enrolments, having just seen its dramatic growth of the late 1960's come to a sudden halt. Because government funding was tied to student numbers, the Board was concerned about its ability to meet obligations to regular, full-time staff in the event of further enrolment declines. Its motion was intended to ensure that, over time, up to 20% of the University's academic staff would be on 'limited term' appointments (i.e. no obligation of renewal or extension beyond the end of a stated term) so that there would be some method, however crude, of responding to financial exigencies.

The Deans' Council expressed concern that the 80/20 Guideline would have a deleterious effect on recruitment unless the attractiveness of 'limited term' appointments could be enhanced. Accordingly, the Board of Governors, at its meeting of February 6, 1973, approved a recommendation that regular fringe benefits (pension, group insurance, sabbatical leave, etc.) be extended to persons employed full time on 'limited term' Board appointments of 12 months' duration or longer. This appointment category became known as the 'full-time limited term' appointment.

At its meeting of February 11, 1975, the Board of Governors approved a modification to the 80/20 Guideline, based on a recommendation from the Deans' Council and the Personnel Relations Committee, as follows:

"That when a 'full-time limited term' appointment ... expires and a subsequent appointment is to be offered to the same person in a unit which has more than 80% of its members in a tenured or tenurable class, then the subsequent appointment may be a probationary one, implying consideration for appointment 'without definite term', it being understood that candidates for appointment 'without definite term' normally require five years' previous service."

While this relaxation of the Guideline reduced budgetary flexibility somewhat, the Board was advised that the revision was necessary to enhance the University's ability to attract and retain top calibre staff.

The University of Calgary

BOARD OF GOVERNORS MANUAL

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Section: 3.13

POLICY

Page: 3.13.2

80/20 Guideline

Date: 77-08

In March of 1975, the General Faculties Council passed a motion asking the Board of Governors "to remove the 80/20 Guideline with respect to further appointments at The University of Calgary and, in the event of the removal of the 80/20 Guideline, arrive at a policy decision with respect to clarifying the appointment of those people currently on terminal appointments". Council's request was considered by the Personnel Relations Committee, resulting in a motion, passed at the January 15, 1976, meeting of the Board of Governors, that the 80/20 Guideline be preserved.

next page: 3.14.1

APPENDIX D

MEMO FROM KRUEGER

TO DEANS' COUNCIL (78-02-24)

TO Members of Deans' Council

INTER-OFFICE

FROM Dr. P.J. Krueger
Acting President

DATE: 1978-02-24

Re: Academic Personnel Policy

In view of -

- (a) the possibility of declining (or at best static) overall University enrolment,
- (b) internal enrolment shifts requiring some re-allocation of staff resources,
- (c) the uncertainty of fee increases, and
- (d) government grants that fail to keep up with inflation and increases in the continuing cost of the operation of the University,

the Deans' Council at its regular meeting on 1978-02-20 determined (by motion) that it advise the President that its members declare their intention to operate in terms of the following policy for a one-year period, effective immediately:

- (1) that in the exercise of decanal authority with respect to recommendations for academic staff appointments, Deans will submit only recommendations for "full-time limited term" appointments to fill (a) new positions provided for in the budget, (b) authorized replacements for vacancies, (c) "full-time limited term" positions where current appointments have expired and another offer is to be made to the same individual,
- (2) that term appointments normally be for periods not exceeding two years, except where longer terms (max. 5 years) are deemed absolutely necessary,
- (3) that all exceptions to (1) be brought to Deans' Council by the Vice-President (Academic), for general discussion, examination and recommendation by the Deans' Council. In this manner all such exceptions must be justified before the full decanal group.
- (4) that Deans' Council be informed on a regular basis of the changing academic staff profiles in the Faculties, and
- (5) that the range of alternatives to a more restrictive hiring policy such as previously proposed be investigated during the next year by the Subcommittee of Deans' Council, with recommendations to the Council.

It was understood that this policy would not affect the normal consideration of "initial term" appointees for appointment "without definite term", as provided for in the Handbook, and that it was likewise not applicable to sessional appointees.

In view of the strong support this approach to the monitoring and control of our long-term academic staff commitments received from the senior academic administrators who would themselves be responsible for its success, I am authorizing the implementation of this policy, effective immediately.

Please ensure that your Department Heads and faculty members who may be affected understand this policy, and the need for it.

APPENDIX E

MEMO FROM ZWIRNER TO CARNIE (78-03-07)

THE UNIVERSITY of CALGARY

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TO Dr. R. H. Carnie, GFC Secretary

INTER-OFFICE

FROM W. W. Zwirner

DATE: March 7, 1978

I would appreciate it if I will be allowed to bring the two motions which follow at the end of this letter to the GFC meeting of March 9, 1978. Certain action by Deans' Council and the General Promotion Committee will have an effect on this year's merit assessment which necessitates asking for consideration of this issue at this Thursday's GFC meeting. In this regard, I would like it to be noted:

1. The powers of GFC as outlined in Section 34(1)(o) with respect to appointments and promotions have been infringed on by recent decisions of Deans' Council and GPC.
2. The advisory value of Deans' Council to GFC is evident in the Universities Act 35(2). I feel that recent actions by Deans' Council move Deans' Council outside of their constitutional powers, in particular, in Section (1) and (5) of the attached document A, Deans' Council has decided to implement an appointment procedure which they themselves recommend. This clearly circumvents GFC. I also find that Section (2) and (3) should be considered by GFC before they can become official University policy.
3. The relationship between GPC and GFC has to be considered similar to Dean's Council and GFC's relationship if questions of promotion are considered. GPC approved a Career Progress Adjustment (CPA) of .4 which was later overruled by the Chairman. The ruling would bring professors 7 steps above the floor into the unenviable position of having an expectation of 0.0 Career Progress Adjustments. I feel that this constitutes promotion procedures, which should be considered by GFC.

Therefore, it is MOVED

- 1) That the implementation of this policy decision re appointments contained in the Acting President's letter of February 24, 1978 be held in abeyance until GFC has considered and made recommendations concerning academic appointment policies.

Comment: This motion, if approved, would affect all faculty who are now on limited term appointments and have been led to believe that they could be considered for initial term appointment.

- 2) That the CPA for all faculty be considered to be .4 increments unless GFC recommends a different CPA structure.

APPENDIX F

MEMO FROM KRUEGER
TO KRUEGER COMMITTEE (78-10-31)

THE UNIVERSITY of CALGARY

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TO MEMBERS OF KRUEGER COMMITTEE ON APPOINTMENTS

INTER-OFFICE

FROM Dr. P.J. Krueger
Vice-President (Academic)

DATE: 1978-10-31

This refers to the meeting on Wednesday, November 1st at 9:00 a.m. in Arts 201A (Controller's Office).

Some notes on the first meeting are attached. This was an attempt to identify a broad spectrum of concerns that might be highly relevant to faculty "renewal" in the University in the next decade or two. Some of these points may not strictly apply to "University Appointment Policies" which we are to review.

Please bring your calendars so that we may set our schedule of meeting dates/times.

Notes on meeting held 1978-05-17

No priority intended by order of items.

1. Early Retirement:

- "The Universities Academic Pension Plan" (new plan eff. July 1, 1978) makes retirement at 55 more attractive, i.e. no actuarial reduction.
- new Plan more generous with respect to recognition of "pensionable service"; payment of contributions and interest may make more faculty members eligible (and interested) in retirement.
- 1978: some 102 of our faculty members are in age bracket 55-64.

2. Part-time continuing appointments, i.e. with tenure:

- F/T for less than 12 months/year (of interest to some professional Faculties: 8 mos. with university; 4 mos. with non-University agency, industry, etc.)
- P/T for 12 months/year.
- advantages/disadvantages
- mechanism for moving to such appointments:
 - only following regular F/T service?
 - mutual consent (individual/university)?

3. Shared appointments:

- a variation of (2).

4. Dismissal for cause:

- "cause": incompetence in teaching; total lack of scholarship at a level where "job description" clearly requires national/international level of performance?
- "dismissal for cause" procedure exists; not been tried.
- tie into accumulated record of zero C.P.A. awards ("career progress adjustments" recommended by F.P.C./G.P.C.)?
- morale problems.
- legal problems.
- improve our public image by "cleaning up" our act.
- a workable procedure (not years long) in lieu of the 80/20 guideline?

5. Full-time Limited Term Appointments

6. State of fiscal exigency:

- when?
- who decides it exists?
- who goes? procedure?

7. Procedures for "programme termination":

- presumably requires the same type of University process and review which recommends implementation of programmes in first instance.

8. Faculty Retraining:
 - so they can be more flexible re workloads.
9. Increased instructional activity in community:
 - downtown campus.
 - emphasize P/T students in timetabling and location of classes.
 - new course-based graduate degrees.
10. Spring/Summer teaching as part of "normal load":
 - in principle, should be possible without increased workload if enrolment falls.
 - no honoraria for our faculty; depts./Faculties budget for guest instructors.
 - spring/summer course enrollees could be included in data used by University Budget Committee, to encourage development of these programmes.
11. More structured programmes:
 - more efficient.
 - could be accomplished in many cases by fine tuning of present programmes.
 - drastic reduction in low enrolment courses.
12. Secondment of faculty:
 - to research institutes on/off campus.
 - to prov./fed. govt. agencies and departments.
 - "on loan" to other areas of education where need increases for a period (tech. inst., schools, colleges).
13. Re-allocation of present staff resources:
 - force to some extent before new hiring permitted, e.g. shift from cognate disciplines.
14. Postdoctoral teaching fellowships:
 - combine university funds/research funds.
 - presence of PDF's helps address ageing problem.
15. Faculty exchange with other universities:
 - short term, i.e. year, or a term.
 - brings in new ideas and stimulates exchange of ideas under static hiring conditions.
16. Community rapport:
 - better rapport with community to foster higher rate of budget increase?
 - work on government through the people?

APPENDIX G

MEMO FROM SHEEHAN TO KRUEGER (77-10-31)

TO Dr. P. J. Krueger
Vice-President (Academic)

FROM Bernard S. Sheehan
Office of Institutional Research

INTER-OFFICE

DATE: 1977-10-17
Project 1316

Dear Peter:

Re: Faculty Age Distributions

We have been trying to get a better handle on the sort of information that the Policy and Planning Committee needs in the consideration of aging and related questions. We spoke briefly with Dave Schonfield but have not yet talked with Jim Cragg or Fred Terentiuk. However, since I have to put this aside for the rest of the week, I thought I would give you this progress report.

We have been looking at the following areas, and asking these sorts of questions:

Faculty aging in the steady state	Is the context for this question clear? What are the problems we hope to solve (understand) with information on aging?
Aging	What information is readily available about the characteristics of older faculty members and departments with a faculty age distribution skewed to the older end?
Alternatives	If one wanted to change the effective age distribution of faculty, what means are available?
Data for Planning and Analysis	What basic University of Calgary data seems relevant to planning and management questions on aging? How might these data be presented to the Committee?
Analysis	How would one approach the problem of determining the practical decision-making flexibility available to the University? What sorts of information could one reasonably expect from a practical analysis?

Bibliography

Do we need to check with more people on
how they are coping?

Faculty Aging in the Steady State Context

By the "steady state" we generally mean that the total student enrolment of The University will remain more or less constant and that there will (likely) be:

1. significant shifts in student preferences
2. no growth in real terms in the financial resources available to universities
3. hampering of internal university administration by a lack of flexibility (manageable alternatives); this has not been characteristic of Canadian higher education for twenty years or more

It seems to me that we are not discussing a problem of aging faculty so much as a problem of *unbalanced* age profile of faculty. Hence, we are concerned that the unbalanced age structure will lead to various instabilities, discontinuities and fluctuations in a wide range of teaching and research activities over the next two decades. Also, not all of the peculiar problems of aging are unique to faculty members and, hence, those problems which arise may well be shared with other segments of [an aging] society. This will be particularly true in industries and government agencies that are highly-trained-manpower intensive.

The question of aging and its influence on the distribution of faculty by age can, it seems to me, be viewed from two perspectives in this steady state context. For convenience, these are labelled quantitative, and qualitative.

Quantitative

1. reallocation of faculty resources to meet new instructional demands
2. sensible appointment, promotion, and retirement policies to increase management flexibility
3. analysis to provide information on the demand for new young faculty members
4. studies leading to decisions to ensure that we avoid the boom and bust hiring cycle in the future

1. optimum age distribution of faculty members to ensure best execution of teaching, research and service programs
2. continuous rejuvenation of research capacity on campus

The following notes address various facets of the question. We begin with some general considerations of aging, and then move on to a rough listing of the alternative plans that have been variously suggested in the literature. An illustration of the data on The University of Calgary faculty needed for analysis is given. These data may be supplemented by national and international comparative information. There is a brief treatment of analytical methods to determine the flexibility for decision at The University of Calgary and finally, a bibliography of items that impinge on university faculty age distribution considerations.

The following is a list of questions concerning perceptions of an aging faculty and associated institutional consequences and questions.

1. What percentage of the faculty ought to be young to ensure continuous rejuvenation?
2. Will professors without tenure tend to avoid risk and hence not be aggressive researchers?
3. Do older faculty find it easier to influence students?
4. Is it true that research support in terms of grants increases with age among scientists, and that researchers in the humanities and social sciences tend to be professionally more active in later years? If so, what are the University of Calgary implications?

It is hard to get objective statements about the best university professor age profile. It is said that in many fields age is an advantage over youth. It is also hard to find agreement that older means less productivity, creativity, especially when one keeps in mind the full range of responsibilities of the university professor. There is little or no evidence that professors' overall effectiveness declines between the ages of 40 and 65.

- Those involving policy considerations by institutions -

1. Early retirement

- (a) Voluntary--indexed pensions will likely be required to make early retirement financially attractive
- (b) Mandatory retirement at certain ages

In this context, in both the United States and Canada, recent legislation and press reflect a new attitude against any discrimination on the basis of age. One could speculate that this (coupled with the voting power of an increasing older segment of the population) could lead to the abolishment of any mandatory retirement age. Other concerns about early retirement schemes include the following:

- (i) they only affect upper age groups which are not necessarily the least productive
- (ii) if voluntary, they may be more appealing to the better, older professors who have more alternatives
- (iii) the literature on applications is not optimistic regarding their effectiveness especially in the long run

2. Faculty development including support to change:

- (a) scholarly field of concentration in mid or late career
 - (i) internal institutional shifts
 - (ii) more para-academic work done by senior professors
- (b) professional field or research/teaching emphasis
- (c) employer

3. Altering university benefit package to make part-time employment more attractive. This includes part-time in teaching department and part-time in university institute or other agency associated with university. If one feels that this is a likely solution, then universities which do not want to become "second-class" in the future should rush plans for appropriate institutes or risk becoming only teaching institutions.

4. Organized exchanges among universities and especially between universities on the one hand and government/industry on the other 297

5. Increased contract research. In the 'steady state' it seems that this is an area that might very well grow. Also, in Alberta for the next decade or more the demand for this service from universities seems inevitable.

- Those requiring policy decisions by government or outside agencies -

1. Provide more help to developing nations:

(a) foreign aid program to bring students to Canada

(b) establish significant links with developing universities in other countries which would be such as to encourage professors to work away from Canada for reasonable periods

(c) turn-key packages of institutions in other countries

2. A more progressive tax structure for older professors

APPENDIX H

LIST OF RESPONSES RECEIVED
ON THE KRUEGER REPORT

LIST OF RESPONSES RECEIVED ON GFC REPORT ON APPOINTMENT POLICIESA. FacultiesPage

Faculty of Humanities	March 13, 1979	1-2
Faculty of Graduate Studies	March 16, 1979	3
Faculty of Environmental Design	March 19, 1979	4-6
Faculty of Nursing	March 23, 1979	7-8
Faculty of Education	March 27, 1979	9-11
Faculty of Social Welfare	March 27, 1979	12
Faculty of Continuing Education	March 27, 1979	13-19
Faculty of Fine Arts	March 29, 1979	20-43
Faculty of Management	March 29, 1979	44-49
Faculty of Medicine	March 29, 1979	50-51
Faculty of Social Sciences	March 30, 1979	52-54
Faculty of Physical Education	March 30, 1979	55-58

B. Departments

Department of Sociology	March 8, 1979	59
Department of English	March 9, 1979	60-63
Department of Physics	March 20, 1979	64-65
Department of Geography	March 23, 1979	66
Kananaskis Centre	March 28, 1979	67-68
Department of Romance Studies	March 30, 1979	69-74

C. Committees and Other Organizations

Budget Committee	March 12, 1979	75-76
Deans' Council	March 13, 1979	77
TUCFA Executive	undated	78-83
TUCFA	March 30, 1979	84-85
APD Committee	March 30, 1979	86-88

D. Individuals

R. D. Heyman	February 27, 1979	89-91
B. Baldwin	March 5, 1979	92-93
C. Anger	March 6, 1979	94
D. H. Norrie	March 7, 1979	95-96
L. E. Hajdo	March 9, 1979	97
J. E. Klovan	March 13, 1979	98-100
R. Hornby	March 16, 1979	101-103
A. W. Harrison	March 19, 1979	104
P. J. Krueger (supplementary information)	March 19, 1979	105-108
L. Richards	March 27, 1979	109-110
M. A. Cromie	March 30, 1979	111-112
T. A. Oliver	April 2, 1979	113-114

APPENDIX I

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO THE KRUEGER REPORT

RESPONDENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

	TUCFA	HUMANITIES	GRADUATE STUDIES	ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN	NURSING
1	-don't agree fiscal problem is real E			- would turn UofC into teaching factory - viewed with #s 10, 11, 12. 0	Disagree 0
2	-should be decision of Budget Committee E-A	- position control to President E		- control President - must be guidelines 0	Disagree 0
3	E			- doubtful value 0	
4	E			E	Support if appoint- ment of limited term not automatic E-A
5	- with amendment E-A			E	E
6	E				
7	E				
8	E				
9	- qualified E-A			Agree E	
10	Disagree 0		Possible negative impact on GS supervision E-A	Agree in principle Problems of imple- mentation See #1 E-A	More study needed R
11	Disagree 0			See #1 E	- faculty must make decisions 0
12	Disagree 0			Okay in principle but would spread faculty too thin See #1 E-A	- support need for planning - limited support for #12 E-A
13	Refer to AP&D Comm. - reject student evaluations as mandatory R				
14	Premature, threatens faculty Refer to AP&D R			Disagree - use P & P Comm. 0	
15	- costs paid by university E-A			Interesting but won't work 0	E
16	E				
17	- object strongly - violates faculty rights - proposed alternate 0			Disagree - change reward system - lengthen probation period 0	
18	- should expand to look at all phases of Admin. E			Agree - feel top heavy administration E	

RESPONDENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS	EDUCATION	SOCIAL WELFARE	CONTINUING EDUCATION	FINE ARTS	MANAGEMENT
	Support principle - might work against response to community E-A		- include non-credit and part-time credit E-A	Disagree - report assumes in- stitution is ade- quately staffed O	
	Same as #1 - concern with mechanism for imple- menting EA	E		Disagree - central authorities can't decide as well as Fac. Depts. O	- want an advisory committee for implementation E-A
	E			E	
	- not automatic E-A	E		Disagree - should seek the "best" O	- qualified - not automatic - 80/20 rule cited E-A
	E	E		E	E
	E			E	
	E			E	
	E		- include government and private organ- izations E-A	E	
	E			E	
	Qualified support - honorarium for off campus-define teach- ing loads-visiting profs. E-A	Disagree - need block of time for research - prefer trimester O	Disagree - negative effect on range of offerings - costly O	Disagree - increase work load - costly O	E
	E		Disagree O	Disagree O	Disagree - faculties should control O
	E		Disagree O	Disagree - some courses not available for spring/ summer O	Agree - but OIR rather than FCE E-A
	Refer to AP&D R			E	
	E			Qualified support - object to enroll- ment as criterion E-A	Qualified support - would involve Faculty Council & CARC of GFC E-A
	E			E	
	E			Disagree - same as #4 O	
	Disagree - interpretation - merit system O			Disagree - should use Instructor category - faculty member must agree O	
	E	Agree to review E		E	E

RESPONDENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

	MEDICINE	SOCIAL SCIENCES	PHYSICAL EDUCATION	ENGLISH	PHYSICS
1	-concern enrollment not only indicator of Fac. workload - overlooks research O	- undue emphasis on enrollment and workload indicators O	E	- over-emphasis on enrollment O	
2	- concerned that process might be slowed down O	-former unit get first choice for lost pos. -use advisory comm. to implement E-A	- concern with implementation - decision should be Budget committee's E-A	-more study needed -too much power to VP(A) R	
3	E	E	E	- may be better way to deal with limited term - cite UofA policy E	
4	E	Clarification needed E-A	- concern that limited term appointees not suited to initial term vacancies E-A	- same as #3 E	- not automatic E-A
5	E	Clarification needed E-A	Agree in principle but decision should be Dean's E-A	- same as #3 E	
6	E	E	E	E	
7	E	E	E	E	
8	E	E	E	E	
9	- want their part-time instructors included in new category E	E	E	E	
10	No comment	-question certain operational aspects -agreement withheld pending answers R	-need definition of "normal" workload -negative effect on some programs O	-\$ saving may not be realized-timetabling -reduction of low enroll. sec. (who decides) O	-agree with incorporation -may cost more E-A
11	No comment	Disagree O	Disagree O	Disagree O	Disagree O
12	No comment	-further study needed -faculties should report directly to GFC R	- concern about implementation E-A	Concern E-A	Not likely to increase enrollment O
13	E	- further study needed R	- okay in principle E	Support E	
14	E	- fear that actual resource allocation out of step with Development plan O	E	E	
15	E	E	E	E	
16	E	E	E	E	
17	E	- need specific criteria in Handbook E-A	- needs further study R	Concern - should be faculty member's choice E-A	- Physics already using this - still some unanswered questions E-A
18	E	(no consulting firm wanted) E	E	E	- no comment since rationale not given

RESPONDENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

	GEOGRAPHY	KANANASKIS CENTRE	ROMANCE STUDIES	BUDGET COMMITTEE	A, P&D COMMITTEE
1			Concerned with the emphasis on enrollment O	E	
2			Disagree - want to preserve dept. autonomy O	E	
3			E	E	
4	- define "first consideration" E-A	E	E	E	
5		E		E	E
6		E	E	E	
7		E		E	E
8		E	E	E	
9		E			E
10	Okay if participation voluntary - size of F/W sections do not increase E-A	Favor trimester (interpret policy proposed as trimester) E-A	Disagree O	Reservations (Disagree) O	
11	Disagree O	E	Disagree O		
12	Disagree O	E	Disagree O	E	
13			Disagree O	Reservations (Disagree) O	Concerned that policy might result in fewer "O" increments O
14					
15				E	
16				E	
17	- support intent - concern about implementation E-A		- should be faculty member's choice E-A	Some reservation E-A	- must be by mutual consent E-A
18	- no agreement		Okay, with amendment E-A	E	

RESPONDENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

	CLASSICS	GEOLOGY	DEAN - SOCIAL WELFARE	HEAD - ROMANCE STUDIES	SCIENCE
1		E	E	Concern that criteria be wider than enrollment E-A	- broaden criteria E-A
2		E	E	Decision should not be left to one individual E-A	- use committee - include support staff E-A
3		E	E		E
4	E	E	E		E
5		E	E		E
6		E	E		E
7		E	E		E
8		E	E		- questions on implementation E-A
9		E	E		E
10	Concerned about "normal load" O	Disagree O	Would favor trimester E-A	O	
11	O	Disagree O	E	O	
12	Disagree O	Disagree O	E	O	
13		E	E		
14			E		
15		Okay, qualified E-A	E		
16			E		
17	Okay in principle Problem in implementation E-A	Limited agreement -poor researchers may be poor teachers E-A	E		
18		E	E		

APPENDIX J

DISPOSITION OF THE

KRUEGER COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

DISPOSITION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT OF GENERAL FACULTIES COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
APPOINTMENT POLICIES
(KRUEGER REPORT)

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>DISPOSITION (date, item)</u>
1(a)*	<p><u>"Approved and recommended to the Board as amended" (1979-04-12; GFC 179.3.1)</u></p> <p>(a) except as indicated by Recommendation (10) or provided for through specific development grants, any further growth in the combined <u>total</u> number of regular full-time permanent and full-time limited term appointments be justified by an increase in the University's total student enrolment, or other academic requirements. (Krueger: Barton with Johnston: MacDonald)</p>
1(b)*	<p><u>"Approved and recommended to the Board" (1979-04-12; GFC 179.3.1)</u></p> <p>(b) that a workload increase in any unit that is not accompanied by an increase in the University's total student enrolment, or any other academic requirement which justifies an additional appointment, be dealt with by the internal redistribution of vacancies. (Krueger: Barton)</p>
2(a)*	<p><u>Approved as Amended (1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.1)</u></p> <p>(a) all funds released from vacancies which occur among the regular full-time permanent, full-time limited term, and continuing part-time appointments, be centralized and placed under the direct administrative control of the Office of the President. (Krueger: Zwirner with Weyant: Sucha and Heintz: Sucha)</p>
2(b)*	<p><u>Approved as Amended (1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.1)</u></p> <p>(b) the Vice-President (Academic) shall initiate recommendations for the re-allocation of such funds in E-1 budgets (academic salaries) to a small Position Allocation Committee, advisory to the President, such committee shall have at least half of its membership drawn from the University Budget Committee. (Krueger: Zwirner with Glockner: Chapman)</p>
3	<p><u>"Endorsed" (1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.1)</u></p> <p>that the Vice-President (Academic) be required to report to GFC Annually in December on the total academic staff profile of the University, including data on changes in the number of Board appointees in various categories and ranks, in order to maintain an on-going scrutiny of the composition of the faculty and the potential ability of the University to respond to change. (Krueger: Oliver)</p>
4	<p><u>"Approved" (1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.1)</u></p> <p>that, whenever new academic positions are authorized in the budget or the re-filling of vacancies is authorized, and an initial term appointment is to be made and is permitted under the Board policy, that any limited term appointees eligible for such a position be given first consideration. (Krueger: Glockner)</p>
5	<p><u>"Approved" (1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.1)</u></p> <p>that when full-time limited term appointments are recommended, and the unit concerned has the capacity to offer an initial term appointment, the head of the unit making the recommendation must provide an explanation to the Dean and/or the Vice-President (Academic) as to why an initial term appointment was not recommended. (Krueger: Zwirner)</p>
6	<p><u>"Approved" (1979-10-25; GFC 187.5.2)</u></p> <p>that the University continue to provide more detailed Pension Plan information to faculty members, stressing in particular the arrangements with respect to the establishment of certain types of service elsewhere as "pensionable service" under the Plan, and outlining the early retirement option. (Krueger: Ramsay)</p>

DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT OF GENERAL FACULTIES COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
APPOINTMENT POLICIES (Continued)
(KRUEGER REPORT)

RECOMMENDATIONDISPOSITION (date, item)

7

"Approved" (1979-10-25; GFC 187.5.2)

that the Vice-President (Academic) initiate appropriate steps to develop criteria and guidelines for the appointment of retired faculty members to the rank of Professor Emeritus, as well as appropriate benefits accruing to that rank, for approval by G.F.C. and the Board of Governors.

(Krueger: Ramsay)

8

"Approved" (1979-10-25; GFC 187.5.2)

that where it can be accomplished without serious detriment to established programmes, leaves of absence and secondments (where appropriate) of faculty members to other institutions be actively encouraged by the University.

(Krueger: Seto)

9 **

"Approved" (1979-10-25; GFC 187.5.2)

that the G.F.C. approve in principle the establishment of a new class of continuing part-time academic appointees, and that the G.F.C. recommend that the Board of Governors also approve this proposal in principle, with the understanding that detailed terms of reference for this appointment class will be prepared by the Associate Vice-President (Academic Administration), for consideration in the normal manner appropriate to Faculty Handbook amendments.

(Krueger: Lane)

10-12

Referred to Chapman Committee on Spring and Summer Sessions
(1979-04-26; GFC 180.6.2)

- (10) that, without prejudice to the accepted norms of teaching load, Spring/Summer Sessions and Off-Campus Evening Credit course instruction be incorporated into the regular teaching load of the academic staff, and
- (a) that honorarium payments to our own staff for such instruction terminate as such incorporation proceeds,
 - (b) that the funds normally available for the payment of such honoraria to full-time members of the academic staff be utilized for the purpose of creating new junior academic staff positions in areas that can justify such new positions on the basis of staff loads assessed on a twelve-month basis,
 - (c) that the methods used for the establishment of an annual data base for budgetary and other purposes (e.g. Fact Book) be revised to reflect the total instructional workload of academic units,
 - (d) that this policy be implemented in a step-wise manner but as rapidly as possible, with complete conversion to be effected by April 1, 1982,
 - (e) that in the interim, commitments made to individual faculty members be honored, but that this policy be implemented as rapidly as teaching loads permit, with the understanding that only Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus Evening Credit workloads generated under the new policy can be credited to the workload statistics generated for any unit, and
 - (f) that individual academic units may continue to employ visiting instructors (i.e. not from the regular full-time academic staff) but will be required to budget for these costs.
- (11) that the Faculty of Continuing Education retain responsibility for the co-ordination of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, with the objective of facilitating and enhancing the development of these to the extent that budget allocations permit and student demand warrants.
- (12) that, in recognition of the potential importance of the further development of Spring/Summer Session and Off-Campus course offerings, particularly with respect to the degree programmes of part-time students, the G.F.C. direct that each Faculty review its recent history of such offerings and develop policies and long-range plans. It is anticipated that, subject to student demand, Faculties will plan increases in the Spring/Summer and Off-Campus course offerings over time, these developments to be monitored by the Faculty of Continuing Education and reported annually to G.F.C.

DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT OF GENERAL FACULTIES COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
APPOINTMENT POLICIES (Continued)
(KRUEGER REPORT)

RECOMMENDATIONDISPOSITION (date, item)

10-12

Referred to Chapman . . . (Continued)

Chapman Report Recommendations were variously:

1. Approved (1979-06-28; GFC 184.4.3)

That a Standing Advisory Committee on Special Sessions be established by the G.F.C. with Terms of Reference and membership as submitted.

(Chapman: Humphreys)

2. "Approved as submitted" (1979-06-28; GFC 184.4.3)

(a) That Departments, Faculties and University College be asked to produce a 3-year rolling programme of course offerings for evening, Spring, Summer and off-campus.

(b) That the Advisory Committee initially review these programmes at an early date; review these programmes on an annual basis; and consult with Departments, Faculties and University College to produce programmes which will attempt to meet the needs of part- and full-time students taking courses in special sessions.

(c) That the Committee shall continue to investigate the needs and potential clientele for offerings in special sessions and for part-time degree programmes available to students in special sessions.

(Chapman: Ramsay)

3. "Referred to the new Standing Committee" (1979-06-28; GFC 184.4.3)

(Heintz: Glockner)

4. "Approved as Amended" (1979-06-28; GFC 184.4.3)

That G.F.C. direct the Office of Institutional Research to scrutinize enrollment statistics with a view to identifying those factors which appear to inhibit the offering of Spring and Summer courses by some departments, and to report as soon as possible.

(Hyne: Williams)

The new Standing Committee on Special Sessions subsequently produced seven recommendations which were variously:

1. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

the Vice-President (Academic) ensure that the University Budget Committee is provided with additional appropriate workload information indicative of the contributions of academic units to Spring and Summer Session course offerings.

(Terentiuk: Chapman)

2. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

the responsibility for determining what constitutes a 'normal' teaching load in the Fall/Winter Sessions for a faculty member continue to rest with the respective Dean and/or Department Head.

For "Department" and "Department Head", please read "Faculty" or "University College" and "Dean" or "Provost" throughout as appropriate for those units without departments and department heads.

(McCullough: Enns)

3. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

'overload' courses be those courses taught during Spring and Summer Sessions and those taught off-campus which exceed the number of courses that constitute 'normal' load as indicated in Recommendation 2.

(Krueger: Chapman)

4. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

funds continue to be made available within the Faculty of Continuing Education budget for the payment of 'overload' instruction.

(Pitsel: Glockner)

DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT OF GENERAL FACULTIES COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
APPOINTMENT POLICIES (Continued)
(KRUEGER REPORT)

RECOMMENDATIONDISPOSITION (date, item)

10-12

Referred to Chapman . . . (Continued)

The new Standing Committee on Special Sessions . . . (continued)

5. Approved as Amended (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

at the Faculty member's option, payments for 'overload' instruction be made

(a) as an honorarium directly to the regular or visiting faculty member as is current practice, or

(b) as a sum equivalent to the honorarium placed in to a departmentally administered trust available to the faculty member for research purposes.

(c) or any reasonable combination of the above.

(Chellas: Coward with Weyant: Betz)

6. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

full-time faculty members be allowed the option of teaching part of their 'normal' load during Spring/Summer Sessions or in the off-campus programme provided that their department heads do not require their teaching capacity for the Fall and Winter Sessions and provided that such teaching is without prejudice to graduate supervision, administrative duties, etc., for which due provision must be made.

(Chapman: Williams)

7. Approved (1980-01-24; GFC 192.4.1)

in the case where full-time faculty, with Department Head approval, opt to teach Spring, Summer, and off-campus courses in lieu of necessary Fall/Winter courses, the Faculty of Continuing Education pay to the relevant department the amount of the current honorarium to help defray the costs of employing sessionals for such Fall/Winter courses.

(Krueger: Williams)

13

"Referred to APD Committee" (1979-05-10; GFC 181.6)

(McCullough: Pitse)

that the operational procedures described to document continued unsatisfactory performance of an academic staff member, and the consequent action leading to possible dismissal for cause, be approved.

14

"Approved and Implemented" as Amended (1979-10-11; GFC 186.5.2)

That the mechanism outlined in this Report for the initiation steps to consolidate or terminate programmes (or units) be approved and implemented.

Note: Amendments to guidelines were made as follows:

1. Vice president required to advise Dean of the Faculty and Head of the Department concerned.

(Zekulin)

2. Vice president to invite the Striking Committee to appoint a small ad hoc working group which should conduct such examinations of the case as the circumstances warrant. The ad hoc working group, in conducting its examination, should be careful to consult with the CARC and with the Curriculum Committee of the Faculty concerned.

(Craigie: Zekulin)

15

"Approved as Amended" (1979-10-11; GFC 186.5.2)

that a new category of leave be established, specifically associated with the formal retraining of academic staff members who have been required by the University to re-direct the nature of their instructional contribution in order to meet changes in the demand patterns, and (a) that this leave be available for a period of up to 12 months with full salary and benefits, (b) that a dislocation allowance be provided, if necessary, and (c) that formal initiation of the granting of such leave rest with the University, (d) that the direct costs of such training, e.g., fees, be assumed by the University.

(Krueger: Rasporich with Beck: Zwirner)

DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT OF GENERAL FACULTIES COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
APPOINTMENT POLICIES (Continued)
(KRUEGER REPORT)

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>DISPOSITION (date, item)</u>
16	<p><u>"Approved" (1979-10-11; GFC 186.5.2)</u></p> <p>that a University policy be established whereby academic units in growth areas be required to provide evidence to the Vice-President (Academic) that the availability of staff within other related areas of the University (particularly those with declining enrolment) had been explored before off-campus recruitment to fill a vacant position is authorized.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Krueger: Archer)</p>
17	<p><u>"Defeated" (1979-10-11; GFC 186.5.2)</u></p> <p>that a University policy be established whereby academic staff members who are not significantly involved in research or service activity may be called upon to assume a higher instructional load as part of their normal appointment obligations.</p>
18	<p><u>"Referred to the President as part of a more general review of the cost and efficiency of administration at The University of Calgary (1979-10-11; GFC 186.5.2)"</u></p> <p>that the University review the administrative processes involving faculty members in order to determine the most effective use of the administrative ability of academic faculty as an integral part of their overall university contribution.</p>

NOTES:

- * Recommendations 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b) were received by the Board of Governors at its meeting of 1979-05-17 at which the following motion was passed:

"that, as recommended by the Executive Committee, the Board of Governors:

- (1) approve the guidelines for position control in the E-1 budget (attached to these minutes as Appendix 'A') to be effective immediately; and
- (2) request the President to explore the possibility of taking similar action respecting the E-2 budget, and to make recommendations to the Board as soon as possible."

- ** Recommendation 9 was reviewed by the Board of Governors at its meeting of 1979-11-15 and the following motion passed:

"It was MOVED by Dr. N. E. Wagner and SECONDED by Dr. W. W. Zwirner that the Board of Governors approve in principle the establishment of a new class of continuing part-time academic appointments, as described in Section (G) of the 'Report of the General Faculties Council ad hoc Committee on Appointment Policies', with the understanding that detailed terms of reference for this appointment class be prepared by the Associate Vice-President (Academic Administration), for consideration in the normal manner appropriate to faculty handbook amendments."

Guidelines for Position Control in the E-1 Budget


- (1) The total number of regular full-time permanent, full-time limited term, and continuing part-time positions (hereinafter called "continuing positions") in the E-1 Budget (Academic Salaries) will be limited to a maximum established by the Board of Governors.
- (2) Initially, the maximum number of continuing positions will be as detailed in the 1979/80 Operating Budget.
- (3) Further growth in the maximum number of continuing positions will be subject to the approval of the Board of Governors, based on such factors as specific program development grants, an increase in total student enrolment, or other academic requirements.
- (4) Fluctuations in the requirements for continuing positions in individual units, based on changes in workload or other factors, will be dealt with by the internal redistribution of vacancies in continuing positions arising through natural attrition (retirement, resignation, termination, permanent disability, death).
- (5) All funds released by vacancies in continuing positions arising during the fiscal year will be credited to one central account for which the President will have signing authority.
- (6) The disposition of continuing positions falling vacant during the fiscal year, and of the funds so released, shall be recommended by the Vice-President (Academic) to a Position Allocation Committee advisory to the President and comprising six members selected by the President, at least three of whom shall be members of the GFC Budget Committee.
- (7) In making its recommendations, the Position Allocation Committee will specify the rank deemed appropriate for each position. It is expected that appointments will be made at a junior rank unless the President is satisfied that the academic requirements of the particular unit justify a more senior appointment.
- (8) The reallocation of the funds described in (5) above for purposes other than new appointments to continuing positions will be for the remainder of the fiscal year only, with such funds not forming a part of the continuing full-year cost calculation. In making such allocations, particular attention will be given to priorities and concerns which have been identified by the University Budget Committee.
- (9) Reports of positions and funds reallocated by the President will be made to CFC and the Board in September and January, and to the University Budget Committee in conjunction with its preparation of a budget for the following fiscal year.

APPENDIX K


THE EVOLUTION OF A POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM:

A COMPOSITE MODEL

THE EVOLUTION OF A POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM



OF A POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM



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